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This research examines the State of Qatar in the seminal time period between 1995 
and 2010.  This period began with the accession to power of Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, who ruled Qatar until his abdication in 2013. It ended with Qatar’s 
successful bid to hold the Football World Cup in 2022.  This thesis is divided into 
seven chapters, as well as an introduction and conclusion. Taken together they 
examine the small state diplomacy, state-building and sustainability efforts of the 
government of Qatar over the course of the period under analysis.  Chapter one 
provides an examination and analysis of Qatar’s achievements in terms of what it says 
about diplomacy, state-building and sustainability over the fifteen-year period 
addressed in this thesis. It then goes back to look at Qatar in the immediate period 
prior to 1995 when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power.  Chapter 
three examines Qatar’s socio-economic developments between 1995 and the 
September 2011 (9/11) attacks on the United States. Chapter four looks at the post-
1995 Qatari efforts to engage in diplomacy in Palestine and Lebanon. The analysis of 
these two important examples of Qatari involvement in the contemporary diplomacy 
of the region is combined with an examination of the US-Qatari strategic relationship.   
Chapter five examines the ongoing domestic socio-economic and political challenges 
and reforms that preoccupied Qatari rulers in the period between 1995 and 2010.  
Chapter six looks in detail at the role of Al-Jazeera in developing Qatar’s regional and 
global standing and examines the extent that the news channel has been a key 
instrument of Qatari foreign policy. Chapter seven, the final chapter, examines the 
contemporary challenges that Qatar faces in consolidating and sustaining its 
achievements in the period between 1995 and 2010. 
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Size, Capabilities and Ambition: Qatar and the Small State Paradigm 
 
The objective of this thesis is twofold. The first is to examine the evolution of the 
State of Qatar in the period between 2005 and 2010 both as a domestic and 
international actor. The second is to use Qatar as a vehicle for examining a number of 
influential arguments in the existing literature on small states.  In these terms, one 
central research question addressed throughout the course of this thesis is whether the 
Qatari experience between 1995 and 2010 provides evidence to support or challenge 
the consensus view in the literature that small states have to be vulnerable and weak 
entities in the international system? 
It is the contention of this thesis that under particular circumstances small 
states can challenge the conventional wisdom and, in doing so, can change how they 
act, as well as the perception of what a small state is and how it should act. 
The starting point of this dissertation is 1995 when Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani came to power. Though he ruled until his abdication in 2013, the end point of 
this dissertation is 2010, the year of Qatar’s success in its  bid to host the Football 
World Cup in 2022.   
As Coates Ulrichsen has noted, the ‘award of the 2022 FIFA soccer World 
Cup to Qatar on 2 December 2010 capped the remarkable rise of the GCC states to 
international prominence’. This success ‘reflected’, he continued’ ‘in microcosm its 
nuanced intersection of country-branding and the creation of coalitions of regional 
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and international support [all] encapsulated in its catchy bid slogan, “Expect 
Amazing”’.1 
The branding referred to here, which will be discussed briefly below, has 
always been an important tool for small states looking to increase their profile. In 
these terms, the World Cup bid was undoubtedly part of Qatar’s attempt to brand 
itself as a sporting and cultural leader in the Middle East.2 Prior to the bid the country 
had hosted the Fifteenth Asian Games in 2006, as well as ongoing annual major tennis 
and golf tournaments. Before the global celebration of football that is the World Cup 
descends on Doha in 2022, the city will also serve as host to a stage of the 2016 Tour 
de France and the 2017 World Athletics Championships.   
However, in Qatar as well as across the nations that make up the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC),3 attracting major regional and global sporting events has 
a significant foreign policy, as well as an entertainment, component. Indeed, what 
Jackson and Haigh have termed the ‘cultural and symbolic currency and power of 
sport and its attendant effects’4 is hugely significant for the GCC region in general 
and Qatar in particular. 
As is regularly pointed out in discussions on the power and global reach of 
sport there are 203 National Olympic Committees affiliated with the International 																																																								
1 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the 
Wake of the Arab Spring’, Durham, HH Sheikh Nasser al Mohammad al Sabah Publication Series, No. 
3 (October 2012), p.11-12. 
2 See J. E. Peterson, ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, 
No. 4 (Autumn, 2006), pp. 732-748, p.747. 
3 On 4 February 1981, the foreign ministers of the six Arab Gulf States – Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain –met in Riyadh to agree on the establishment the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC).  This was followed by a signing ceremony in March in Muscat and a launch meeting 
in late May in Abu Dhabi attended by the rulers of the six Gulf States. See Jawid Laiq, ‘The Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Royal Insurance against Pressures from Within and Without’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 35 (30 August 1986), pp.1553-1560; R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1988, Ch.1: 
‘Founding the GCC’, pp.12-32. 
4 Steven J. Jackson and Stephen Haigh, ‘Between and beyond politics: Sport and foreign policy in a 
globalizing world’, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, Vol.11, No. 4 (2008), pp. 
 349-358, p.350. 
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Olympic Committee (IOC), eleven more than the number of member state countries 
of the United Nations (UN).   
This explains why senior Qatari policymakers from the Emir down to officials 
of the Qatar Tourism Board were consistently frank and open between 1995 and 2010 
in admitting that the goal of attracting major sporting events to the kingdom was to 
draw attention not only to Qatari commitment to sport for its own sake but also to 
draw attention to the country’s major strides in all spheres in recent years.5 
As one local supporter of the Qatari World Cup bid explained: ‘we [wanted to] 
turn the negatives of a small country, with a small population, into . . . positives . . . 
Anyone who spends time here knows . . . that this country delivers. And delivers not 
because it has got resources to deliver but because it knows how to build projects and 
get the right people together’.6  
Though some of the foundations for Qatar’s direction and achievements 
between 1995 and 2010 were laid down prior to 1995, the policies and decisions that 
catapulted Qatar to global prominence in subsequent years occurred following Hamad 
bin Khalifa Al Thani’s accession to office in 1995.  They peaked during his decade 
and a half in power and culminated with the successful bid for the World Cup in 2010, 
an event that, again in the words of Coates Ulrichsen, ‘set the capstone on its 
[Qatar’s] rapid rise as a small state with global ambition’.7 
At the heart of the strategy that culminated in the winning World Cup bid was 
the vision of using Qatar’s rising hydrocarbon revenues to transform the country into 
a dynamic small state both at home and abroad.  In pursuit of this, as subsequent 																																																								
5 Regan Doherty, ‘Emir sees Qatar hosting Sports events as way to buoy Mideast’s image’, 
2009http://www.qatartourism.gov.qa/reviews/index/1/23 
6 See World Cup Bid Win had Smart Brains Behind it’, The Peninsular, 11 March 2011, quoted in 
Andrew F. Cooper and  Bessma Momani, ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy’, 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2011), pp.113-
128, p.118. 
7 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Qatar and the Arab Spring’ OpenDemocracy, 12 April 2011, pp.5, p.1. 
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chapters of this dissertation will show, between 1995 and 2010, Qatar developed a 
dual strategy of domestic socio-economic development and cutting edge external 
diplomacy in the cause of regional and global influence and standing. It is Qatar’s 
evolution in these crucial fifteen years from a regional economic and political 
backwater into a significant player in the international system in the contemporary era 
that is the primary focus of this dissertation.    
Speaking in the opening speech of the tenth Doha Conference in May 2010, 
just months before his country was awarded the World Cup, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa 
Al Thani specifically pointed to the rule of law, democracy, stability, development, 
education and innovation as the ‘fundamental basics’ of the Qatari model.8   
In examining the phenomenon of Qatar’s rise to global standing between 1995 
and 2010 this thesis will examine these ‘fundamental basics’, which began when the 
new emir’s government began remodeling the emirate’s education, infrastructural and 
investment policies in the mid-1990s in lines with domestic ambitions and financial 
capabilities.   
From that time onwards the Qatari approach to economic growth and socio-
economic development has been driven by a number of realities. The first is that 
though strong and stable, the Qatari economy, like all oil and gas economies large and 
small, has always been vulnerable to lower hydrocarbon prices that not only reduce 
income and threaten a reversal of the country’s impressive growth rate but also force 
a reduction of capital expenditure on infrastructure and technology, two of the pillars 
underpinning the World Cup bid.  
There are precedents for this in Qatar, as in the rest of the Gulf region and 
wider oil-producing nations.  In 1986-87, for example, reliance on oil revenues meant 
																																																								
8 Al-Watan (Doha), 14 May 2010.  
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that when oil prices plummeted the country did not even announce a budget. Even 
given the massive returns Qatar generated from its energy, and primarily gas, 
resources over the period under examination here, this ongoing vulnerability remained 
a constant concern and served as key factor in explaining for the type of socio-
economic model that Qatar aspired to achieve. 
Another reality that Qatar’s socio-economic model has been designed to 
address is the small size of the country’s total population and even smaller citizen 
component. The population of Qatar grew rapidly in the period under focus in this 
thesis.  Between 2004 and 2008 there was on average per annum population growth of 
15 percent. However, in absolute terms the population remained small over the whole 
course of this study.  By 2009-10, the Qatar Statistics Authority estimated the 
country’s population to be 1.65 million, of which the native population made up only 
20-25 percent.9 This is the smallest indigenous population among the six Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.   
As will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, over the period 
between 1995 and 2010 this demographic reality made it necessary for Qatar to 
engage in the large-scale importation of foreign labour in the service, energy, 
industrial and construction sectors.  Apart from being a major cause of population 
growth,10 it resulted in the government decision to pursue actively programmes 
intended to encourage the employment and promotion of Qatari nationals in the 
workforce.11 																																																								
9 See Qatar Statistics Authority, Annual Report, 2009, Doha, 2010.  According to the IMF the 
population as of mid-2009 was somewhat smaller at 1.2 million. See Qatar: Statistical Appendix, IMF 
Country Report No. 10/62, March 2010. See also Kasim Randeree, Workforce Nationalization in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council States, Doha, Center for Regional and International Studies, Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service, 2012. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1062.pdf  
10Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell and Jeffrey C. Tanner, ‘Qatar‘s Labor Markets at a Crucial 
Crossroad’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No.3 (Summer 2009), pp.84-102. 
11 Kasim Randeree, Workforce Nationalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council States, pp.9-10. 
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As chapter 4 will shown, although this process of Qatarization – the attempt at 
workforce nationalization, with the end goal of reducing expatriate employment by 
bringing more citizens into the workplace –became increasingly necessary in recent 
decades, its launch can be traced back to the mid-1970s.  
Directly related to this was the need for Arab governments, as Qatar’s then 
Finance Minister, Yousef Hussain Kamal, explained in May 2010, to create 100 
million new jobs and to reduce the percentage of the population in public sector 
employment so that the state was no longer the dominant pillar of the economy and 
the private sector had an opportunity to blossom for the first time.12   
It was with such challenges in mind—the need to increase the opportunities 
for employment for native Qataris, especially women, and the need to reduce the size 
of the public sector and increase the size of the private sector—that the development 
of the Qatari socio-economic model over the decade and a half under examination in 
this dissertation took place.  
This model has focused on four key components all of which overlap and all 
of which, in various ways, were key to the successful Qatari World Cup bid in 2010.   
The first was infrastructural development. The second was investing in third-level 
education and the establishment of research parks and centres to develop cutting edge 
technologies. The third was building relationships with external partners in the 
financial, energy, hi-technology and educational sectors, among others, in order to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and technological know-how. The fourth was 
using hydrocarbon earnings to diversify the economy through high profile 
investments at home and abroad, a move that has also contributed significantly to the 
development of Qatar’s global brand and external influence. 
																																																								
12 ‘Qatar: International Risk & Payment Review’, D&B Monthly Review, November 2010, p.79. 
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According to Qatar National Bank (QNB), the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), between 2005 and 2008 nominal 
GDP in Qatar almost doubled to US$71 billion, which represented an annual growth 
rate of 16 percent in real terms adjusted for inflation.  In 2009, despite the global 
financial crisis, real GDP grew 9 percent due to a 10 percent growth in the 
hydrocarbon sector and an 8 percent growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector 
underpinned by investment.  
By 2010, the year of the victorious World Cup bid, the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) estimated Qatari per capita income at $145,300, to be the highest in the 
world. In the same year the IMF estimated that Qatar’s GDP per capita in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) was the second highest in the world after Luxembourg 
at US$76,000.13  By this time, Qatar could also claim to be home to the fifth highest 
number of millionaires in the world as a proportion of the population.14 Even more 
significant the country was still in the growth stage, with the highest GDP growth per 
annum of the GCC member states at 7 percent (compared to Saudi Arabia, the lowest 
in the GCC at 1 percent).   
In the post-2010 era the euphoria and global attention surrounding the World 
Cup bid has leveled off.  However, Qatar has remained in the international spotlight 
for a number of reasons since then. This has included the ongoing scale of its socio-
economic development at home and its ongoing extensive strategic investment policy 
overseas.  Both have kept Qatar in the global public eye. So has the country’s role in 
the regional politics of the Arab Spring and post-Arab Spring periods.  The country 
was a leading party in the NATO-led removal of long-time Libyan leader Muammar 																																																								
13 Qatar: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 10/62, March 2010 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1062.pdf  
14 Qatar: 2009 Article IV Consultation-IMF Country Report No. 10/41, February 2010, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1041.pdf . Qatar came fifth behind Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Switzerland, and Kuwait and ahead of UAE in the global rich list of 2009-10. 
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Gaddafi.  To the distress of its GCC partners, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Doha has also championed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt since 
the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and has been a vocal and practical backer the anti-
Assad rebels in Syria.   
Despite all this, the Arab Spring and its consequences are outside the scope of 
this thesis.  It is very much a living issue, continuously evolving in many directions. 
This makes it hard to clearly analyse or interpret properly its real and lasting 
consequences for Qatar in particular and the Arab world in general. Moreover, this 
dissertation was conceived from its outset to end at the time of the successful World 
Cup bid. As the culmination of an economic, financial, and external strategy initiated 
for the most part post-1995 this is a natural cut-off point.  
The only exception is in chapter 6.  It is vital to examine and analyse the key 
role of the Al-Jazeera news networks in the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya 
in order to illuminate properly its previous role as a central component of Qatar’s 
small state strategy in the decade and a half between 1995 and 2010.  
By excluding for the most part events and issues post-2010, this thesis will not 
deal with a second factor that has kept Qatar in the spotlight recently and which, like 
the Arab Spring and its consequences, has a direct bearing on this thesis. This was the 
summer 2013 leadership transition, which saw the retirement of Hamad bin Khalifa 
Al Thani as emir and the transition of power to Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani. 
This move undoubtedly has implications for both Qatar and the wider Arab 
region, though its major relevance to this thesis is that it highlights very clearly Emir 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s innovative and even radical approach (at least 
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compared with other leaders in the Arab world) to making major decisions.15  
 
 
Description of thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, as well as this introduction and a conclusion.  
Each chapter begins with a quote from a major work in the small state literature.  The 
first chapter starts with A.H. Henrikson’s acute observation that ‘a small state’s 
perception of its size is very subjective and differs greatly from the perception of 
other external parties’.16  
This provides a very relevant starting point for examining Qatar in the 
contemporary world up the time of its World Cup bid victory in December 2010. In 
the process, it looks to examine how Qatar’s recent success as a small state in today’s 
international system has been perceived, as well as the factors that have driven its 
success and attainments in the period between 1995 and 2010. 
Chapter 2 examines the political gradualism and the socio-economic risk-
taking that defined the first phase of the new emir’s rule between 1995 and the early 
2000s.  It begins with a quote from Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem that contends that in a 
small state ‘important policy decisions… emerge out of the personal aspirations and 
preferences of the leader’.17   
																																																								
15 See for example, Thomas Lippman, ‘Transition in Qatar: Lessons for the GCC States ’, 17 July 
2013, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C; Jane Kinninmont, ‘What next for the Gulf's rulers- for-
life?’, The Guardian, 22 June 2013; Andrew Hammond, ‘Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, 
Like Son’, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, 2014; Lina Khatib, ‘As Son Takes 
Over in Qatar, Little Chance of New Policies’, IPI Global Observatory, 2 July 2013; Jeffrey Goldberg, 
‘Qatar: Attention-Starved Teen of the Middle East’, Bloomberg, 2 May 2013. 
16 A.H. Henrikson, ‘A coming ‘Magnesian age? Small states, the global system, and the international 
community, Geopolitics, Vol. 6 (2001), pp.49-86, p.62-63. 
17 See Hassan Ali El-Ebraheem, Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States in the International System, 
London, Croom Helm, 1984, p.49; W.S. Jung, ‘Financial Sector Development and Economic Growth: 
International Evidence’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.34, No. 2 (January 1989), 
pp.333-346. 
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In these terms, this chapter looks at the highly personalized nature of rule in 
Qatar between 1995 and 2010 to show how the decisions and policies proposed and 
implemented in the both the domestic and external arenas laid the foundations of 
Qatar’s subsequent evolution at home and abroad.  
Chapter 3 examines Qatar’s foreign policy repositioning in the period between 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s ascent to power in 1995 and the September 2001 
(9/11) Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States (US).  This chapter begins with Robert 
Keohane’s observation from the small state literature that ‘[A small state is one] 
‘whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a 
significant impact on the system’.18  
From here the chapter focuses on examining Qatar’s small state diplomacy 
and argues that Qatari efforts to engage in regional diplomacy and strategic relations 
with the US, though in part confirming the limitations of a small state acting in the 
international system, also challenges and contradicts the conventional  view of the 
effectiveness of small state external engagement in international affairs.    
Chapter 4 begins with a quote from the writings of Miriam Fendius Elman’s 
assertion ‘Statesmen in newly independent states should be responsive to external 
stimuli and should react to external threats in order to protect the emerging state’s 
survival.  However, in later periods, state behaviour may be better explained from a 
domestic level perspective’.19 
The chapter then goes on to examine the transformation that took place post-
1995 in Qatar’s energy sector.  This had a profound impact on the entire socio-
economic basis of Qatari society. As this chapter argues, almost every major 																																																								
18 Robert Keohane, Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 291-310, p.296. 
19 Miriam Fendius Elman, ‘The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own 
Backyard’, Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 171-217, p.212. 
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development between 1995 and 2010 was driven by the high-risk strategy of moving 
from oil to gas as the key earner of the country’s hydrocarbon revenues. In examining 
this move and assessing its impact, this chapter examines the ongoing domestic socio-
economic and political challenges and reforms that have preoccupied Qatari rulers 
into the early part of the twenty-first century. 
Chapter 5 examines the limits and opportunities that Qatar has experienced as 
a small state in the international system in the post-9/11 era. It begins by quoting 
Robert Rothstein’s assertion that a small state ‘recognizes that it cannot obtain 
security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally 
on the aid of other states institutions, processes or developments to do so’.20  
This well-known claim by one of the most respected thinkers on small states is 
challenged in the course of this chapter by an analysis of Qatar’s evolving bilateral 
relationship with the US and its engagement in two key regional disputes –the Israel-
Palestine conflict and sectarian strife in Lebanon.  
Chapter 6 begins with Peter R. Baehr’s 1975 assertion that small state 
‘decision-makers [are] unable to compete with their counterparts in larger states in 
regard to the quantity and diversity of information that is available to them and which 
they can disseminate’.21 In order to test this claim, this chapter examines Al-Jazeera 
as an instrument of Qatar’s soft power, in particular its role in developing Qatar’s 
regional and global standing from 1995 to 2010.  In doing so, as noted above, it will 
address Al-Jazeera’s key role in the Arab Spring but only in order to set the context 
for the news network’s evolution up to that time.   
																																																								
20 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, New York and London, Columbia University 
Press, 1968, p. 29. 
21 Peter R Baehr, ‘Small States: A Tool for Analysis’, World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1975), pp. 
456-466, p. 462. 
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The final chapter begins with one of the most well-known arguments in the 
literature on small states – David Vital’s assertion from the late 1960s that ‘Weakness 
[is the] most common, natural and pervasive view of self in the small state’.22   
This chapter then examines the challenges that Qatar faces in consolidating 
and sustaining its achievements over the last two decades in terms of Vital’s postulate. 
This is particularly pertinent at a time when Qatar’s reputation as a regional 
diplomatic power is coming under increasing pressure in the face of post-Arab Spring 
realities and its status as an enlightened model of good socio-economic practice is 
being challenged amidst an international focus on the experience and conditions of 
foreign workers involved in the country’s hugely ambitious construction projects in 
preparation for the World Cup.   
This last chapter elaborates on Qatar’s contemporary position in the context of 
the overall argument of this thesis –that Qatar in the years between 1995 and 2010 
was both an exceptional small state in the international system, as well as one that 
often exhibited classic tendencies and characteristics of a small state both at home and 
abroad. 
Contribution to the literature  
This dissertation focuses on a period, between 1995-2010, during which Qatar’s dual 
strategy of investing its significant hydrocarbon revenues in the cause of development 
and stability at home and influence abroad attracted the growing attention of states 
large and small in the region and beyond.   
This decade and a half also saw Qatar become an increasingly popular topic 
for both scholarly and policy literature.  The amount of material written on any given 
subject, whether social, economic or political, is evidence of the world’s interest and 
																																																								
22 David Vital, The Inequality of Small States, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 33. 
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focus on it at any given time. In the context of the politics of the Arabian Peninsula 
and Persian Gulf, during the late 1970s and early 1980s for example, there was a huge 
amount of material written on Qatar’s larger neighbor to the south, Saudi Arabia.  
Much of this highlighted the centrality of Saudi Arabia to regional and 
international politics in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 and the revolution in Iran in 
1979. Both of these major events transformed Saudi Arabia into a key regional 
strategic ally of the US, as well as a global financial powerhouse in the last decades of 
the Cold War. 
Similarly, the 1980s saw an extensive bibliography on the Iran-Iraq war which 
lasted from 1980-1988; while the early 1990s saw a surge in literature on regional 
security, Washington’s unipolar dominance of the Gulf, and the prospects of 
democratization in the Arab world following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 and the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces by a US-led international coalition in 
the early months of 1991.   
Prior to the mid-2000s there were comparatively few works dealing with Qatar 
as a foreign policy player, economic actor or small state in the international system. 
The literature that did exist focused primarily on the history and politics of the 
country up until its independence in 1971 and in the few years that immediately 
followed. These works included, most notably Rosemarie Said Zahlan’s, The 
Creation of Qatar, published in 1979, Ragaei al Mallakh’s Qatar: Development of an 
Oil Economy, published in the same year and Nasser Al-Othman, With their Bare 
hands: The Story of the Oil Industry in Qatar published in 1984.23  
Other literature on Qatar from the period prior to 1995 includes a limited 																																																								
23 See Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, London, Croom Helm, 1979 and Ragaei al 
Mallakh, Qatar: Development of an Oil Economy, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1979. This work was 
reprinted in 1985 as Qatar: Energy and Development; Nasser Al-Othman, With their Bare hands: The 
Story of the Oil Industry in Qatar, London, Longman, 1984. 
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number of scholarly examinations, notably Emile A. Nakhleh’s 1977 work on 
citizenship and labour markets and Jill Crystal’s comparative work on the political 
nation as well as Ballantyne’s comparative work on legislative authority and 
governing structures in the country.24 
These studies provided valuable insights into in different historical, social and 
cultural contexts and many of the issues addressed are still relevant. This is evidenced 
by the fact that thirty years after Nakhleh’s groundbreaking article on Labor Markets 
and Citizenship in Qatar,Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell and Jeffrey C. Tanner 
published an major article on the same still key issues.25   
Despite the quality and contemporary relevance of these works pre-2000 
works on Qatar, the reality is that in absolute terms the literature on Qatar prior to the 
twenty-first century was minimial compared to the vast amount of publications on 
other regional states.  With the exception of Ahmad Zakariya al-Shilq’s 1999 study 
Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi,26 Qatar pre-2000 received almost no significant 
attention in the literature even when contrasted with writing on other small states in 




24 See Emile A. Nakhleh, ‘Labor Markets and Citizenship in Bahrayn and Qatar’, Middle East Journal, 
Vol.31, No. 2 Spring 1977, pp.143-156, p.148 and Jill Crystal, ‘Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait 
and Qatar’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 1989), pp. 427-443 and Oil and Politics in the 
Gulf: rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; On 
the history of legislative authority in Qatar, its Constitution and governing structures see W. M. 
Ballantyne, ‘The Constitutions of the Gulf States: A Comparative Study’, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, 
No. 2 (Feb 1986), pp. 158-176. 
25 Berrebi, Martorell and Tanner ‘Qatar’s Labour Market at a Crucial Crossroad’, pp.421-442. 
26 Ahmad Zakariya al-Shilq, Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi [Chapters from Qatar’s Political 
History], Doha, A.Z. al-Shalaq, 1999. 
27 Mary Ann Tètreault, ‘Autonomy, necessity, and the small state: ruling Kuwait in the twentieth 
century’, International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (September 1991), pp. 565-591; See also Hassan 
Ali Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States in the International System, London, Croom Helm, 
1984. 
	 21	
By 2000, however, this was changing as the impact of the new emir’s 
ambitious policies –political, economic and strategic – at home and abroad began to 
be realized and Qatar’s rising regional and global standing became increasingly 
apparent. In terms of the domestic political developments and reforms that have been 
instituted since 1995, Rathmell and Schulze’s 2000 study was valuable as for its 
examination of ‘ruler-society fiscal relations’.28   
Mehran Kamrava subsequently built on Rathmell and Schulze’s work by 
examining Qatar’s move towards political liberalization since 1995.29 Kamrava made 
the case that domestic political reform was slowed down by internal competition and 
differences inside the ruling family. He has also argued that the tension between the 
state’s access to massive oil and gas funds and its ability to determine the political and 
economic transformation of society with the least possible interference from society‘s 
different social groups has undermined the emergence of autonomous civil 
organisations and the development of democracy. This explains, in his view, how 
Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s initial push for political reforms stalled and why 
real power, up to the present day, lies with the Emiri Diwan and the Emir’s closest 
and most influential advisers.30   
Building on Jacob Abadi’s important 2004 article, one of the first to present 
Qatar in the context of its growing foreign policy role,31 Kamrava has also contributed 
																																																								
28 Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze, ‘Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar’, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No.4 (October 2000), pp.47-62, p.56. Other works dealing with the political 
evolution of Qatar include Louay Bahry, ‘Elections in Qatar: A Window of Democracy Opens in the 
Gulf’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999), pp.118-127; Olivier Da Lage, ‘La Constitution du 
Qatar approuvee par referendum le 29 avril 2003’, Maghreb-Machrek, No. 176, Spring 2003, pp. 111-
121; Michael Herb, ‘Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(October 2002), pp. 41-47. 
29 Mehran Kamrava ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’, Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2009), pp.401-420. 
30 Mehran Kamrava,  ‘Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 65 No.4 
(Autumn 2011), pp.539-556. 
31 Jacob Abadi, ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Quest for National Security and Territorial Integrity’, 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Winter 2004), p.14-37. 
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to the developmebt of thinking about Qatar as a foreign policy player in recent 
decades.  His research identified Qatar as a ‘civilian power’ defined by a 
‘combination of personal and state-owned wealth and stability along with strategic 
and clever use of these assets’.32   
Kamrava subsequently extended his research on Qatar’s domestic politics and 
external engagement into a 2013 book-length study titled Qatar: Small State, Big 
Politics.33 In this work, he examined both the rapid rise of the Qatari socio-economic 
state to a position of ‘high-modernism’ as well as what he calls the country’s 
‘hyperactive diplomacy’. He also introduced the concept of ‘subtle’ power to 
differentiate Qatar’s attempt to influence events beyond its borders with the soft 
power elucidated by Joseph Nye and others in recent years.34  
One other book-length work has dealt with Qatar in recent times. The first, by 
Allen J. Fromherz and published in 2011 was titled Qatar, A Modern History35. It was 
the first work since Zahlan’s 1979 monograph to examine Qatari history and place it 
in the modern context. Its focus was on local, social and economic history and the 
majority of the work was dedicated to the historical rather than the contemporary 
period.36 
Another work that began as a PhD thesis at Durham University was Abdulaziz 																																																								
32 Mehran Kamrava, ‘Power Realignment in the Gulf’’, Center for International and Regional Studies. 
Georgetown University in Qatar Newsletter, No. 6 (Summer 2009), p.6. See also Steven Wright, 
‘Foreign Policies with International Reach: the case of Qatar’, in David Held and Kristian Coates 
Ulrichren, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economic and the Global Order, London and New 
York, Routledge, 2012 and Lina Khatib, ‘Qatar’s foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2 (March 2013), pp.417-432. 
33 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 
2013. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Allen J. Fromherz, Qatar, A Modern History, Washington D.C, Georgetown University Press, 2012.  
36. Another book to be published soon will be David Roberts book on Qatar: Securing a City State with 
Global Ambitions, London and New York, Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2014. The book’s 
content, the product of a doctoral dissertation completed at Durham University, has been widely 
disseminated in a policy papers and journal articles. See for example, David B. Roberts, The Arab 
World’s Unlikely Leader: Embracing Qatar’s Expanding Role in the Region, 13 March 2012, POMED 
Policy Brief, pp.6 For a scholarly article making much the same point see his ‘Understanding Qatar's 
Foreign Policy Objectives’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2012) pp. 233-239. 
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Al-Ghorairi’s doctoral thesis, The Development of the Financial Sector of Qatar and 
its Contribution to Economic Diversification, completed in 2010. This is an excellent 
study that investigates the relationship between financial sector development and 
economic development in Qatar and the impact this relationship has had on the 
country‘s policy of economic diversification. 
Outside of academia there has also been a surge in policy-type publications on 
Qatar over the last several years. Notable among these, in so much as they offer a 
representative sample of this growing literature, are the regularly updated 
Congressional Service Reports on US-Qatari relations authored by Christopher M. 
Blanchard;37 and works by major research and policy institutions on key aspects of 
Qatar’s domestic and external development ranging from Rand’s work on the Qatari 
education system to Qatar’s foreign policy engagement in the context of the Arab 
Spring.  The most notable works on this latter issue, which is outside the scope of this 
thesis, include Kristian Coates Ulrichsen’s ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring’, published by HH Sheikh 
Nasser al Mohammad al Sabah Publication Series at Durham University. 38 
This thesis both draws from and builds on this growing body of scholarly and 
policy literature on Qatar’s domestic development and external engagement.  It also 
raises questions and examines the subject from its own distinctive perspective.  In 
doing so it makes a number of significant contributions to existing knowledge. First 
of all, it adds to recent scholarship that examines GCC member states from a small 
																																																								
37 See Christopher M. Blanchard, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, Washington D.C., 
Congressional Service Report, January 24, 2008, Order Code RL31718 updated, 16 May  2011 and 30 
January 2014. 
38 Joy S. Moini et al ‘Revitalizing Qatar’s National University’, RAND-Qatar Policy Institute, 
Research Brief, 2009; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen’s ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring’, Durham, HH Sheikh Nasser al Mohammad al Sabah 
Publication Series, No. 3: (October 2012). See also Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Qatar and the Arab 
Spring’ OpenDemocracy, 12 April 2011, pp.5. 
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state perspective  
J.E. Petersen 2006 article on this issue characterised Qatar as a ‘micro-
state’.39However, Petersons’ research is primarily focused on the role of branding in 
small states rather than on developments in Qatar itself. As he notes, branding has 
‘emerged as a state asset to rival geopolitics and traditional considerations of power’ 
as it increases prestige and awareness, which in turn provide legitimacy-key for a 
small state’.40   Peterson frames Qatar branding ‘in context of the constraints and 
problems of small states’41 and he provides clarity of thought on small states in 
general. However, only the last two pages of his eighteen-page article directly deal 
with the Qatar case study.  
Like Petersen’s earlier work, a 2014 paper by Gidon Windecker and Peter 
Sendrowicz, examines Qatar as a business model for a micro state and views the 
country from a branding perspective. It argues that turning a country into a highly 
recognisable international brand is not enough as it is also necessary to attract 
stakeholders and form long-term bonds with them.42  This view is in line with Van 
Ham’s classic argument that ‘a brand is best described as a customer’s idea about a 
																																																								
39 J.E. Peterson, ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 
4 (Autumn 2006), pp.732-748 
40 Ibid., p.746-748. On the issue of branding as an instrument of international relations also see 
Gregory J. Ashworth, ‘The Instruments of Place Branding: How is it Done?’, European Spatial 
Research and Policy, Vol.16, No. 1 (2009), pp.9-22; ‘Special Section on Place Branding in the Middle 
East’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (February 2012); Peter Van Ham, ‘The 
Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Political Image and Reputation’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 
5 (Sept-Oct 2001), pp.1-6. On the issue of branding as an instrument of foreign policy for Gulf states in 
general and Qatar in particular see Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani ‘The Challenge of Re-
branding Countries in the Middle East: Opportunities through New Networked Engagements versus 
Constraints of Embedded Negative Images’, Paper presented to the ISA Annual Conference, San 
Francisco, March 2008; Hanan Hazime, ‘From city branding to e-brands in developing countries: An 
approach to Qatar and Abu Dhabi’, African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 5, No.12 ( June, 
2011), pp. 4731-4745; Li-Chen Sim, ‘Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From Oil giant to Energy titan’, Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 8, No.1 (February 2012), pp.83-98. 
41 J. E. Peterson, ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State’, Middle East Journal, p.732. 
42 Gidon Windecker and Peter Sendrowicz, ‘Qata Between Marketing and Realpolitik: A Smart 
Business Model for a Microstate?’, No. 1, 2014, KAS International Reports, pp.83-102, p.85. 
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product’ and that in these terms the ‘brand state’ comprises the ‘outside world’s ideas 
about a particular country’.43  
From this perspective, it is certainly possible to see Qatar’s World Cup 
winning bid as an excellent example of event hallmarking, whereby places organise 
events, usually cultural or sporting, in order to obtain a wider recognition that they 
exist but also to establish specific brand associations.44  
This is even truer of the subject of chapter 6 – Al Jazeera. Since its 
establishment in 1996 this news network has not only had the ‘greatest impact on the 
region’s news service landscape’;45 as chapter 6 will show, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa 
Al Thani envisioned Al-Jazeera as ‘a TV station reflecting the new image of Qatar 
that he wished to project to the outside world’.46  This in turn, was central to Qatar’s 
evolving approach to, and engagement, in public diplomacy.47 
 
Qatar: A Small State in the International System 
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen has recently challenged the characterization of Qatar as a 
micro-state. As he has perceptively noted in arguably the most acute analysis of 
contemporary Qatar, extraordinary levels of in-migration have trebled the Qatari 
population and propelled it out of the ‘micro-state’ category. 48  
																																																								
43 Van Ham, ‘The Rise of the Brand State’, p.2.   
44 For a detailed analysis of this form of branding see Gregory J. Ashworth, ‘The Instruments of Place 
Branding: How is it Done?’, European Spatial Research and Policy, Vol.16, No. 1 (2009), pp.9-22. 
45 See Cooper and Momani ‘The Challenge of Re-branding Countries in the Middle East: Opportunities 
through New Networked Engagements versus Constraints of Embedded Negative Images’. 
46 Louay Y. Bahry, ‘The New Arab Media Phenomenon: Qatar's Al-Jazeera’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 
8, No. 2 (June 2001), pp.88–99. 
47 For a more in-depth look at Al-Jazeera’s public diplomacy strategy as a non-state actor see Eytan 
Gilboa and Shawn Powers. ‘The Public Diplomacy of Al-Jazeera’, in P. Seib (ed.), New Media and the 
New Middle East, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp.53-80 and Norbert Wildermuth, ‘Defining 
the “Al-Jazeera Effect”: American Public Diplomacy at a Crossroad’, Media Res, Vol. 1, No .2 
(February 2005). 
48 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the 
Wake of the Arab Spring’, p.8. 
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Demographics was only part of this and, again as Coates Ulrichsen as well as 
Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani in their own work on the contours of Qatar’s 
small state diplomacy, have argued, ‘domestic factors converged’ with the changing 
nature of the concept of power itself in an intensely interconnected and globalized 
world.  
Indeed, during the 1990s and 2000s, at exactly the same time as Qatar under 
its new leadership was engaging in its ambitious vision for the country at home and 
abroad the new global environment increasingly allowed for small states to project 
greater power internationally as the link between size and power eroded.49   
This is a distinct change from the traditional situation.  In the immediate post-
World War Two era considerations of size played at least some part in deciding 
whether a territorial unit was fit to become independent.  Since that time the notion of 
a small state has become well established and currently the great majority of the 
world’s two hundred plus legally sovereign states can be defined as small.50  
When Qatar achieved independence and entered the United Nations in 
September 1971 it was one of the smallest of the world’s small states. Its most 
extreme length was 90 miles, its extreme breadth 56 miles, and its total area was 
3,800 square miles. Its population was then estimated to be between 150,000 and 
180,000.  
It was so small that it was widely acknowledged at the time that, in the words 
of one contemporary commentator, ‘if the United Nations had yet reached a decision 
as to the minimum population entitling any country to membership, Qatar could 
probably not have sought it but the UN has not yet enacted the statute’.51  Indeed, 																																																								
49 Ibid., p.10. See also Cooper and Momani, ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy’, 
p. 123. 
50 ‘A Quiver of Sheiks’, The Economist, 15 July 1961, p. 222. 
51 Tom Little, ‘News Desk’, Middle East International, October 1971, p. 9. 
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Qatar’s entry into the UN along with that of Oman, Bhutan and Bahrain at the same 
time, saw then UN Secretary- General U Thant declare that ‘the problem of micro-
states…is likely to become more acute in the years to come’.52 
The study of small states as a specific research category reached its peak in the 
1970s at exactly the same time as Qatar entered the UN, in a period following the 
process of decolonization during which numerous small entities gained statehood. 
This period of decolonisation, as Cooper and Momani have noted, coincided with the 
Cold War, and thus not surprisingly was a time of bipolarity, great power domination 
and Realist thinking that dictated that small states choose between a narrow set of 
choices, namely either a bandwagon and a balancing approach.53 
On the one hand in the post Cold-War era, globalisation has served to 
exacerbate this sense of divergence between strong and weak actors.54 On the other 
hand, as Peterson has pointed out, there is growing consensus that small states now 
matter because of the large number of sovereign entities that are small. 55  
However, up to the present day there remains little consensus on how to 
conceptualize and define the ‘smallness of small states’.56  Given this, the term “small 
state” is used more in a descriptive than conceptual manner.  This does not mean that 
Peter Baehr’s argument, made during the mid-1970s, that the concept of small states 
is not a useful analytical tool in understanding world politics is accurate either in 
general or specifically in the case of Qatar.57  As this study of Qatar’s internal and 
external development will show there is value in viewing the country as a small state 
																																																								
52 ‘Independence has many vital voices’, Middle East International, No. 4, July 1971, p. 19. 
53 Cooper and Momani, ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy’, p.114. 
54 Ibid., p.114. 
55 J. E. Peterson, ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State’, p.737. 
56 Matthias Maass, ‘The elusive definition of the small state’, International Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1 
(2009), pp.65-83, p.70. 
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as long as the definition and concept is highly flexible and relative rather than 
absolute.   
This is particularly the case because this dissertation is not looking to either 
praise or judge Qatar in terms of its successes and failures. There were plenty of both 
between 1995 and 2010, and the period since the Arab Spring in 2011, a time beyond 
the scope of this thesis, has also underscored the risks and downsides related to the 
policies adopted by Qatar, particularly in external affairs.  
Nevertheless, Qatar can still be used to examine, to illuminate and to 
contribute to our understanding of small states in ways that move beyond the 
conventional wisdom contained in much of the literature that small states are, and can 
only be, weak members of the international system.  Indeed, by examining Qatar in 
the light of this literature, this thesis looks to achieve two things. The first is to shed 
light on Qatar over a key period in its recent history. The second is to challenge and 
change the perception of what a small state is.  
For example, traditionally the most commonly used criteria for identifying 
small states is population size.  In his classic text, The Inequality of Small States, 
written in the middle of the era of decolonization in the late 1960s, David Vital 
classified those nations with a population of less than 10-15 million in the 
economically advanced world and less than 20-30 million in the underdeveloped 
world as small states.58  Others have subsequently gone further, classing those states 
with a population of less than one million as micro-states,59 a definition under which 
																																																								
58 David Vital, The Inequality of Small States, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 8. 
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Qatar, would not have even qualified for small state status for most of its post-
independence existence.  
Similarly Karl Deutsch has argued that a small state is one where Gross 
National Product (GNP) is less than 1 percent of the total world GNP.60 Other 
traditional indicators have included geographic area and military capability, while 
other scholars have acknowledged the need to adapt a set of criteria to define small 
states, with the key dimensions of small state size being a combination of a number of 
key factors including, but not limited to, a state’s population, its geographic size, its 
military capability and its GNP.61 
Certainly, the approach of more recent scholars like Bjorn Olaffsson,62 who 
has argued that there is no consistent correlation between population size and other 
measures of state size is a more illuminating and informative model to adopt in any 
examination of Qatar’s development over recent decades than an approach that 
focuses on any one single factor such as population size, military strength or even 
national wealth.   
In 2007, Qatar spent 10 percent of GDP on military expenditure, making it the 
number two global spender in percentage terms behind Oman and before Saudi 
Arabia.  Apart from an air-force Qatar has a total military with manpower of about 
12,000 men, including a coast guard, national firefighting force, air wing, marine 
police, and an internal security force. This makes it home to one of the smallest 
militaries and civil defence infrastructures in the Middle East.63  																																																								
60 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in 
the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Qatar’s GDP in 2008 was US$71 billion, less than 1% of the size of US 
GDP.  
61See also Niels Amstrup, ‘The perennial problem of small states: a survey on research efforts’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1976), pp. 139-163. 
62 Bjorn Olafsson, Small States in the Global System: Analysis and Illustrations from the Case of 
Iceland, Aldershot, Asghate, 1998 pp. 8-10. 
63 Gidon Windecker and Peter Sendrowicz, ‘Qatar Between Marketing and Realpolitik: A Smart 
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Likewise, Qatar’s experience since the mid-1990s illuminates the difficulty of 
speaking of a specific form of small state behaviour or of defining too precisely terms 
such as ‘weakness’ or ‘power’ by measuring it in terms of military capability alone. 
Time and again, as this thesis will demonstrate, Qatar’s capacity to project 
power and influence has not been hindered by the fact that it has always lacked the 
one structural precondition of power that the literature has argued was essential—
military strength.64   
Qatar’s first taste of power was, in the phrasing of famed political scientists 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, was in a specific ‘issue area’—oil and gas. Even 
prior to the first years of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s rule in the mid-1990s, 
Qatar met the criteria set down by Keohane and Nye of small states possessing power 
in these terms.65  
For example, in response to the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Qatar had 
been one of the Arab oil producing states that had initiated the unilateral price rises 
and the oil embargo and reduction in supply.  Writing subsequently, Michael Handel 
argued that the oil crisis of the early 1970s had resulted in a new breed of states that 
though militarily weak and underdeveloped in the technological sense were 
economically strong states with huge financial resources that allowed them to develop 
their own form of small state power.66 
But it was Qatar’s ambitious project to build its position as a leading global 
gas exporter from the 1990s onwards that truly established it as an ‘issue area’ power 
on the international stage. In fact, between 1995 and 2010 Qatar was a notable 																																																																																																																																																														
Business Model for a Microstate?, p.85. 
64 See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, 
International Organization, p.292. 
65 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Toronto, Little Brown and Co., 1977. 
66 Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System, London and New York, Routledge, 2nd 
edition, 1990. 
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example of a country that might have a small population and territory but was 
economically more powerful and influential on a global scale than most states with 
larger populations, territories or even economies.  
From this base, and even leaving aside at this stage the presence of significant 
numbers of American military personnel in Qatar in the period under discussion, the 
country has subsequently challenged the traditional notion of ‘national security’ as 
having a very strong military and territorial component.  
In the years under examination in this thesis the case of Qatar has 
demonstrated clearly that to comprehend fully the power potentialities of small states 
one must go beyond assumptions based exclusively on physical attributes and 
capabilities.67 Qatar’s role, particularly in the period since 2001, has challenged the 
underlying conceit of small state theory that the essence of smallness is either lack of 
influence on the environment, or high sensitivity to the environment and lack of 
immunity against influences from it, or both.68 At the same time it has also challenged 
the Realist argument that small states matter little in international affairs because they 
lack the power to insulate themselves from the insecurity engendered from external 
threats.   
Such realist views of the lack of small state power are not surprising. Realism, 
in terms of the international relations literature, reflects a set of assumptions about the 
way relationships are ordered in international affairs. They are based on the belief that 
the international system is anarchic and exists in a state of constant antagonism and 
the primary concern of all sates is survival.  
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They also assume that the nation state is traditionally the central actor in the 
international system and that states act in order to increase their own security, pursue 
their own national interests, and are in a constant struggle for power.   
Indeed classical realism is primarily concerned with the sources and uses of 
national power in international politics and the problems that leaders encounter in 
conducting foreign policy. In these terms small states are viewed to be at a real 
disadvantage as they constantly look to deal with bilateral ties in terms of a set of 
cost-benefit assumptions intended to advance their national interests in the security, 
economic and diplomatic spheres.69 
This is true but Qatar has also shown in the period under examination in this 
thesis that in a rapidly changing global economy and security environment, small 
states can act in a less constrained fashion with greater flexibility, and adopt an 
innovative and independent approach to outside engagement that challenges 
traditional notions about size and capabilities. 
As Cooper and Momani have noted, it would be ‘difficult’ to explain Qatar’s 
role in contemporary international relations using traditional thinking as ‘comparative 
politics, including Middle East political science literature, has often been perplexed 
by the Qatari case’.70  
This does not make the existing literature on small states irrelevant or outdated. 
For example, it remains true, as much of the literature argues, that a small state’s 
foreign policy is largely reactive—a response to external conditions, such as the 
																																																								
69 Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for 
Peace, Chicago, Rowman & Littlefield 2006, p16.; Jack Donnelly, ‘The Ethics of Realism’, in 
Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 150; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
p.16.  
70 Cooper and Momani, ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy’, p.125. 
	 33	
degree of great power competition and the demands made upon small states by great 
power belligerents.  
It is also true that the prevailing features of the international system during any 
given period (the Cold War, the “War on Terror” etc), will have a greater potential 
impact on small states than on Great Powers.  Certainly, small states are more 
preoccupied with survival than great powers. As such, a small state’s foreign policy 
will naturally reflect careful attention to the constraints of the international 
environment.71  
As Rosenau has summed up, for the small state, ‘the environment is a much 
more important variable than for the great power’. As such, any reasoning about its 
role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in 
which the small state has to operate.72  Qatar is not exempt from such realities. As 
Kemrava has put it, as ‘a small state’ Qatar’s ‘national security needs dictate 
proactive diplomacy, particularly in light of chronic regional turmoil and 
instability’.73  
But while Qatar, like other small states, lacks, in the words of Robert Jervis, a 
‘margin of time and error’ when responding to external exigencies,74 its actions over 
recent years have challenged, at least in part, Maurice East’s argument that small 
states are primarily reactive if not inactive political entities.75 
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In pre-modern tribal politics, leaders either looked to develop an alliance with 
another tribal group or country that was more powerful than their potential 
adversaries or they embraced neutrality with those potential adversaries. These two 
strategies have survived to the present day. 
As Peterson has pointed out, small states in the contemporary world must be 
able to reach a modus vivendi with their neighbours. At the same time they generally 
require a powerful protector against larger neighbors and will often look to exploit a 
unique niche whereby they can position themselves as providers of a benefit, service 
or commodity that makes them valuable to their neighbours, region or world.76 
Small states have traditionally entered into various types of alignment and 
non-alignment. These have included bilateral alliances with major powers; alliances 
of two or more small states; membership of a multilateral alliance around one or more 
major power; non-alignment and neutrality in any war; non-alignment without any 
generalized commitment to neutrality.77  
In the case of alignment with a major power, there is always the assumption 
that the small state can keep more independence by allying with it than by standing 
aloof, or that the loss of independence vis a vis a major power is a worthwhile price to 
pay for counteracting possible pressures from another one. In this context, as Stephen 
Walt has hypothesized, small states are more likely to bandwagon with an aggressive 
great power than balance against it.78  
Of course, as several authors of works on small states in the international 
system have noted, small state alliances occur under different conditions and the costs 
and benefits of entering into and staying outside alliances vary greatly as do the 																																																								
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conditions necessary to enable and allow small states to pursue their own security 
interests inside an alliance.79  Qatar’s eagerness to play a role as chairman of the 
Group of 77 in 2004 and on the UN Security Council in 2006-07, highlighted that it 
was not averse to maximize the traditional opportunities for a small state to play a 
lead role in the international system. 80   
However, as shall be seen in the course of this thesis, Qatar’s engagement in 
diplomacy in its home region and beyond in the last decade has also challenged, again 
in part, such assumptions.  Qatari actions in the period covered by this thesis never 
followed simple alliance structures.81 Most importantly, Qatar’s bilateral strategic 
relationship with the United States (addressed in subsequent chapters) is a case in 
point that demands clarification of the above assumptions in the literature. The myriad 
conflicts and tension in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf region and the wider 
Middle East have provided Qatar with more influence and power vis a vis larger 
partners than is necessarily its due under other circumstances.  
In 2009, for example, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, suggested that the 
international system be ‘redefined’. He called for profound changes to its 
organisational framework in recognition of the emergence of a multi- polar order in 
which the West was no longer the sole or even the major player.82 
Such statements are not in line with traditional thinking about the role of small 
states (or their leaders) in the international system.  A small power, according to 
Maurice East, is characterized by five main features: (1) has limited interaction with 
other states; (2) gets involved with great enthusiasm in international organizations; (3) 																																																								
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supports international laws; (4) has a minimum use of force; (5) and finally 
concentrates its foreign policy on regional matters.83   
While points 2 to 5 above do fairly reflect the Qatari experience since 
independence, between 1995 and 2010 the country has challenged East’s analysis in 
relation to number 1– its interaction with other states.   
Moreover, Qatar’s role in international affairs for much of the time between 
1995 and 2010 has challenged the widely accepted argument in the literature that a 
small state’s foreign policy can ever be ‘voluntary’—initiated by the small state itself 
and centred on its own interests. In these terms, Qatar challenges Keohane’s 
definition of a small state as one ‘whose leaders consider that it can never, acting 
alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system’.84   
As this thesis will show, in the post-9/11 era up to 2010, Qatar was engaged in 
wide-ranging diplomacy and mediation efforts throughout the Middle East and 
beyond that did ‘make a significant impact on the system’.  Namely, it was 
responsible for building a ‘bold new way to engage with the world while maintaining 
the country’s independence’, as the New York Times termed it.85  
This included involvement in conflict resolution, conflict prevention and 
peace talks in Yemen, the Western Sahara and Darfur. Additionally, Qatar was deeply 
involved in negotiations with Israel, Hamas, Fatah, and Hezbollah.  Indeed, as chapter 
5 will show, a notable example of this is the case of Lebanon where Qatar, in recent 
years used its financial power and diplomatic standing in the region and beyond to 
take the lead in bringing both local and external parties to the negotiating table despite 
reluctance and suspicion on all sides.  While, in 2009 alone Qatar’s foreign minister 																																																								
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travelled to Morocco, Libya, Lebanon and Yemen (a country other GCC states have 
studiously ignored86) to mediate disputes.87  
From a comparative perspective, Qatar’s role in mediating conflict has some 
similarities to that of Norway.  Both are small states with access to significant 
hydrocarbon revenues.  Both have been hugely active in engaging in peacemaking. 
Though, as has been noted, one notable difference is that while Norway has carried 
out conflict mediation on a global scale, Qatar has limited its conflict mediation to the 
Middle East and North Africa.88 
 Directly related to this, the Qatari experience challenges Robert Rothstein’s 
argument that a small state is one that ‘recognizes that it can not obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid 
of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so’.89  It also challenges 
Rothstein’s critique of small states for their ‘vaunted irresponsibility’ based on the 
‘imperatives of immediate security’, which may preclude consideration of long-range 
problems.90  
As chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this thesis demonstrate, the bilateral relationship with 
the US in particular has been driven, on the Qatari side at least, by long-term 
considerations of security and strategy.  In particular, Qatar has invested heavily in 																																																								
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consolidating and expanding this relationship as part of its long-term objective to 
achieve stability at home and security and influence outside its borders.  
Given all this, as noted above it is the contention of this thesis that during the 
period between 1995 and 2010, Qatar challenged much conventional wisdom in the 
literature on how small states should act in the international system.  
The country’s leaders, from Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani down, 
consistently refused to accept a worldview put forward by others in the region, that 
‘we in the GCC states are feeling like helpless bystanders with little room to 
manoeuvre’.91 Instead, profoundly opposed to the limiting and negative implications 
inherent in this outlook, Qatar, between 1995 and 2010, showed itself consistently 
willing to  “put its money where its mouth was” both at home and abroad.  The result 
was a ‘ambitious, reform-minded ruling elite’,92 that transformed the country’s 
domestic, regional and global status in a ‘truly dramatic’ way93 in little more than a 
decade and a half. 
The great commitment (of time, political capital and financial resources) that 
Qatar invested between 1995 and 2010 in pursuing what one astute observer has 
described as ‘a ‘Scandinavian foreign policy, acting as mediator for the perma-
conflicts of Africa and the Mid-East’,94 won much applause at the time.  Speaking on 
a visit to Qatar in 2010 Finnish President Tarja Halonen praised Qatar for its policy of 
openness and the ‘special international position it enjoys’.  In particular, she 
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commended Qatar for having ‘opened avenues of dialogue between the nations of the 
world, a matter that helps enhancing international cooperation’.95  
 However, this Qatari attempt, in the words of one informed commentator, to 
maintain a conflicting set of friendships and to move ‘between different 
worlds…reaching for a political role that is much, much bigger than its regional 
weight’,96 also undoubtedly caused tensions and complicated its relationship with 
many of its regional and global partners.  
Qatar’s success in breaking with the traditionally perceived role and place of 
the small state in the international system has caused, in the years under study in this 
thesis and since (most recently in relation to major differences with Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE over support of the Muslim Brotherhood), numerous regional 
tensions and jealousies.   
As this thesis will show, throughout the decade and a half between 1995 and 
2010 there were also numerous other occasions that Qatar, through its foreign policy 
actions and the broadcasts of the Doha based Al-Jazeera news network, led to 
allegations of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In April 2009, for 
example, Ethiopia broke relations, saying that Qatar’s support of Eritrea had made it 
‘a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa’.97 Moreover, the Qatari strategy 
has also opened it up to international criticism for being an amoral, overly clever 
‘political maverick’ ‘with no politics’ and a ‘schizophrenic foreign policy’. 98  
Senior Qatari officials repeatedly rejected such accusations and instead 
emphasized the apolitical and altruistic motives driving their involvement in the years 																																																								
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between 1995 and 2010. ‘We are a peaceful country and we want to see peace in the 
area’, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani explained in a 1997 interview.99   
In another interview more than a decade later he made the same point: ‘our 
policy is to be friendly with everybody ... We are looking for peace’.100  A view 
reiterated by foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, 
when admitted in 2008 that  ‘good relations with everyone’101 was the cornerstone of 
Qatari policy.   
But Qatar’s foreign policy in the period under question was about much more 
than ‘a delicate attempt to try to get along with everyone at the same time’.102 Nor 
was it the result of, as one commentator put it, ‘Money, hotel space and 
connections’.103 Indeed, the country’s international involvement, notably its 
‘readiness to step outside the Arab mainstream on a number of contentious issues’,104 
was an innovative and an unorthodox strategy that enabled this small state to 
consolidate its autonomy of action; protect its interests; increase its global profile; and 
go some way to neutralizing the pressures and instabilities that come from being 
located in a volatile region.  
 In the years before World War I, so the story goes, new recruits into the 
British Foreign Office were instructed to learn the following dictum: ‘All actions have 
consequences, all consequences are unpredictable, therefore take no actions’.  As this 
thesis will show, Qatar’s leadership between 1995 and 2010 rejected such an 
approach as a basis for its domestic development and international engagement.  
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In doing so the country demonstrated a valuable lesson – a small state, even 
one located in a highly unstable regional setting and a rapidly changing global 
economy, can make traditional notions about size and capabilities irrelevant if it has 
the resources to do so and is willing to approach the challenges it faces in a flexible, 






‘The Time is Now’: Re-Defining the Place of Qatar in the Contemporary World 
‘[A small state’s] perception of its size is very subjective and differs 
greatly from the perception of other external parties’. A.H. Henrikson.105 
 
On 2 December 2010, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 
the governing body of world football, awarded the 2022 World Cup, the world’s most 
watched sporting competition, to Qatar. This decision saw Qatar become the smallest 
country to both bid for and be chosen to host the tournament, as well as the first 
Muslim and Middle Eastern country to stage the event.  
‘Expect Amazing’ was Qatar’s slogan for it World Cup bid and this ‘sporting 
miracle’ and ‘mammoth upset’ that ‘had made the seemingly impossible, possible’,106 
was all the more impressive because, in winning the FIFA vote, Qatar led the way in 
every round of balloting to beat bids from Australia, South Korea, Japan and the 
United States (US). 
The final decision was a particular blow to the hopes of the US delegation, 
which lost the final round of voting to Qatar by 14 votes to 8. The US bid for the 2022 
event had long been viewed as the overwhelming favourite and the result meant that 
the US will now have to wait until at least 2026 until it is eligible to be awarded the 
men’s tournament. By selecting Qatar, FIFA also precluded a 2026 bid from China, 
the world’s other superpower, since the same continent cannot host consecutive 																																																								
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World Cups.107  
Many commentators explained the Qatari victory primarily in terms of the 
amount of money spent on the bid, which exceeded the total two-year bid budget for 
all of their rivals except Australia, which spent £28 million on its campaign.108  
Others went further and accused Qatar of using bribery to win the World Cup 
especially after a private email sent by FIFA general secretary Jerome Valcke, that 
claimed the 2022 event had been ‘bought’, was leaked to the press.  Despite, Valcke 
subsequently clarifying his email arguing that he was simply referring to the financial 
power that Qatar had brought to lobbying for the right to host the World Cup when he 
used the term ‘bought’,109 subsequent allegations and investigations continued to keep 
the issue in the international headlines. 
Undoubtedly, Qatar did draw on the country’s vast hydrocarbon earnings to 
make its case and win support across Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa. 
Looking beyond the media headlines Coates Ulrichsen has placed the financial aspect 
of the bid in its proper context.  The Qatari victory was not, he has argued, simply a 
function of financial largesse. Rather the Qatari leadership ‘worked the political 
mechanics of vote-winning better than rival bidders in order to secure the support of 
enough of the 24 voting members on the FIFA Executive’.110 
 Others were sceptical of the awarding of the World Cup to Qatar for reasons 
that had nothing to do with money.  As one media outlet put it, Qatar may have won 
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over FIFA but it faced an ‘even harder task: Convincing skeptical fans who fear the 
desert nation will hold a sweltering, boring and alcohol-free tournament’. 111  
Subsequent discussions over the summertime heat and the freedom of fans to 
drink alcohol in their locations of choice, as well as the working conditions of the 
army of foreign labourers brought in to build the facilities for the tournament have 
continued to cause controversy as Qatar steps up its preparation for the event.  
At the same time, there has also been widespread agreement that the 
meticulously planned, highly ambitious and innovative bid for the World Cup 
represented a culmination of Qatari efforts at home and abroad over the previous 
decade and a half.  In these terms, winning the World Cup bid was a significant boost 
to Qatar’s regional and international standing.   
It consolidated the country’s position as a leading global player inside the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) and it increased Qatar’s attractiveness as a destination for 
sports, business, tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI). It also validated Qatar’s 
efforts to use sports as a pillar of its soft power along the lines addressed in the 
introduction. 
Some went further. Former US president Bill Clinton, a member of the US bid 
delegation in Zurich, was gracious in defeat, telling an audience in New York that the 
‘FIFA people were in a mood to give it to people who didn’t have it. I think they 
wanted to make soccer a world sport…they wanted to say, here’s a good non-terrorist, 
non-bigoted way of embrace—no really, I’m not trivializing this—a way to embrace 
the modernization attempt of the Middle East’.112   
Clinton’s post-vote analysis was similar to those offered by senior Qatari 
figures closely involved in the bid process.  Prior to the FIFA decision, Qatar’s then 																																																								
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first lady Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned emphasised this aspect. ‘Just think’, 
she urged ‘what we can achieve together on behalf of our shared values’, as she 
argued that a vote for Qatar would send ‘out a message that after 92 years of waiting 
we are fully part of the global football family... When is the right time to bring the 
World Cup to the Middle East? The time is now’.113  
The Qatari bid-team’s thirty-minute presentation in Zurich immediately prior 
to the vote also directly addressed this issue by explaining how the tournament could 
unify a region ravaged by conflict. While, in the immediate wake of the decision, the 
Qatar bid chair Mohammed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani made much the same 
point when he thanked the voting committee and the global audience of football fans 
‘On behalf of millions of people living in the Middle East’, and praised the FIFA 
executive committee ‘for believing in us, thank you for having such bold vision ... 
Thank you also for acknowledging this is the right time for the Middle East. We have 
a date with history, which is summer 2022’.114   
The decision by FIFA to award Qatar the 2022 World Cup was certainly 
momentous on many levels for what it promised in the future in terms of the 
tournament going to a Muslim and Middle Eastern nation for the first time. It meant 
that the world’s number one global sporting event would take place in a country that 
inhabits a region where the potential for large-scale regional war between now and 
2022 is far from theoretical.115   
Apart from emphasizing the opportunities for contributing to peace and 
stability in the region, the bid also drew attention to the positive social impact of 
granting the event to Qatar. It promised to create leadership roles for, and further 																																																								
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contribute to the empowerment of, women in the region both in sport and wider 
society by launching a women’s football league and establishing a serious of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to support soccer clubs for underprivileged 
youth. Directly related to this, the bid document and presentation also promised that a 
Qatar World Cup would open up the Arab Middle East’s huge, and as yet untapped, 
youthful commercial market. It is estimated that by 2022 nearly 50 percent of the 
Middle East’s 700 million inhabitants will be children and young adults.116  
Not surprisingly, FIFA president Joseph “Sepp” Blatter welcomed the 
possibilities that a World Cup in the Middle East offered in terms of marketing 
football. ‘We need to expand’, Blatter argued, ‘we need to include people in the 
football family that have not been included before’.117 Thus Blatter presented the 
FIFA decision to choose a Muslim and Middle Eastern nation for the first time as 
enabling football to go to ‘new lands’.118    
Despite never having qualified for a previous World Cup, Qatar did have a 
track record over the previous decade of hosting and investing in football. In its 
efforts to develop its status as a football power on the world stage, Qatar built the 
45,000-seat Khalifa Stadium, which has hosted international exhibition and 
competitive matches, including a clash between the leading teams of Brazil and 
Argentina. The Qatari Football Association also looked to tempt some of the biggest 
names in the sport into Qatar’s domestic professional league (previously known as the 
Q-League, prior to being rebranded as the Qatar Stars League). These have included 
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Marcel Desailly, a member of France’s world cup winning team, and the former 
Argentina striker Gabriel Batistuta.   
Even more importantly, in terms of influencing the FIFA executive 
committee’s decision, was the fact that in 2004 Qatar established the Aspire Sports 
Academy, which identifies and trains young soccer players from all over the 
developing world, notably Africa. It also launched the Excellence programme, a 
government-backed project that runs football development schemes in 10 African 
nations and in Asia, as well as an academy in Doha.  
Most of the other World Cup bids competing with Qatar promised FIFA that 
they would use the World Cup to aid world football development, but in the Aspire 
and Excellence programmes, Qatar could already point to a long-established, thriving 
programme in the developing world. 
By 2010 Qatar could also boast a track record in other international sporting 
events apart from football as a part of its strategy of attracting visitors and raising its 
profile internationally. Most notably, Qatar hosted the fifteenth Asian games in 2006 
and, prior to World Cup bid, made an unsuccessful bid for the 2016 Olympics. Qatar 
also hosts the annual Qatar Masters that has established itself as part of the PGA 
European Golf Tour; while the Qatar Open and WTA Championships are now two of 
the biggest events on the tennis calendar. In 2010, the year that this study ends, Qatar 
successfully organized and hosted no less than 24 major sports events. 
Qatar also promised to spend up to US$57 billion on various infrastructural 
projects prior to the start of the World Cup.  Most notably, the bid emphasised the 
provision of environmentally friendly public transport facilities, free of charge for 
match ticket holders, based on short transfers between the stadia, hotels and other 
facilities in the greater Doha area.  This is part of a plan to invest US$24 billion in 
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transport infrastructure, including high-speed rail lines to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
and the construction of a 340-kilometre public transport network serving Doha and its 
environs.  
The proposals are based on the Transport Master Plan adopted in 2006 to 
support Qatar’s unsuccessful bid for the 2016 Olympic Games.  In November 2009, a 
US$25 billion contract was signed to design and build Doha’s metro and suburban rail 
network. The metro network will eventually have four lines with 98 stations, with 
Phase I covering the 30 kilometre Red Line from Lusail to New Doha International 
Airport, the US$13 billion airport opened in 2011.119 Seventy percent of the planned 
rail network should be operational by 2020. 
Qatar also plans to invest US$4 billion to build nine stadiums and renovate 
three others in time for the World Cup.  These twelve venues will be concentrated 
within a 60 kilometre radius of Doha and will be served by the new rail networks. The 
new stadia will underline the mix of infrastructural investment and cutting edge 
technology that has defined Qatar’s recent development.  
Notably, all the primary components of the Sports City Stadium— its roof, its 
seats, even its field— will be retractable.  The roof, which will open and close in 15 to 
20 minutes, can also claim a design feature that sets it apart from others: It will be 
large enough to hold people within it, thus adding to the 47,560-seat occupancy of the 
stadium, which can be adjusted downward for concerts, exhibitions, and other non-
soccer events.120 
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Another revolutionary element of the Qatari bid is the cooling system that is 
being developed in order to address the challenge of summer-time heat that can reach 
the mid-40s Celsius. The plan is to develop a cooling technology that will use solar 
power to provide zero-carbon air conditioning to cool outdoor stadiums for both 
players and spectators. The solar energy will be converted into electricity that will 
then be used to cool the stadiums. This will then reduce the temperature by as much 
as 20 degrees Celsius compared to the summer average by keeping the stadium and 
the pitch at a constant temperature of 27 Celsius. 
When the venue needs to use its cooling system, the hot water will run through 
an absorption unit that will chill the water and send it into another tank which will 
pump cool air at the ankle and neck level in each row of seats.121 During matches, the 
stadia will draw energy from the grid and at the same time an off-site solar farm will 
transfer energy to a city grid. Solar collectors will use the sun’s power to heat up 
water, which will then be transported to an on-site water storage tank, which will keep 
the water’s high temperature.   
When games are not taking place, the solar installations at the stadia will 
collect and export energy onto the power grid. This is the basis for the Qatari promise 
that its World Cup will be a carbon-neutral event and that every venue will take part 
in a countrywide zero-carbon-emissions plan.122 The bid also promised that on 
conclusion of the competition the stadiums built for the tournament would be 
dismantled and donated to countries in the developing world where they would be 
rebuilt.  
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All these plans gained much positive comment following their announcement 
and initiation: ‘Qatar: Eco-Friendly Soccer Utopia’ was how Wired magazine put it. 
‘Qatar’s World Cup Win is Win for Technology’, ran another headline. Design Daily 
ran a large spread on the technology being used in building the Qatari World Cup 
Stadia. 123 While another expert predicted that the World Cup in Doha in 2022 would 
be a ‘month long lab in sustainability, clean energy, and green technology’124 – in 
other words, a giant advert for the kind of socio-economic development that Qatar as 
a country has been very keen to be associated with on the world stage since 1995. 
That FIFA voted for Qatar despite all the controversy and risk attached to the 
bid signalled clearly the international community’s faith in what Qatar promises to 
achieve in coming years, something that was symbolised by the victory over the US in 
the final round. Not only had Qatar defeated the only global military superpower, and 
its long-time strategic partner, but it had outbid an economic giant (Qatar’s GDP in 
2008 was less than 1 percent of the size of US GDP) and the world’s leading 
knowledge economy, by promising to do what it had done so often in the period 
between 1995 and 2010—use its hydrocarbon earnings to push the limits of 
infrastructural design and environmentally-friendly technology as a springboard for 
projecting Qatar’s stature on the global stage.125 
Central to being able to do this was Qatar’s rising status as a world-leading 
exporter of natural gas since 1995.  As the doyen of energy commentators Daniel 
Yergin has noted, the rising importance of natural gas has brought ‘new opportunities 																																																								
123 ‘Qatar’s World Cup Win is Win for Technology’, Crunch Gear, 2 December 2010 
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and risks, new interdependencies and geopolitical alignments’.126  
Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of Qatar. Qatar established 
itself ‘a game changer’ in the gas market during the decade and a half between 1995 
and 2010.127 Traditionally there was a much more limited market for gas than oil but 
in the course of recent decades the benefits of gas became very clear. There exists 
huge deposits of gas and it is also the cleanest burning fossil fuel, producing little 
pollution and less carbon dioxide emissions—the key greenhouse gas—than either 
coal or oil.  
When natural gas is refrigerated down to temperatures of minus 260 degrees 
Fahrenheit it contracts into liquid, which can be transported by tanker.  On arrival at 
its destination the liquefied gas is restored to its original state in a re-gasification 
terminal. Traditionally the whole process has been costly, but it is very effective—
methane is 600 times less voluminous as a liquid than as a gas—and it allows a large 
amount of energy to be packed into a single cargo as one shipment holds the 
equivalent of five percent of the gas consumed in the US on an average day.128 
Qatar’s North Field129 was discovered by Dutch Shell in 1971 but long 
considered of little value because it had no oil and its natural gas was difficult to 
transport. But by aggressively seizing on new ways of commercializing its natural gas 
resources, Qatar succeeded in turning the North Field into what is now widely 
considered to be the second largest petroleum deposit in the world after the Ghawar 
oil field in Saudi Arabia. In the process, by being at the forefront of a shift away from 
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crude oil to natural gas, Qatar became a key player in a world that has more gas than 
oil. 
Qatar’s natural gas reserves amount to 900 trillion cubic feet, equivalent to 15 
percent of the proven gas reserves in the world and the world’s third largest after 
Russia and Iran.  In comparison the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) can only claim 7 percent of the proven gas reserves between them. 
The extent of the gas supply-demand imbalance in the Gulf region has made it 
necessary that the countries of the GCC, with the exception of Qatar, consider 
importing gas to meet rapidly rising demand.130 Indeed, by the early 2000s Qatar was 
providing low-cost gas supplies to Bahrain, to spur its industrialization; to Kuwait, to 
help fuel its power generation and desalination plants; and to Dubai to fuel its energy-
intensive industries.131 
 From the late 1990s, Qatar also succeeded in attracting the largest gas projects 
internationally and dwarfed both the scale and number of similar projects being 
developed by competitors such as Indonesia, Algeria, Australia, Iran and Egypt.   
 This success was the reward for the bold vision and unprecedented risk taken 
by Qatar’s leadership from the mid-1990s to develop its massive reserves and 
establish itself as a leading gas exporter.  As recently as 2003, Liquid Natural Gas 
(LNG) accounted for less than 5 percent of the gas dealt on global markets. Despite 
this, between 2003 and 2009, Qatar invested over US$40 billion in order to quadruple 
its LNG export capacity.   
In 2004, Qatar’s then industry and energy minister, Abdullah bin Hamad Al 
Attiyah, was confident that ‘we will be the first country in the world to sell LNG to all 																																																								
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three regions – US, Europe and Asia’ and that Qatar would also top the ranks in sales 
of gas to liquids (GTL) by 2011, becoming the world’s largest exporter of LNG in the 
process. 132 
Qatar expanded its yearly LNG output from 4.5 million tons annually in 2002 
to 77million tonnes in 2010, in turn  becoming the world’s largest exporter of LNG 
over Malaysia and Indonesia and serving 23 countries.133  It met its goal a year ahead 
of schedule in December 2010.134   
 This milestone was reached the same month as Qatar won the right to host the 
World Cup in 2022.  It was marked by a celebration at the Qatari industrial city of 
Ras Laffa attended by the chief executives of all the major energy corporations 
including Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and ConocoPhillips. 
None of those attending underestimated this impressive achievement or were 
ignorant of just how far Qatar had come as a gas power considering that it was only in 
1977 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the first Gulf state to export LNG.  
Moreover, Qatar’s aggressive investment and development strategy from the 
mid-1990s onwards meant that while other GCC states began to import gas (notably, 
the UAE and Dubai from Qatar in 2006 and 2009 respectively and Kuwait from 
Russia in 2009) Qatar is likely to be the only GCC state that will not have to consider 
importing gas to meet rapidly rising demand in the foreseeable future.135  
Central to the Qatari success in meeting its goal of becoming the leading 
producer and exporter of LNG was an early realisation that such ambitious targets 
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could only be achieved through cooperation with external partners. Despite the fact 
that there has rarely been consensus within the GCC with respect to foreign 
investment in oil and gas,136 Qatar long embraced a policy of welcoming oil majors 
through production and sharing agreements. This has brought in significant 
investment, which is important as the cost of LNG projects is high—unlike oil it can 
be very difficult and expensive to ship across the world—and on average run from 
US$3 billion-US$10 billion for a single project.  
As one senior Ministry of Industry and Energy figure explained in 2009, ‘In 
Qatar, we believe that a “global partnership” is the key’ in all aspects of the energy 
sector.137 But Qatar’s success was also been predicated on a willingness to abandon 
overly ambitious or financially unfeasible flagship projects despite the negative 
publicity that such decisions entail.  
For example, in 2006 Qatar placed a moratorium on new gas projects due to 
an escalation in costs; while the following year, Qatar’s state run oil and gas company 
agreed, along with its partner Exxon Mobil, to abandon one if its biggest investments 
ever, a project to produce clean-burning diesel from natural gas. Instead both decided 
to focus on a new gas drilling project in the Barzan field, expected to produce 1.5 
billion cubic feet of gas a day and upwards from 2012.138 
Qatar not only looked to attract the major global energy players to work with 
them in sharing the cost of production and distribution of its gas reserves. As it hopes 
to show the world during its World Cup of 2022 it has also looked to tie these 
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companies into the Qatari goal of becoming a cutting edge player in “green” 
technology, research and development (R&D) and innovation. 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total all established research and 
training centres at Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP), launched in 2009 and 
known as Technology City.139 The mandate of QSTP is to provide facilities, 
commercialisation support programmes, capital repatriation and tax incentives for 
international companies to develop new technologies in partnership with the City’s 
universities, and as an incubator for start-up ventures. As a Total spokesman has 
explained Technology City has contributed significantly to the perception of Qatar as 
a cutting edge player, committed to ‘pushing the boundaries of technology’.140   
Indeed, as a leading Qatari businessman Sheikh Abul Aziz al Thani has 
emphasised, the importance of setting up Technology city is that it ‘shows our 
country has a vision about the kind of development it wants to pursue’.141 The same is 
true for the US$2.6 billion Energy City, first mooted as an idea in 2006. It is the 
region’s first integrated business hub dedicated to the hydrocarbon industry providing 
a single point of access to markets and expertise, in what is planned to be a hub for 
global players across all sectors of the hydrocarbon industry that have an interest in 
the Middle East.  
The project was fully backed by the government of Qatar and has led the way 
in hydrocarbon above ground resource development.142 This project has been credited 
with placing Qatar at the forefront of building what has been called the ‘Silicon 
Valley of alternative energy’.143 This has been very much in line with the aspirations 
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and hopes of Qatari leaders. As Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah has explained, the 
plan was always been to make Qatar ‘the capital of the world for this new age of 
fuels’.144 
Qatar Science and Technology Park and Energy City, as well as the Sidra 
Medical and Research Centre, a centre of excellence for biomedical research, are 
other important reminders of the fact that in the decade and a half between 1995 and 
2010 Qatar succeeded in developing its infrastructure so sufficiently that it could 
attract global leaders in numerous sectors—in areas ranging from energy (Exxon 
Mobil) to finance (JP Morgan), to hi-technology (Microsoft and Cisco Systems), to 
technology innovation (the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company).   
This in turn helped to develop Qatar’s research capacity from a very low base 
in a short space of time notably in the areas of water, food and energy, which are not 
only considered important to the future of Qatar but which are key global policy 
priorities.  
The objectives in attracting such leading private sector firms to these parks is 
not only to develop research in vitally important areas but also to ensure that 
appropriate research is brought to market. They are also intended to support the 
vigorous programme of “Qatarization”, under which all joint venture industries and 
government departments strive to move Qatari nationals into positions of greater 
authority in the workplace.  
One indication of the success of this has been the growing numbers of foreign-
educated Qataris, including many educated in the US and Europe, who have returned 
home to assume key positions formerly occupied by expatriates.  This follows the 																																																								
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experience of other small states—such as Israel and Ireland—whose focus on 
developing the knowledge economy during the 1990s resulted in a similar inflow of 
highly-qualified and high-achieving nationals previously working overseas.145 
All this required dramatic increases in spending and investment in the 
education and research and development (R&D) sectors between 1995 and 2010. By 
the end of this period Qatar led the way (followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE) in 
GCC investment in education and R&D.  In 2008, for example, Qatar invested 
QR19bn (£3.45bn), 21 percent of the state’s total budget on education and R&D. This 
compares favourably with the QR418m invested in the same areas in 2003 and clearly 
underlines the long-term, focused, strategy of development that existed for much of 
the period under analysis in this thesis.  
During this time period, the government also established national research 
agencies to address major gaps in the provision of funding. It also looked to promote, 
through financial support, collaboration with the Qatar National Research Fund 
(QNRF).  This frequently involved (and continues to involve) joint projects with local 
organisations in order to support the development of an indigenous research culture.  
It puts special emphasis on funding collaboration between researchers in Qatar, 
and their international colleagues. QNRF was founded in 2006 with the aim of 
contributing to the development of Qatar as a knowledge-based economy. From the 
outset it aimed to advance knowledge and education by supporting original, 
competitively selected research.  Its mandate was clear. Successful research 																																																								
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applications should result in the accumulation of human capital or a sustainable 
research capability in Qatar; answer research questions of vital interest to Qatar; and 
provide positive recognition of Qatar due to the regional or global significance of the 
research.146 
Research capacity building in Qatar is the responsibility of the Qatar 
Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (QF).  One of the 
earliest ventures established by the new Emir on taking power in 1995, from the 
outset it was envisaged as a vehicle to convert the country’s hydrocarbon wealth into 
sustainable human capital by establishing state-of-the-art facilities and a world 
leading collaborative environment.  
As chapter 2 will show, Qatari strategy from this time onwards also looked to 
involve the development of a completely new third level education infrastructure.  
The scale of Qatar’s ambitions to become a key regional and even global education 
centre has also been underlined by its launch of a biennial World Innovation Summit 
for Education which brings opinion leaders, policy makers and leading thinkers in the 
field of education from around the world to Doha.  The aim of this summit is to find 
new ways to address educational challenges by driving innovation though anticipating 
future trends and the exchange of experiences and “success stories”.    
Qatar’s achievements in gaining investment in R&D, especially by the private 
sector, and in promoting collaboration in research between universities and industry, 
as well as the protection of intellectual property have been acknowledged 
internationally. The Global Competitiveness Report for 2008-09 prepared by the 
World Economic Forum measured the degree to which a supportive environment was 
found in 134 participating countries. Qatar ranked top of all GCC states in 5 of the 8 
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categories. It came 25th in university-industry collaboration compared to Bahrain 
(101); Kuwait (73); Saudi Arabia (37) and UAE (58). Qatar also led the GCC states in 
company spending on R&D coming 35th overall—compared to Saudi Arabia (43); 
UAE (50); Bahrain (82); and Kuwait (93).  
In the category of Quality of Scientific Research Institutions, Qatar ranked at 
number 30. This compared to Saudi Arabia (47); Kuwait (54); the UAE (74); and 
Bahrain (100). Qatar ranked 9th in the category of government procurement of 
advanced technology products, compared to Bahrain (27); Saudi Arabia (34); the 
UAE (46); and Kuwait (98). While in the key category of overall innovation, Qatar 
was ranked 29th, compared to Saudi Arabia (34); the UAE (46); Kuwait (71); and 
Bahrain (75).147 
All this underlines one key point: reinvesting massive surpluses generated by 
oil and gas revenues in a way that supports the long-term prospects of the country was 
a central priority for government of Qatar between 1995 and 2010.   One of the 
primary vehicles for achieving this both domestically and externally has been the 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA).  Established in 2004 as part of the strategy of 
economic diversification, the QIA serves as the kingdom of Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (SWF).   
A Sovereign-Wealth Fund is a state-owned investment fund composed of 
financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial instruments 
funded by foreign exchange assets. These assets can include balance of payments 
surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.148 																																																								
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Qatar’s SWF was one of more than twenty similar entities founded globally 
between 2003 and 2008 in response to rising commodity prices, especially in oil and 
gas.  In 2007 it was estimated that SWFs had a US$4 trillion cache of petrodollar 
investments around the world.149 In the same year Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates estimated that member states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) earned US$700 billion from energy exports, up from US$243 
billion in 2000 and had to place collectively over US$5 billion a week from energy 
revenues. 
The QIA has a mandate to invest in a diverse range of assets classes to make 
money for the Qatari people.150 Since its establishment, the QIA looked to use some 
of Qatar’s commodity surplus of wealth, which comes primarily from its exports of 
LNG, to curtail reliance on energy price volatility by diversifying into new asset 
classes globally.  
According to its constitutive instrument, the QIA’s objectives are to develop, 
invest, and manage the state reserve funds and other property assigned to it by the 
Government via the Supreme Council of Economic Affairs and Investments. As such, 
the government, through this fund, is ultimately the main investor and guarantor of 
the stability of the economy. The establishment of QIA is a reflection of Qatar’s 
strategic view of how to shape its economic future, as well as its emerging capacity to 
operate in the global financial markets. The strategy of the QIA is to invest its surplus 																																																																																																																																																														
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funds in a mixture of asset classes in a variety of places directly rather than via private 
equity funds to whom they allocate capital.  
As of the end of 2010 QIA was ranked the twelfth largest SWF globally in 
terms of assets held, with between US$85-$100 billion.151 The Qatari Diar Real Estate 
Investment Company is fully owned subsidiary of QIA. It was founded in early 2005 
and was initially capitalized at US$1 billion to support Qatar’s rapidly expanding 
economy and to provide structure and quality control for the country’s real estate 
development priorities. It has developed into a key global real estate player and has 
built up a large portfolio with more than 40 projects in 17 countries across the Middle 
East, Africa, and Europe including France, the UK, Italy, Oman, Morocco, Egypt, 
Syria, Sudan and Seychelles.  
As of 2010, Diar had invested more than US$60 billion in projects. In 2006 
Qatar Holding LLC was incorporated, within the jurisdiction of Qatar Financial 
Centre (QFC), as the prime vehicle for strategic and direct investments by the State of 
Qatar.152 The fund also owns a holding company called the Qatar Investment 
Company.153  
Like other resource- rich nations that are poor in arable land and have a 
growing population,154 in the years prior to 2010 Qatar, like other GCC states, also 
looked to secure its heavy dependence on food imports by exploring the strategy of 
buying farmlands abroad to produce output exclusively for local markets.155   
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As such, another smaller, but increasingly important strand of Qatar’s SWF is 
Hassad Food, the Farm/Agricultural Investment Company that was established in 
2008 by QIA to work towards the government’s strategic priority of securing 
adequate food supply at reasonable prices by investing in and taking shareholdings in 
agricultural, livestock, and food companies.  
Qatar for example, has followed other countries—such as South Korea, which 
is developing 400 square miles in Tanzania—in investing in arable land, notably in 
Kenya where it has agreed to lease nearly 100,000 acres in return for financing a new 
port.156 More generally, Qatar has differed from others in addressing its food security 
concerns because instead of just acquiring land, it has primarily chosen to concentrate 
on investing in existing agri-businesses.157  
The QIA has made some notable investments across the Arab world in the 
period examined in this thesis. In 2006, for example, it established the Qatar Oman 
Investment Company with paid-up capital of QR300million to invest in both countries’ 
financial, educational, health care, tourism and real estate sectors.158 While in May 
2008 Qatari Diar invested US$245 million (QR892mn) in Palestine to build a self-
sufficient township in Rawabi, located between Ramallah and Nablus on the West 
Bank.159 
But the QIA has not limited itself to investments in its home region (in line 
with the fact that the Arab region only attracts 10 percent of total FDI from other 
Arab countries). In May 2008 a senior QIA official speaking at the Wealth Funds 
Conference in Abu Dhabi estimated that 40 percent of its future real estate 																																																								
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investments would be in Asia, especially ‘cities in India, China, Singapore, Korea, 
Vietnam and Malaysia’.160 Since then the Qatari fund has taken major stakes in 
everything from office complexes, and power companies in India to shopping malls in 
Malaysia, to luxury residential and hotel resorts in Tajikistan and investment funds in 
Vietnam and Indonesia.161   
The QIA and its offshoots have also made many highly visible investments in 
much more developed markets. These have included stakes in Volkswagen AG and 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE in Germany and numerous property and business 
investments in Paris and Monaco.162 In London, Qatari purchases included the iconic 
department store Harrods, and major holding in the Canary Wharf financial services 
centre as well as an historic building in Grosvenor Square, that has housed the US 
embassy since 1938. It was also a key partner in developing the Shard building at 
London Bridge, into Europe’s tallest building.163 
Not surprisingly at the height of the Qatari boom, in 2008, the QIA, with all its 
various branches, was described as being on ‘a seemingly unstoppable upwards 
trajectory’.164  Indeed, between 2006 and 2010 the QIA’s constituent parts made some 
of the largest (and most talked about) investments and asset purchases across the 
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global economy culminating in 2010 when Qatar was estimated to be the world’s 
largest investor in cross-border property.165   
The scale of the Qatari investment strategy of taking numerous stakes in big-
name companies and real estate assets (notably the purchase of Harrods department 
store in London) generated much passionate debate.166 In particular there was 
criticism of what the Financial Times has termed the apparent ‘penchant for trophy 
assets’.167 Despite this, there is no doubt that Qatar’s ‘global shopping spree’,168 
played a notable role in raising the country’s international status, especially in the 
context of the global financial crisis since 2008-09.  
Though fully integrated into the world economy and financial markets the 
GCC was the regional economic bloc least affected by the global economic crisis. The 
international recession did have a negative impact on the GCC states, including Qatar.  
From 2008 onwards there was a significant withdrawal from debt financing in the 
region and a contraction of capital inflows into the GCC economies. In April 2009 
Qatari Diar announced that in the face of the global financial crisis it would focus on 
40 projects that were already in place before expanding its investment into new 
areas.169  
Most notably, the financial crisis that gripped the world post-2008 came at a 
time when Qatar and other GCC countries were focusing on developing their financial 
markets as an essential component of their economic diversification programmes.170 																																																								
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The global downturn placed significant pressure on this sector.  In October 2008, as 
regional markets slumped in response to global crisis, the QIA launched a US$5.3 
billion plan to buy shares in 10-20 percent of the capital of banks listed on the Doha 
stock market in order to shore up investor confidence.171 The following December the 
Commercial Bank of Qatar and Qatar Islamic Bank announced similar plans to sell 
stakes to the QIA, as part of the plan to ensure that banks in Qatar were able to keep 
project financing on track.172 
Despite such major state-sponsored efforts, by January 2009 the Doha stock 
market was down nearly 50 percent on its peak of 12,629 in June 2008. 173 The 
following October QIA announced that it would raise the capital base of Qatari banks 
by a further 10-20 percent, and committed an estimated US$5.3billion for this 
purpose. 
In March 2009, in order to protect the banks from their investment losses, the 
Qatari government, through the Central Bank of Qatar, announced that it was willing 
to buy from banks their entire portfolio of investments classified as available for 
sale.174 The following June the Qatari government stated that it was willing to 
purchase from banks, real estate exposure worth US$4.1billion.  In the end the 
government bought the investment portfolios of Qatar National Bank (QNB), Doha 
Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank, Qatar International Islamic Bank, Ahli Bank and Al Khalij 
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Commercial Bank and Commercial Bank of Qatar. 
By the end of 2009 official intervention reached about 6.5 percent of GDP, 
mainly in the form of capital injections into banks by the QIA and the purchase of the 
relevant bank’s equity investment and property portfolios, a move commended by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a  ‘timely and decisive intervention in the 
banking system’.175 
Ultimately, Qatar was wealthy enough to undertake such a range of 
interventions without causing a lasting impact on its state finances. This meant that 
during the global financial crisis the country retained huge investment potential.  This 
was true even compared to other hydrocarbon producing nations, because of Qatar’s 
lower extraction costs and easily accessible reserves.  Qatari Prime Minister, Hamad 
bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, head of the QIA during the period up 
to 2010, was confident that the credit crisis had ‘minimally’ affected Qatar compared 
to other developed nations and restated the QIA’s policy position that ‘We cannot 
build all our reserves on one kind of investment, so we have to spread it’.176  
As such, from the outbreak of the crisis, EU and US officials appealed to 
Qatar and other GCC nations to contribute to the rescue of their ailing financial 
institutions by pouring credit into the international financial system in order to add to 
liquidity.177  As then US Deputy Treasury Secretary, Robert Kimmitt, explained, 
‘Collective efforts are needed to tackle the global financial crisis and Gulf countries 
have a key role in resolving it’.178  Then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and 
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French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as senior IMF officials also appealed to the 
Gulf States to provide funds to the IMF when it became clear that the US$250 billion 
that the IMF earmarked to bail out countries in distress was insufficient for the 
crisis.179 
Notably, in November 2008 Prime Minister Brown visited Qatar as part of a 
trip to the region to attract investment from SWFs for the financial markets and get 
nations including Qatar to add ‘hundreds of billions of dollars’ to the IMF.  Since then 
a series of other European leaders, including those from the most badly affected 
economies, have visited Qatar on similar missions.180 
Traditionally, as a percentage of GNP, Qatar’s foreign aid and development 
assistance to the region and beyond had been above average and there had been 
significant contributions to regional entities such as the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development, the Arab-African Oil Assistance Fund, the OPEC Special Fund 
and the IMF Oil Facility.181  
However, in response to the global financial crisis, Qatar agreed to take a 
number of proactive measures to monitor and manage the challenge outside its own 
borders, notably in the global financial services sector. 182 In early 2008 it was 
reported that the QIA had up to US$15 billion to invest in European and US banks 
and rumours abounded following reports that the QIA was considering investing in 
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Royal Bank of Scotland, then the UK’s second biggest bank.183 In mid-April, the QIA 
played a key role in stabilising Credit Suisse’s position, which in turn, allowed the 
Swiss bank to weather the global crisis.184  
Later in the year the British bank Barclays raised US$7.6 billion by selling 
securities including convertible notes to Middle Eastern investors, again led by Qatar 
Holdings, at a time when less than a fifth of its existing shareholders signed up to buy 
shares.185 This contributed significantly to the stabilisation of Barclays, which had lost 
two-thirds of is market value at the height of the global crisis.   
Following the Qatari investment, the share price rebounded by 96 percent, 
leading the British prime minister to say, ‘Right now, we aren’t worried about 
Barclays… we in fact have a strong belief that Barclays will get over this problem.’186 
Subsequently, Qatar also invested an estimated $5 billion into Greek assets to prop up 
the struggling Mediterranean economy.  
In the wake of the financial crisis the vital capital injections made by SWFs 
such as the QIA in key sectors and in cooperation with national governments, 
corporate leaders and financial institutions attracted positive attention from markets, 
policymakers, national parliaments and the media.82  As a consequence, as Qatar’s 
finance minster Yousef Hussain Kamal noted, following the global financial crisis 
world opinion about the role of SWF’s ‘changed 180 degrees’.187 Long-held 
																																																								
183 ‘Qatari government eyes RBS investment: report’, Reuters News Agency, 24 February 2008; G. Tett, 
‘Western Banks Face Backlash as they Hand out Begging Bowl’, The Financial Times, 8 February 
2008. 
184 H. Sender, ‘Qatar Fund Buys Credit Suisse Stake’, The Financial Times, 18 February 2008; ‘Qatar 
gives Credit Suisse clear backing’, 24 April 2009, 
http://en.news.maktoob.com/20090000001781/Qatar_gives_Credit_Suisse_clear_backing/Article.htm 
185 ‘QIA buys into Barclays Bank’, Reuters News Agency, 18 July 2008. 
186 Edward Evansand Francine Lacqua, ‘Qatar Seeks ‘Blue Chips’ to Diversify, Leader Says’, 
Bloomberg News.Com, 30 January 2009. 
82 G. Tett, ‘Davos: Sovereign Funds Face Growing US Pressure’, The Financial Times, 24 January 
2008. 
187 ‘Qatar pledges more funds for infrastructure’, Business-Intelligence Middle East (Bi-Me), 13 
November 2008. 
	 69	
suspicions gave way to relief that these institutions, previously perceived as predators 
on the global markets, had played an important role in contributing to the return of 
financial stability and liquidity.  
 The QIA, in turn, established itself as a high profile and leading member of 
this global ‘aristocracy of liquidity’, as SWFs have come to be known. At the same 
time, as Doha Bank Group chief executive office, R. Seetharaman, argued in mid-
2009, speaking before the US-Arab Chamber of Commerce at a meeting in Houston, 
Texas, the global financial crisis allowed for Qatar to showcase its fundamental 
strengths. In particular, it provided Qatar with the opportunity to promote itself as a 
highly professional business partner with the means, ambition and capability to take a 
lead role at the top table of international finance.  
Another consequence of the global economic crisis was a closer relationship 
between SWFs, including the QIA, and the IMF. The Qatari government underlined 
the importance of collaboration with the IMF not only in terms of regulating 
management of SWFs but in maximising the funding of financial injections.  As 
Yousef Hussain Kamal explained, the global crisis had changed the view of Qatar’s 
key policymakers in terms of how the QIA should operate.  Previously, Qatar had not 
considered directing investments towards non-profit or non-strategic ends, but the 
economic crisis had highlighted how imperative this could be in order to bolster 
global stability.188 
Another interesting aspect of Qatari investments in the period under analysis is 
that they were often made in order to add value to existing or future plans for 																																																								
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domestic infrastructural or technological development. In late 2008, for example, 
Qatari Diar acquired Cegelec, an international group providing technological services 
to companies and public authorities in the areas of energy and electricity; automation, 
instrumentation and control; information and communication technologies.  As 
Ghanim Al Saad, Chief Executive Officer of Qatari Diar, explained ‘We intend to 
fully associate Cegelec to all of our development projects in the Middle East, in 
Europe and Africa, where Qatari Diar is strongly established’.189   
In late 2009, Qatari Diar raised QR4 billion through syndicated Islamic debt, 
an amount 14 percent greater than that originally mandated.  Though these funds were 
intended to be used for further domestic and overseas investments, there was also 
another objective—to employ a local Qatari banks in the process as the sole Mandated 
Leader Arranger (MLA) and book-runner in order to highlight the increased 
sophistication, professionalism and expertise of Qatar’s financial services sector. This 
drew further attention to the local financial sector’s ability to provide for the needs of 
the international markets, in turn increasing the profile and appeal of the Qatar 
Financial Centre (QFC).190    
In the financial sphere, Qatar put as much as US$6 billion into the initial 
public offering by Agricultural Bank of China, a decision described by observers as a 
political move intended to help Qatar open new markets for its gas. While its US$2.7 
billion investment in Santander Brazil in late 2010 further underlined this ‘financial 
diplomacy’,191 as it followed a January trip by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to 
Latin America’s emerging global powerhouse.   
By maximizing the value of its natural gas reserves (the third largest in the 
world), through international partnerships and by re-investing hydrocarbon wealth in 																																																								
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socio-economic development at home, Qatar has excelled in creating an environment 
that is conducive to innovative activity and initiatives that create an infrastructure and 
enabling environment for research to develop and flourish. Some have gone so far as 
to describe this process as going some way to turning Qatar into a cross between 
Sweden and Switzerland in the Middle East.192 
In his recent history of Qatar, Fromherz asks whether Qatar can be described 
as a ‘new model of modernity’.193  Certainly, by becoming a purveyor of leading 
global brands abroad, by having the ambition to compete for the Olympics and the 
World Cup, by developing a rich and vibrant sporting, educational, technological and 
cultural hub , the country has developed a ‘huge sense of itself’.194  
In doing so, Qatar by the end of 2010 had increasingly come to be viewed as a 
first rank economic, sporting and diplomatic power in the region. How this has come 
about is a focus of successive chapters.  
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Chapter 2   
 
A New Vision at Home? Political Gradualism and Socio-Economic Risk-taking 
in Qatar, 1995-2005 
‘[In a small state] important policy decisions… emerge out of the personal 
aspirations and preferences of the leader’. Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem195 
 
On June 27, 1995, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani , Qatar’s Deputy Emir 
deposed his father Emir Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed 
Al Thani, who had ruled Qatar for 23 years. This followed the pattern of ‘bloodless 
and rather gentlemanly coups’ that were common across the Gulf.196  Indeed, in 
February 1972 Sheik Khalifa himself had become Emir of Qatar when he displaced 
his cousin Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani 
in what became known in the country as the ‘corrective movement’.197   
On taking power, the Sandhurst trained and Cambridge-educated new Emir 
put forward a new vision for Qatar at home and abroad in the economic, societal and 
diplomatic spheres.  Over the next decade and a half, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani, described by the New York Times as the ‘face of a new generation’, 1 built up a 
reputation for astute, ambitious and cautiously progressive rule, that had the potential 
to profoundly alter Qatar’s domestic situation and its relationship with regional and 
global powers.198 																																																								
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That is not to say that Qatar’s contemporary achievements have solely been 
the result of policies introduced following the new Emir’s rise to power in mid-1995.  
A number of key strategic and economic decisions relating to the development of the 
gas industry, bilateral relations with Israel, the United States and Qatar’s neighbours 
in the Gulf had already been proposed and initiated prior to Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani’s succession.   
But it is also true that prior to becoming Emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani had played a leading role in initiating many of these innovative policies. From 
1989 he had been heir apparent and defence minister. By 1993 he had taken over 
much of the day-to-day running of the country and, as the key figure setting the 
national agenda, was intimately involved in all decisions of national importance.199 
Though the transfer of power in 1995 was bloodless and had the backing of 
most of the ruling Al-Thani family, it was not without its complications. Despite 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s de facto leadership of Qatar prior to 1995, his 
father contested the coup.  
Before the new Emir could fully consolidate his power he had to weather an 
attempted countercoup in February 1996 allegedly masterminded by a cousin and 
former government minister, who was subsequently captured outside of Qatar and 
prosecuted. Over one hundred others, mostly ex-military officers, were also detained 
and prosecuted for their roles in the attempted counter-coup.  
This challenge to his rule in February 1996 prompted Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani to initiate civil proceedings against his father to retrieve an alleged 
US$3-$12 billion of state assets supposedly in his possession. This led to a protracted 
lawsuit between father and son over the rightful ownership of these billions of dollars, 																																																								
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which was finally settled out of court.   
Qatar’s neighbours, in particular Saudi Arabia, had supported Sheik Khalifa 
bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed Al Thani’s rise to power by 
deploying National Guard units near the Qatar-UAE border. 200  Now, two decades 
later Saudi Arabia, along with Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, backed Sheik deposed Emir 
and provided either moral or material support for the attempt to dislodge his son.   
Their decision to do so profoundly influenced Qatar’s emerging approach to 
external engagement in international affairs. As this thesis will show, this in turn 
would have significant implications for Qatar’s future bilateral and multilateral 
relations with its Gulf neighbours inside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
well as its regional engagement more generally. 
 In a move that went a long way to clear up the succession question, and thus 
eliminate a major cause of domestic political tension, the new Emir issued an Emiri 
decree changing the line of succession from within the Al-Thani family to male 
descendants of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani 
 He also quickly appointed an heir, his third son, Jasim bin Hamad bin Khalifa 
Al Thani.  In 2000, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani established the Ruling Family 
Council, a body appointed by him and under his chairmanship, tasked with deciding 
on the vacancy for the post of Emir. The new Emir also placed his allies in positions 
of power and populated the cabinet with highest number of ruling family members of 
any GCC state.201  
 Once succession was settled and potential familial threats were neutralized the 
Emir faced few other credible challengers to his rule.  The Al-Thani family had 																																																								
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dominated Qatar since the nineteenth century to the extent that the history of the 
ruling family and the country were almost inseparable.  As western official documents 
on the region from the time of independence in 1971 highlight, there was agreement 
among US and UK officials at the time that ‘it is difficult to see how any subversive 
group could get a footing there in view of the tight control by a large and tough ruling 
family’. 202 
  As Mehran Kamrava has pointed out, unlike the situation in other GCC states, 
most notably Saudi Arabia, the religious establishment of Qatar did not traditionally 
pose any real threat to the ruling family because there was no indigenous local clerical 
powerbase in Qatar.203  Nor was there any tradition in Qatar of Islamists challenging 
the established order by acting outside the law. Indeed, the October 1996 attempt to 
set off a bomb near a government building in Doha by a group calling itself Al-
Munazzamat Awdat al-Sharia, the Organisation for the Return of Islamic Law, was a 
one-off action that had no broader implications for the country’s vulnerability to 
radical Islamists.  
A national market did not emerge in Qatar until the twentieth century and the 
prolonged weakness of the trade sector meant that the merchant community, 
especially in comparison to their counterparts in Kuwait or Dubai, had never been 
able to transform its economic power into a claim for political leadership. The new 
Emir benefited from this to the extent that he inherited a country that was not home to 
a cohesive and organised merchant class capable of challenging the ruling family for 
political power.204  
Moreover, even factoring in the tribalism, local territorial disputes and internal 																																																								
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power struggles that resulted in the involuntary transfer of power in 1949, 1960, 1972 
and 1995, Qatar had been remarkably stable under the paternal and personal political 
leadership of the Al-Thanis.205 This ensured that the ruling family’s position as the 
most important player in the formation, integration and modernization of the Qatari 
state went unchallenged. 
As such, Qatar was free to exhibit two characteristics common in small states, 
both of which would have significant implications in the period under examination in 
this thesis. The first was a highly personalised form of government. Between 1995 
and 2010, Qatar’s foreign relations were dominated by what commentators have 
called ‘the two Hamads’ –the Emir and the Prime Minister.206  The second was the 
fact that Qatar’s regime has always enjoyed both exceptional autonomy in foreign 
policymaking and, as noted above, has faced very few domestic political constraints.  
One should never understate the significance of the personalized nature of 
Qatari political life in the decade and a half covered by this thesis.  As Hassan Ali Al-
Ebraheem has noted in relation to Kuwait, this allows for important policy decisions 
to emerge out of the personal aspirations and preferences of the leader rather than 
through a cold, and impersonal political system.207  The flip side of this is always the 
possibility of unchecked actions based on instinct but the upside is a decisiveness 
lacking in larger political nations.208  
This, in turn, allowed the Emir to focus his efforts on bringing his vision for 																																																								
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twenty-first century Qatar to fruition. As Rosemarie Said Zahlan noted in her path 
breaking 1979 book, The Creation of Qatar, the fundamental challenge that faced the 
country in the wake of independence in September 1971, was how to provide an 
effective and realistic forum for political participation that would complement the 
tribal and Islamic make up of society.209  
Until Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani acceded to power, Qatar was widely 
viewed as the ‘quintessence of the Gulf’ in terms of the make up, constraints and 
opportunities of a small state in the region.210 In part, this was due to the fact that 
Qatar had not yet faced up to the challenges that produce resistance. Its leaders had 
not had to neutralise any opposition elites. Nor were they forced into coalitions that 
restricted their power, forced them to dilute their rule or agree to wider political 
participation.  As noted above, there had not even been any substantive pressure to 
deal with societal partners with an independent stake in the regime’s viability.211  
This gradually changed in the early 1990s on the eve of the royal succession. 
In mid-1992, to take one notable case, apart from petitioning on the issue of education, 
a group of 54 prominent Qatari citizens called on Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad bin 
Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed Al Thani to bring about free parliamentary 
elections, a written constitution and broader personal and political freedoms.212  
On taking power, the new Emir looked to address the rumblings of discontent 
that the above petition symbolised by embarking upon a ‘limited course of political 
liberalization’213 in order to find a balance between what Zahlan correctly termed in 
her work as a process of ‘change and continuity’. As Rathmell and Schulze have 																																																								
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noted, this took the form of a highly publicized programme of political reform 
involving liberalization and steps towards democratization’ 214  
From the time of independence in 1971 the machinery of the Qatari state had 
centred on the Emir, the Council of Ministers (most of whom hailed from ruling 
family) and the Advisory Council (majlis al-Shura), appointed by the Emir. On taking 
power in 1995 Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani appointed a new government and 
successfully separated the powers of the royal family from those of cabinet and prime 
minister, although the new prime minister remained a member of the royal family. 
The prime minister was then able to choose his own cabinet, which nevertheless owed 
its ultimate loyalty to the head of state, the Emir.215   
Peter J. Katzenstein has argued that for small states ‘periods of great crisis can 
profoundly affect the way domestic politics is organized; periods of relative normality 
can…reinforce that pattern of organization’.216  This is undoubtedly true in most cases. 
However, what is immediately noticeable and impressive in the context of Qatar from 
1995 onwards is that from the beginning of his reign Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani broke with this norm. Instead, in what was both a highly innovative and 
potentially extremely risky move, he looked to capitalise on the country’s stability in 
order to ensure elite support for his vision of re-organising the political (and socio-
economic) basis of the Qatari state.   
This meant, as Rathmell and Schulze have argued, that economic necessity 
was not the only driver of political reform under the new Emir in the first five years of 
his rule.  Rather, they argued, it was ‘consciously chosen for reasons of foreign policy 																																																								
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and domestic dynastic politics’.  In fact, they note the ‘striking contrast between the 
limited actual economic problems faced by Qatar and the ambitious political reforms 
that Emir Hamad has made such a central feature of his reign’ As they put it, Qatar 
‘initiated liberalization measures and democratic reforms not by a re-negotiation of 
the rentier state political bargain, since the state does not face a long-term inability to 
meet its side of the bargain’. 217 
This is an important point as it challenges the conventional wisdom on two 
levels – that there is a direct causal link between political reform and socio-economic 
problems and that existing regimes avoid new ideas in times of stability as they can 
threaten the status quo and, in turn, can weaken the grip on power.  
In a speech at Georgetown University on his first visit to the US in June 1997, 
the Emir explained why he had decided to initiate this process.  Greater openness was, 
he argued, necessary to ‘secure ourselves in the future’. He also drew attention to the 
fact that in some countries unrest was a direct result of the ‘lack of democracy, 
because of lack of sharing with their people’, before concluding with the late 
President John F. Kennedy’s famous quote that those who failed to make peaceful 
revolutions possible made violent revolutions inevitable.  
These words pointed to the new Emir’s belief in, and commitment to, a pro-
active approach to policy-making that would ultimately come to define his time as 
leader.  However, in the same speech the Emir also acknowledged and justified his 
cautious approach to implementing full political reform on the grounds that Qatar was 
‘not yet ready’, and because he did not want to ‘force myself to stop democracy…I 
want everything to go smoothly, and non-stop’218 
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As part of this push to open up Qatar in order to ‘secure’ its future, the new 
Emir promoted a more independent press (a vitally important issue for Qatar’s 
evolving international standing as well as its domestic development that will be 
addressed in full in chapter 6).  There was also an attempt to democratize Qatar “from 
below” through explicit support for political participation at the grass-roots level as a 
means of creating the environment necessary for a more substantive subsequent move 
towards democratization.219   
It is in these terms that one should view the establishment of the Supreme 
Council for Family Affairs in 1998 and the call for all government-run schools to 
have democratically elected student councils that would serve as a link between 
students and the authorities. A similar intention was behind the push for elections to a 
national Chamber of Commerce that saw 3,700 business and community leaders elect 
17 members from a slate of 41 candidates. 
More significantly, the Emir called for elections to a Central Municipal 
Council. As originally conceived this body was intended to be a ‘stepping stone’ on 
the road to democracy and a precursor to subsequent parliamentary elections.  All 
Qatari citizens over 18 years of age, including women, were eligible to vote for 
candidates from their specified constituencies who would then form the 29-member 
Central Municipal Council tasked with running the affairs of nine municipalities.   
Underscoring the difficulties inherent in altering the long-accepted political 
make up of Qatari society, and emphasising the importance of finding a balance 
between ‘continuity and change’, was the fact that voter registration for the municipal 
elections was disappointing.   
Large numbers of older and more conservative citizens expressed opposition 																																																								
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to political reforms by refusing to join the process. Of the 40,000 eligible voters 
(military and police personnel were barred from voting) only 20,000 registered during 
the required period.220  
This influenced the Emir’s decision, prior to the vote in March 1999, to 
downgrade an elected Council to a purely advisory level, which put paid to any earlier 
hopes among younger, more progressive Qataris, that this new institution might serve 
as a quasi-parliament. This had as a precedent another move by Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani that underlined his gradual, cautious approach to political change.  
That was his decision to continue the custom of the Emir appointing members of the 
35-member advisory council even though the country’s 1971 constitution allowed for 
the election of members.  
Nevertheless, the March 1999 Central Municipal Council elections were a 
significant milestone in the new Emir’s project for political reform at home. Two 
hundred and forty eight candidates, including 6 women, competed for 29 seats. This 
was Qatar’s first ever nation-wide election in which all adult citizens were allowed to 
run for office. No less notable, it was also the first time that any Gulf country had 
enfranchised all of its male and female citizens in a nation-wide election.221  Midway 
through the same year a constituent assembly was established to write a permanent 
constitution for Qatar, including provision for an elected parliament.222   
Critics saw these moves as an attempt by the Emir to neutralise any internal 
family challenges to his rule by shifting the focus of political activity towards elected 
institutions.  This may have had an indirect, though long-term, benefit to his own rule 
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and that of his chosen successors, but the moves were also primarily part of the 
attempt to transform, albeit again gradually and with caution, Qatar’s political 
landscape by facilitating the transition toward greater democratic participation. They 
also had the practical goal of establishing and building up Qatar’s previously non-
existent national electoral infrastructure. 
Both Qatar’s influential prime minister and foreign minister and the Emir 
championed this approach in the first five years of their reign.  In April 2001, for 
example, the prime minister stressed the country’s determination to press ahead with 
its active democratisation drive.  The following November, in an address to the 
country’s consultative council, the Emir explained his political objectives in the 
previous few years.  It was, he stated, ‘satisfactory for our aims to establish the pillars 
of the state, guarantee rights and freedoms to citizens, incorporate popular 
participation and preserve our heritage’.223 
Soon after, he announced that a constituent assembly was ‘finalising’ its draft 
constitution. Up to 2001 Qatar had been ruled by a provisional constitution 
promulgated in 1971 by the previous Emir, which vested all power in the Emir and 
stated that the Emir must be from the Al-Thani family. 
The assembly had been appointed in 1999 with the mandate to produce a 
constitution setting out the separation of powers between executive, judiciary and 
legislature within 3 years. It was also required to produce a document that provided 
for the establishment of a directly elected national parliament. Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani also set out detailed plans to establish a constitutional court, a 
unique move in the Arab Gulf up to that point, to act as Qatar’s final interpreter of 
rights and privileges under the new inoperative constitution.   
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On completion, the new draft constitution included equal rights for all citizens 
irrespective of tribal and family affiliations and promised individual freedoms and an 
independent judiciary. The Emir explained that the new constitution ‘represents the 
beginning of an important phase of our national action’ and ‘maintains a balance 
between the legislative and judicial powers, between the rights and obligations of the 
public and between the interests of the individual and society’.224 
The new proposals were certainly of note.  They looked to end rule-by-decree 
and confer legislative power on an elected legislature to which government ministers 
were accountable. This move was an explicit attempt to enhance Qatar’s status as a 
progressive state in a conservative region and to strengthen the country’s political and 
legal institutions. 225 
The new constitution was approved overwhelmingly (by 96.6 percent of the 
69,000 votes cast) in a national referendum held in late April 2003. This provided for 
the establishment of a 45-seat Shura council, two thirds of whose members were to be 
elected. The highest elected official in Qatar, president of the Central Municipal 
Council, Ibrahim Haydous, described the council’s establishment as a ‘landmark 
event intended to give Qataris a voice’.226  
Although all these attempts to broaden and deepen political debate and 
democratic institutions in the country were important, there remained some significant 
challenges to overcome in order to ensure that gradual political change was not 
subject to impediment.  
The constitution, for example, was by no means a full or final attempt to 
address the “democratic deficit” in Qatar. For example, it formalized the hereditary 																																																								
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rule of the Al-Thanis by stating that the Emir must be drawn from that family. It also 
gave the Emir, whose rule was described by article 64 d as ‘inviolable and ...must be 
respected by all’, the power to appoint one-third of the Shura council, dissolve the 
body, issue decrees with the force of law, and determine the state budget with only 
limited input from the legislature.227 
As noted above, the Municipal Council, which was directly elected for the 
first time in 1999, only had an advisory capacity and could, in theory, be dismissed by  
unelected ministers. In 1999, the Emir had said he wanted women to fully participate 
in all facets of that year’s municipal elections. But none of the six women candidates 
were elected. The low percentage of women who voted for these six candidates 
underscored the difficulties inherent in integrating women into political life on an 
equal footing after generations of entrenched and enforced exclusion from the body 
politic.  
Nevertheless, the 1999 elections were the first amongst the GCC countries to 
allow women to vote, setting an example to Gulf neighbours and removing excuses 
for blocking emancipation.  Though it should also be noted that at the time of the 
election Qatar had still not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.228 
At the same time, females were making notable strides in terms of access to 
education (as shall be examined subsequently), and in leadership outside the political 
sphere, including in socio-economic life. The Emir, for example, regularly appointed 
women to senior positions. In 2002 his younger sister, Sheikha Hessa Bint Khalifa Al-
Thani, was appointed to position of deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of 
Family Affairs, with cabinet rank. Following its ratification, the constitution included 																																																								
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a clause granting women equality and one woman was elected in the municipal 
elections, the first female in a GCC state to achieve this.229   
  Nor should one underestimate the regional aspect of this, albeit gradual, 
change in the political sphere.  Notably, it was widely discussed at the time whether 
the timing of the elections in Qatar in March 1999, had influenced the Kuwaiti Emir’s 
subsequent decree on the matter in May 1999.230   
There was similar speculation over whether subsequent political reform efforts 
in Qatar in the next few years influenced moves in this direction in Bahrain in 2002 
where municipal elections were held, followed by legislative elections; there were 
also legislative elections in Kuwait in July 2003; and the election of an Advisory 
Council in Oman in October 2003.231  
All of this highlights very clearly the central role of the implementation of 
political reform in Qatar for ‘regional contagion’ as it has been called.232 Certainly, 
this was part of the Emir’s vision.  In September 2004, in a widely reported speech 
marking the promulgation of the new Qatari constitution, the Emir made a forceful 
case for political liberalization in the Middle East before the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in New York. 
While political reform leading to political participation is one vital pillar of 
national security, economic and socio-political reform is no less essential for long-
term stability. Economic stagnation, mass unemployment, lack of diversification, 																																																								
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foreign debt, inequitable income distribution, treatment of foreign workers and 
wasteful spending are now all recognized as security issues that directly challenge the 
functioning and even the survival of small states in general, and the small states of the 
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula in particular.233  
No country can be secure unless its citizens feel safe and well. This is an 
increasingly accepted conception of security. While such satisfaction demands that 
new forms and modalities of political participation be negotiated and implemented 
between the ruler and the ruled it is also impossible to achieve this without providing 
opportunities for citizens to be valued members of society.234  
As Bjorn Olafsson has shown, throughout history domestic unity has been a 
vital factor in the security and stability of small states.235 A small state with strong 
national unity will be more difficult to subdue militarily than a larger, more divided 
one that suffers from ineffective governance and where the leader lacks legitimacy. 
Likewise, a state with a considerable degree of local self-reliance (economic 
as well as political) will be more difficult to divide and rule. As such, while military 
deterrence and strategic diplomacy make up one vital pillar of national security, 
economic and socio-political wellbeing are no less essential in contributing to state 
stability, legitimacy and effective governance.  
However, while in the wake of the Arab Spring all this seems obvious, such 
views gained little attention or interest in previous periods.  In part this was a 
consequence of the fact that following the discovery of oil most Arab Gulf states, 
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including Qatar, could be described, in the words of J.E. Peterson as ‘post-
traditional’.236  In other words these newly resource rich small states modernized 
within the traditional confines of the tribal and monarchical order.237 
 The rentier model most is the prominent theorization on the development and 
behaviour of the Arab Gulf countries following an oil boom that saw oil revenues 
across the Gulf region rise from US$11 billion in 1971 to US$210 billion in 1981. 
 A number of scholars, influenced by Iranian economist Hossein Mahdavy’s 
1970 conceptualisation of pre-revolutionary Iran and his attribution of a rentier 
pattern of development to its oil based economy,238 borrowed the theme and applied it 
to the Arab Gulf states.  
 These included Giacomo Luciani, Hazem Beblawi and others in the seminal 
book The Rentier State.239 They defined rentier states as having economies 
predominantly relying on external rent, in this case oil revenues, which sustained 
them and removed the need for a strong productive domestic sector. This impacted on 
the state and its relationship with society in two ways.  
 Firstly, it created distributive states in which the expenditure of the state sector 
was central to the functioning of the economy. This removed the need to develop an 
extensive tax base and allowed for the provision of services that were either free or 
heavily subsidised. This in turn, resulted in a state separated from society, since there 
was a lack of productive sectors and no dependence on the surplus produced within 
the private economy. Crucially, rentier economics allowed the state to maintain a 
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mutually beneficial corporatist arrangement with selected social groups, therefore 
lessening the possibility of demands for radical political change and, by extension, for 
democratisation.240  All this allowed the state to maintain legitimacy without 
democracy and encouraged the entrenchment of traditional networks of tribe and 
family as the most effective channels for the distribution of wealth.  
 A second, more recent, conceptualisation of the development of the region was 
introduced in Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb’s influential book, Society and State in the Gulf 
and Arab Peninsula: a different perspective.241 This work presented an alternative to 
the rentier thesis by blaming the inability of Gulf States to produce an integrated 
development on their authoritarian structure.  
As both the above schools of thought acknowledge, traditionally oil and gas 
revenues not only enabled rulers to co-opt domestic elites quite openly and to retain 
their independence from domestic society as the source of state income, but they also 
expanded resources so astronomically that rulers could create a huge constituency 
supporting the regime by making the whole population dependent on the state. 
Economic reform is always directly related to political reform because 
political stability relies on economic stability and because political independence 
demands economic independence.242 This is especially true in small states that use 
economic progress for political purposes because restructuring the economy is 
essentially an exercise in consolidating political independence.243  
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In his history of Qatar, Fromherz argues that Qatar in the contemporary period 
cannot be explained solely by its reliance on oil rents, primarily because the country is 
still deeply rooted in the outlook and norms of the pre-oil era. As such, he does not 
accept the rentier model as an adequate explanation for Qatar.244 
 This is a legitimate point but it is also very possible to argue that on acceding 
to power in 1995 the new Emir realised that Qatar would also have to look forward to 
a post-oil, as well as back to a pre-oil era, in order to prosper in the longer term.  This, 
as noted previously in chapter 1, was to be done primarily by investing current 
resources in order to develop the knowledge economy. 
This strategy was not only the key to the country’s future economic prosperity, 
but was also vital for real progress across all sectors because restructuring the 
economic foundations of the state was a vital prerequisite for political development. 
As such the Emir embarked on a radical plan to overhaul the socio-economic basis of 
the country that was directly entwined with, but far more ambitious and 
comprehensive in scope, than the political reforms he looked to implement over the 
same period.   
These economic reforms covered almost all existing socio-economic sectors 
most notably education (repeatedly described by the Emir as an integral part of his 
overall reforms245), sport (as evidenced by the bids for the 2016 Olympic Games and 
the 2022 World Cup), industry, construction, and the energy and financial sectors, 
including, for example, a plan by the QIA to invest US$2 billion to lure asset 
management firms to Doha. 
 In a convocation address at the University of Qatar in 2000, Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, speaking in his role as Supreme President of the University, 																																																								
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emphasised the necessity of concentrating on ‘scientific and applied specialization’ 
and on the ‘need for continuous education which has come to take its place in the 
programs and concerns of contemporary universities’.246  
 Though post-independence Qatar was by no means one of the major recipients 
of oil revenues, it had been earning petro-dollars for a much longer period of time 
than some of its Arab Gulf neighbours such as Abu Dhabi. It was also far less 
developed than many of its neighbours and, as such, had much less to spend its new 
wealth on.  This gave Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin 
Muhammed Al Thani the financial resources to introduce some sporadic and uneven 
socio-economic restructuring of the state by focusing on educational investment. 247   
 This was vital, as before the discovery of oil there had been no formal education 
system in Qatar. According to a 1970 study, only 9 percent of the population born 
between 1895 and 1910 were literate, as were 15 percent of those born between 1910 
and 1920 and 14 percent of those born between 1920 and 1930.248 
Under Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed Al 
Thani the number of children receiving a proper education increased dramatically. In 
the 1975-76 academic year, 21,402 children attended primary school. In 1982, at a 
time when there were only 141 schools, a ten-year plan was introduced for the 
construction of 156 schools, of which 99 were to be built in the suburbs and villages. 
By the 1985-86 academic year, that number of children attending primary school had 
risen to 31,844.  
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By 1986, approximately 5.6 percent of the country’s GNP went toward public 
education and only 10 percent of children in Qatar, compared to 20 percent in Bahrain 
and 30 percent in Kuwait did not attend school. In the 1988-89 academic year, there 
were 48,097 students in 97 primary schools taught by 2,589 teachers and 22,178 
secondary students in 78 schools taught by 2,115 teachers. At the three vocational 
schools, there were 924 students and 104 teachers. This number continued to rise into 
the 1990s as the state continued to cover education costs, including school supplies, 
transportation and food as part of its social welfare provisions. 249 
 However, as late as 1992, one of the main complaints of the group of prominent  
Qataris, including senior officials and academics who had issued a petition to the then 
Emir, was the deterioration in education.250  
 In response to such criticism, on taking power in 1995, Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani immediately and repeatedly stated that investing in a world-class 
research capacity, higher education and more generally human capital and the 
knowledge-economy was at the top of the political agenda as doing so was the 
prerequisite for a small state to be successful in the contemporary world.251  
 This required a fundamental restructuring of knowledge-driven areas such as 
education, healthcare technology/innovation, financial services and the business 
services sectors as a major step towards diversifying growth and improve 
competitiveness.  
 In order to achieve this, as noted in the previous chapter, the Qatar Foundation 
for Education, Science and Community Development was founded in 1995.  From the 
outset it was an umbrella organisation to push forward the state‘s agenda in the areas 																																																								
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of education, science and community development. Its establishment gave the state 
ultimate responsibility and therefore ultimate control over the transformation of these 
three key sectors.  
Parallel to this the government looked to establish third level educational 
programmes that would become the envy of the world and would, at the same time, 
increase the opportunities for Qatar’s female citizens.  In Qatar, as in the rest of the 
Gulf region, the battle for education and women’s rights has always been part of a 
wider conflict between traditionalists who distrust Western ways and view their entire 
way of life as being under threat and reformists, impatient for change.252 
 The challenge that Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani faced on taking power 
was how to balance modernization with traditional values in both developing a world-
class university system and in integrating Qatari females into an educational system, 
which until the latter half of the twentieth century had completely excluded and 
ignored them.253 
The first institutions of higher education in Qatar were separate teacher-
training colleges for men and women that opened in 1973. Before that, those wishing 
to pursue higher degrees either studied abroad (mainly in Egypt and Lebanon) or took 
correspondence courses.  
Later in the same decade, in 1977, at a time of rapidly rising oil wealth, the 
Emir passed a decree establishing the University of Qatar and faculties of humanities, 
social studies, Islamic studies, and science joined the education faculty of the teacher-
training colleges. 254  
																																																								
252 For more on Education City and the Qatar Foundation, which oversees its activities, see the 
Foundation’s website, available at http://www.qf.edu.qa/output/Page1.asp.  
253 Ayad al-Qazzaz, ‘Education of Women in the Arab World’, California State University, Sacramento, 
n.d., http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/awomeduc.html  
254 ‘Qatar University: Office of Vice President for Research’, http://www.qu.edu.qa/offices/research/. 
	 93	
This followed the establishment of universities in Saudi Arabia (King Saud 
University, 1957) Kuwait (Kuwait University, 1966) and Yemen (Sana’a University, 
1970) but came before homegrown universities had been established in Bahrain 
(University of Bahrain, 1986), Oman (Sultan Qaboos University, 1986) and the UAE 
(UAE University, 1987).  
The impact of the establishment of the University of Qatar on wider society 
was slow.  In the 1989-90 academic year there were 5,637 students at the University 
of Qatar, and 504 instructors, mostly Egyptians and non-Qatari Arabs. At the same 
time about 1,000 Qataris received government scholarships to pursue higher 
education abroad, mostly in other Arab countries and in the United States, Britain, 
and France. 255 By 2008, some 7,200 students were enrolled at the University of Qatar, 
three-quarters of whom were female.256 
By the time Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took power in 1995, illiteracy 
in Qatar was at 20.8 percent among males. This compared unfavourably with Bahrain 
(10.9 percent) and Kuwait (17.8 percent) but was superior to the situation in Saudi 
Arabia (28.5 percent) and the UAE (21.1 percent). However, even at this stage, the 
Qatari level of female illiteracy (20.1 percent) was lower than in Bahrain (20.6 
percent), Kuwait (25.1 percent) Saudi Arabia (49.8 percent) and the UAE (20.2 
percent).257  
By 2000, according to Qatari government statistics, literacy had reached 88 
percent of the population, a figure close to the Gulf average. But while male literacy 
continued to fall short of the Gulf average, the literacy rate for Qatari females 
continued to be higher than elsewhere in the Gulf.  Similarly, in 1980 only 17 percent 
of Qatari women entered tertiary education. By 2000, the figure had risen to 36 																																																								
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percent placing Qatar ahead of Kuwait at 32 percent, Bahrain at 28 percent and Saudi 
Arabia at 25 percent.258 
The number of indigenous universities in Qatar rose from 3 in 2001-02 to 5 in 
2007-08. This saw a growth rate equal to Oman, which had also established five 
universities by this time, but less than Bahrain (10), Kuwait (6), Saudi Arabia (25) 
and the UAE (15). This highlights the fact that over this period of rapid growth in the 
Gulf’s higher education sector Qatar was more cautious than its neighbours in this 
area contributing only 5 of the 66 universities that operated across the GCC by 
2008.259 
Qatar under its new Emir also chose to invest heavily in the private education 
sector, bringing in branch campuses of prestigious western universities to the 2,500-
acre Education City campus on the outskirts of Doha.  Education City was originally 
conceived as the largest enclave of American universities overseas, with six branch 
campuses of prestigious American universities, each responsible for a subject area 
and bringing in the words of the New York Times a ‘seedbed of change, with a 
profound impact on Qatar’s future’.260    
They six selected were Virginia Commonwealth University (fine arts), Weill 
Cornell Medical School, Texas A & M University (engineering), Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service (International Relations) Carnegie Mellon 
University (business administration, computer science and information systems) and 
North Western University (journalism and communication). 																																																								
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All six were selected largely on the basis of their research records and 
admission standards, degree requirements and curriculum were intended to be the 
same as the home campus with research-led teaching a key attraction.   
However, branch campuses were never intended to accommodate the large 
majority of Qatari secondary school graduates who sought academically oriented 
higher education but did not qualify for or chose not to attend foreign universities. For 
these graduates, Qatar University (QU) was, and still is, the most appropriate option 
These reforms in third level education are just one example, though a very 
important example, of the highly ambitious strategies for the overhaul of all aspects of 
the Qatari economy and society that were conceived post-1995.  
This goal provided the Emir with three challenges. The first was to introduce a 
new way of thinking about the value of human capital to development at a time of 
gradual political liberalization.  The second was spending the funds needed to 
implement this ambitious strategy in a way that minimized social dislocation, 
instability and opposition at home. The third, as the next chapter will show, was to 




A Place at the Table: Re-positioning Qatari External Engagement 
in an Era of Change, 1995-2001 
‘[A small state is one] whose leaders consider that it can never, acting 
alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system’. 
Robert Keohane261 
 
Qatar declared independence on 3 September 1971, three years after the United 
Kingdom announced its intention to end its treaties with the Gulf kingdoms and 
withdraw from the region. Qatar joined the United Nations at the opening of the 26th 
UN General Assembly session along with Oman and Bahrain after being voted in on 
21 September 1971. This brought the number of UN states to 131. 
Originally Qatar had intended to join Bahrain and the seven trucial sheikdoms 
that now make up the UAE in a Union of Arab Emirates, but this failed to take place 
due to demands made by Bahrain, with its larger educated population, and Qatar due 
to its oil wealth.262 As one commentator put it at the time, ‘in theory the idea appeals, 
but in practice results have been disappointing’.263 
Despite being opposed to a continued British military presence after the 1971 
withdrawal from the region,264 Qatar’s strategy for maintaining external autonomy 
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and security following independence in the early 1970s was conditioned by its 
experience as a British client.265 
 It had never received direct aid from London due to its oil wealth but it did 
receive other practical kinds of support.  For example, in 1970, at the request of the 
Qatari government, British officials undertook a census of the country and, in 1971, 
again at the behest of the Qatar, Britain agreed to carry out a full economic and 
development survey in preparation for the imminent arrival of independence.266  
In terms of post-independence Qatar’s relationship with the Cold War 
Superpowers, the kingdom had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 
1988.  The US, on the other hand, was one of the first countries to recognize Qatar’s 
independence and a US embassy opened in Doha in March 1973. The first resident 
US ambassador arrived in July 1974 and the foundations of this deepening strategic 
relationship between the US and Qatar preceded Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990. 
During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, the bilateral US-Qatari relationship 
developed greatly.  It was reported that Qatar had pledged storage facilities for US 
medical supplies and jet fuel among other items.267 As such, the late 1980s were a 
time of practical cooperation between the US and Qatar in the face of regional 
instability brought on by the Iran-Iraq conflict. This period was also, however, a time 
of tension in the bilateral US-Qatari relationship.  
Through the 1980s Qatari relations with Bahrain were strained, with friction 
involving Hawar and the adjacent islands, which both countries claimed as their own.  
																																																								
265 Mary Ann Tetreault, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth 
Century’, International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 565-591, p.566. 
266 Ralph Izzard, ‘A Far cry from the bad old pirate days’, London Times, 16 December 1970. 
267 Yousseff M Ibrahim, ‘US Quietly gets Gulf states aid against Iranians’, The New York Times, 10 
October 1987. For its part Bahrain provided naval mooring facilities while Saudi Arabia provided 
surveillance and other intelligence assets to the US. 
	 98	
Neither Qatar nor Bahrain were able to agree on a compromise mediated by the GCC.  
In March 1982, the GCC Ministerial Council reviewed the dispute and expressed its 
regret that both parties had felt ‘unable to adhere to the principles embodied by the 
basic statutes of the GCC and were clashing in contradiction to the prevailing spirit 
among the GCC states’.268 
In 1982 and 1983 the two countries almost came to blows as a result of these 
differences. Both states put their military on alert and, in April 1986, Qatari military 
helicopters landed on an uninhabited island of Fasht al-Debel and arrested all 39 
foreign workers surveying the area for a Dutch construction company hired by 
Bahrain to build a coast guard base.269 Subsequently, both expelled each other’s 
citizens, cut all communications links with each other, including flights by the jointly-
owned Gulf Air, and criticised each other in their respective media outlets.270 
In mid-1988, Qatar challenged the US decision to sell Bahrain 70 Stinger 
missiles,271 the state of the art portable heat-seeking missile. Air-to-air and surface-to-
air capabilities have always been of great importance in the Gulf because no regional 
state has been able to assume that it will find itself with air superiority in any conflict 
without external assistance. And the Stinger was highly prized because they had been 
a key factor in the success of anti-Soviet guerrillas in Afghanistan against Soviet 
airpower throughout the 1980s.In turn, President Ronald Reagan’s administration in 
Washington was angered by Qatar’s refusal to turn over American-made Stinger 
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missiles purchased on the black market six months after Congress had passed a law 
forbidding the US administration from selling Stingers to countries in the Gulf region. 
While Qatari officials admitted purchasing the weapons they refused to 
divulge their source, though it was widely assumed that Iran, which had offered to sell 
these weapons on the open market, had been the supplier.272  Qatar also refused to 
relinquish the weapons to the US or to allow an inspection.273 This dispute froze 
planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on arms 
sales to Qatar (Section 566(d), P.L.100-461) until the months leading up to the 1991 
Gulf crisis.274  
 The ban was formally repealed under the Foreign Operations Export Financing 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991 (Section 568(b), P.L.101-513), 
following information provided by the Bush administration ‘that it is in the national 
interest to reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support 
for United States troops in the Middle East’.275 
This whole affair was little more than a footnote in Washington’s engagement 
with the Arab Gulf in the late 1980s. The Reagan administration was preoccupied 
with far more pressing challenges including the instability being caused by the 
seemingly unending Iran-Iraq war and the post-war situation in the region following 
the ceasefire of August 1988.  But it is important in terms of the relationship between 
tiny Qatar and the American superpower.   Despite the fact that the GCC states were 
increasingly reliant on the US for security by 1987-88, when the Stinger issue came to 																																																								
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the fore, Qatar was unwilling to give in to American pressure on the matter.  In terms 
of small state relations with major powers this was by no means the norm and was a 
portent of relations to come between Qatar and the US. 
 In the wake of the Cold War, in the years immediately preceding Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s rise to power, Qatar now looked to answer for itself 
the perennial question of how much can a small state do by itself to ensure its own 
security. Like many small states outside Europe, the end of the Cold War did not 
radically alter the threat perceptions and challenges facing Qatar. Its priorities 
remained homeland defence, maintaining access to, and stability in, the sea-lanes of 
the Gulf and maintaining the regional military balance.  
All three of these priorities faced a direct challenge following the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.276 The following December, Qatar’s then Emir  
told the eleventh annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Doha, the first 
top-level meeting of the GCC organisation since the invasion of Kuwait the previous 
August, that ‘things cannot be allowed to proceed as they were before’.  
This frank and prescient speech also acknowledged that the region would need 
to ‘establish a more effective security system’ in response to the ‘vicious Iraqi 
invasion of the sisterly state of Kuwait’.  The Emir also reminded his audience that 
recent events had ‘upset all the realities and standards which we had taken for granted 
regarding the basis of inter-Arab relations, the concept of Gulf security, and Arab 
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security’. The Gulf crisis, he concluded ‘makes it imperative upon us to review and 
reassess’ long-held beliefs.277 
This review and re-assessment became ‘imperative’ only following the Iraqi 
invasion because it had shown Qatar and its other small neighbours that the GCC as a 
regional security mechanism had failed to neutralise the threat from larger 
neighbours.278  
In August 1990, US Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney visited Qatar where he 
met the current Emir, Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad b Al Thani.  Cheney was the highest-
ranking US official to visit Qatar and there was significant speculation that Cheney’s 
objective in visiting Doha was to gain permission for the US to establish forward 
bases in the country.279  
Less than one week later such speculation was proved correct when Qatar joined 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE in making military facilities available to the 
US.280  By January 1991 there were almost 1,000 US service personnel (900 men and 
48 women) stationed in Qatar, making up the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing.281  
On one level this newfound military partnership was surprising to many in both 
countries. The reality was that despite almost two decades of evolving diplomatic and 
strategic ties prior to the Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, Qatar was virtually unknown in 
the US. As one senior US Air Force officer told the media, on being told he was going 
to the country: ‘I grabbed my National Geographic and looked it up myself to figure 
out where we were going’. As the United States Information Service officer in Doha 																																																								
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explained in December 1990, ‘this is a place that tends to get overlooked. Reporters 
weren’t exactly flocking here’.282 
Nevertheless, as noted by the Qatari Emir in his statement to GCC leaders 
discussed above, the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had forced Qatar along with 
its GCC partners to fundamentally rethink the strategic, diplomatic and security 
foundations of the entire region.  
 In the early months of the crisis Qatar, along with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Venezuela and the UAE, had formed a block within OPEC opposed to excessively 
high oil prices and their adverse consequences.283  The oil price spiked immediately 
towards US$40 per barrel but by the time that Iraqi forces fled Kuwait in February 
1991, prices had dropped to below US$20 per barrel.284  
The arrival of US troops had slowed the flight of capital from the region that 
occurred following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, but was not enough to prop up the 
recent renaissance in the Gulf financial institutions that followed the end of the eight-
year long Iran-Iraq war.  Qatar, along with the UAE, had been hit less hard by the 
Gulf crisis than other regional economies.  Qatar (and UAE) needed to borrow less 
and reduce their external assets less to pay for the war than their neighbours.285  But 
even before the conflict its oil revenues were not large enough to make a major 
contribution to the economic reconstruction of the region.286  
Nevertheless, Qatar, along with the G-7 countries, the European Commission, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and South Korea, was a member of the Gulf Crisis 
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Financial Co-ordination Group. Chaired by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, 
the group was tasked with coordinating US$16 billion to Turkey, Jordan and Egypt, 
the three front-line states whose economies were most damaged by the UN sanctions 
against Iraq.287  In the wake of the Gulf Crisis, Qatar, along with other GCC states, 
also cemented economic ties with Egypt and Syria, providing funds to both countries 
and signing an agreement on trade and economic and technical cooperation with Syria 
in January 1991.288  
During the crisis and subsequent war Doha served as a base for offensive strikes 
by French, Canadian, and US aircraft against Iraq and the Iraqi forces occupying 
Kuwait, but Qatari territory remained minimally affected by the conflict. Qatar’s 
contribution was not limited to providing a base for US and other coalition forces. 
Arab forces were deployed closest to the Kuwait frontier, with US, French and British 
troops to the rear. Once the main military operations began Qatari forces participated 
in the combined Arab fighting force also made up of troops Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Syria. 289  
In late January 1991, Qatari and Saudi forces successfully engaged Iraqi troops in 
the small Saudi border town of Ra's al-Khafji, on the coastal road leading south from 
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil rich Eastern Province. The clash resulted in dozens of 
Iraqi fatalities and hundreds of prisoners, while the coalition Arabs lost 19 killed and 
36 wounded.290  
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For Qatar, which had been historically sensitive to outside military intervention in 
the Gulf, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm of 1990-91 forced a 
reconsideration of the role of the US, now the sole global superpower.291 Qatar, along 
with the other smaller Arab Gulf states, increasingly perceived the US, which had 
never wielded so much power in the international system, as a guarantor of security 
assistance.292  
On 23 June 1992, Qatar and the US signed a bilateral defence cooperation 
agreement that provided for US access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United 
States materiel, and future combined military exercises. 293 According to figures for 
1989, prepared by the United States Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, Qatar 
recorded the highest per capita military expenditures of any country in the world. 
Although Qatar steadily built up its military equipment levels and capabilities during 
the 1990s military spending was far less in both dollar terms and in terms of 
percentage of total annual imports than its GCC neighbours. In fact its arms imports 
as a percentage of total imports fell consistently in the first five years of the 1990s. In 
1990 arms imports were 5.9 percent of imports. This fell to 1.2 percent of imports in 
1991, 2.1 percent in 1992 and zero in 1993 and 1994.294  
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 However, for a small state, arms sales are not only economic considerations. 
They are also important as an expression of strategic and political cooperation and 
even partnership. In particular, they raise the vital question of ‘operability’. The 
purchase of advanced weaponry always requires integration into existing capabilities, 
which in turn increases dependence on foreign personnel (in contrast to the quest for 
greater self-sufficiency in other areas).    
In the case of Qatar, the deepening of a military purchasing relationship with 
the US also meant a growing reliance on US-manufactured systems and US 
technicians. Michael Handel has also convincingly argued that on top of issues of 
operability, high Research and Development (R&D) costs for military technology 
forces small states (even wealthy ones like Qatar) to import weapons, which in turn 
makes them further dependent on the seller.295  
Moreover, one driving factor in the quest for advanced weaponry that was 
noticeable in the context of evolving US-Qatari relations was the lack of available 
qualified manpower and a small pool of personnel to draw from. Manning levels in 
the Qatari military were as low as 8,000 in the early 1990s.296 
Qatar’s embrace of US protection as a pillar of its security doctrine was 
reciprocated by a greatly improved image of Qatar in the US as a desirable security 
partner following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm of 1990-91.  In turn, 
post-1991 Qatar exhibited an open willingness to permit the US air force (as well as 																																																																																																																																																														
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those of Canada and France) to operate from its territory.  This resulted in a 
transformation of bilateral military and strategic relations including a nascent 
relationship with NATO that would develop greatly from the early 2000s, culminating 
in extensive cooperation in the final years of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s 
reign.  
In 2004, for example, Qatar joined the NATO-sponsored Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI), a forum intended to contribute to long-term global and regional 
security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral 
security cooperation with NATO. Qatar was one of 4 GCC members to accept the 
initial invitation to participate. Through the ICI, as the NATO secretary-general 
would say a number of years later, Qatar engaged in both good practical cooperation 
and active political dialogue with NATO, which had created mutual confidence and 
understanding.297 
Parallel to the US and NATO Qatar also continued to develop relations with 
other major international powers. In 1971 Qatar had entered into a special defence 
relationship with France when it gained independence from Britain in 1971, 
purchasing an estimated 70 percent of its arsenal from French firms over the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Despite US dominance post-1991 France and Britain, continued to 
provide security guarantees and military hardware and training to Qatar.   
In mid-November 1996, for example, Qatar signed a US$500 million arms 
deal with the UK shortly after a visit to the country by then British defence minister, 
Michael Portillo.  Two years earlier, in 1994, Qatar and France had signed a defence 
agreement, which led to a major purchase of 12 Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft for 
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US$1.4 billion.298 This deal was consolidated by the signing of a bilateral defence 
agreement in 1998,299 which resulted in what French officials described as ‘a semi-
permanent presence’ of French military personnel on Qatari soil.300 
In these terms, as well as many others, the Gulf crisis and its economic, 
military and geo-strategic consequences opened a new chapter in the history of Qatar, 
bringing new challenges and opportunities in both the security and economic sphere 
that would have to be addressed with its neighbours, regional and external partners 
and most of all at home in the coming years. 
All this took place parallel to an evolving Qatari regional agenda that 
increasingly saw Qatar look to develop ties with its neighbours and to present itself as 
a regional peace broker. Speaking at the opening of the GCC summit in 1983, the then 
Emir had been clear that ‘divisions are a very serious threat to the destiny of our 
nation’.301  
When his son, the new Emir, came to power in 1995 he built on this 
worldview by developing a policy based on an unprecedented, ambitious and 
innovative engagement abroad that complemented the socio-economic and political 
change at home that was examined in chapter 2.  In the period after 1995, Qatar began 
to implement a foreign policy that would come to contradict many of the established 
conventions about how small, resource rich, states operate in the foreign policy sphere 																																																								
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in order to ensure state survival.302 In doing so, the country would challenge one of 
the most widely accepted arguments in the small state literature, David Vital’s 
postulate that ‘weakness’ is the ‘most common, natural and pervasive view of self in 
the small state’.303 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’ accession to power in June 1995 and the 
subsequent political reforms he looked to implement, notably the move towards a 
more inclusive electoral and institutional framework, were viewed with both concern 
and suspicion across the region, most notably in Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
Indeed, his rise to power was followed almost immediately by cabinet reshuffles in 
Bahrain (the first since the 1970s) and in Saudi Arabia, where 15 new ministers were 
appointed, in the most dramatic political change in the kingdom for almost two 
decades.  
The message was clear.  Substantive changes under the new Emir of Qatar had 
implications that would transcend the country’s borders.  This was true in the external 
and diplomatic spheres as well as the realm of domestic politics and was a stark 
reminder that it is always difficult to draw a dividing line between economic and 
political, domestic and external motives or consequences in international relations.  
This is all the more true of small states. Some observers believe that the task 
of state building in small states should be solely focused on economic rather than 
foreign policy issues.304 Certainly, in the first decade after independence, Qatar’s 
foreign policy was intertwined with, and to a great extent driven by, its economic 
development.  																																																								
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As will be seen in chapter 4, the fundamental challenges of restructuring the 
economy, building up financial reserves and moving from oil to gas as part of its 
diversification strategy were political as much as economic priorities. Similarly, just 
as the modernization process and the public expectations it engendered were to a great 
extent economic in nature they also had profound political implications.  
However, it was very apparent for Qatar, a small country with a tiny 
indigenous population sandwiched between vastly larger and more powerful historical 
competitors, that the ambitious domestic reforms initiated and implemented in the 
post-1995 era were directly related to the new Emir’s attempt to tackle the perennial 
challenge of achieving a balance between internal socio-economic and political 
development and security and stability in the regional and international arenas.   
In other words, there was little point in undertaking unprecedented political 
and economic reforms at home only to abdicate responsibility for regional and 
international developments that had a direct impact on Qatar but over which Qatar 
previously had little or no influence over.    
In these terms, Qatar in the period under analysis provides credibility to the 
argument of scholars like Elman who have challenged the ‘theoretical primacy’ 
granted to neo-realism in the study of small state behaviour  and instead have argued 
that small state behaviour is not immune from domestic political influences and that 
‘causal primacy’ granted to international explanations of small state behaviour is 
unwarranted.305  
As noted in the previous chapter, three of Qatar’s GCC partners—Bahrain, the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Arab states outside the Gulf, notably Egypt— 
had backed Emir Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed Al-																																																								
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Thani to varying degrees both before and after his failed counter-coup attempt against 
his son, the new Emir, in early 1996. 306 This resulted in Qatari officials regularly 
accusing the governments of all three of its GCC neighbours of promoting opposition 
to the new Emir and of interfering in the country’s domestic affairs.  
What preoccupied and disturbed these countries was not simply the new 
Qatari ruler’s vision for political reform at home.  Another consideration was the fact 
that prior to becoming Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani had been largely 
responsible for establishing Qatar’s pre-existing reputation as a ‘maverick’ in the Gulf’ 
that caused ‘discomfort and alarm’ to neighbouring states.307  
All the more so as Sheik Hamad had been willing to take a stand against Saudi 
Arabia in the name of Qatari independence, while his predecessor had earned a 
reputation as deferring to Saudi Arabia in many matters related to foreign policy and 
maintaining strict prohibitions against criticism of his gulf neighbour, the dominant 
player in the Gulf.  
 Qatar was one of the few Arab countries to observe the full forty-day 
mourning period after the assassination of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz 
Al Saud in March 1975 and the death of King Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud in 
1982. The two countries signed a bilateral defence agreement in 1982 and on several 
occasions Saudi Arabia acted as mediator in territorial disputes between Qatar and 
Bahrain in the age-old rivalry between the al-Khalifas of Bahrain and the al-Thanis of 
Qatar. 308  
																																																								
306 In May 2010 the Qatari Emir pardoned a number of Saudis implicated in the attempted 1996 coup. 
See Sultan Soud AL Qassemi, ‘How Saudi Arabia and Qatar Became Friends Again’, Foreign Policy, 
21 July 2011. 
307 See ‘A pebble in the pond’, The Economist, 1 July 1995, p. 54; Douglas Jehl, ‘Young Turk of the 
Gulf: Emir of Qatar’, The New York Times, 10 July 1997. 
308 Sir Rupert Hay, ‘The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary Problems’, The Geographical Journal, 
Vol. 120, No. 4 (Dec. 1954), pp. 433-443. 
	 111	
But during the early 1990s, as Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s influence 
increased in his role as Qatar’s Deputy Emir, there was a noticeable rebalancing of 
Qatari-Saudi bilateral relations. The two countries had been involved in a border 
dispute over Abu al-Khfus since 1965, when a British brokered memorandum of 
understanding on borders was concluded.  In 1974, the UAE ceded to Saudi Arabia a 
portion of a territory adjacent to Qatar. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia claimed a strip 
situated between the UAE and Qatar. This matter was not resolved to the satisfaction 
of either party. 
During Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia requested permission 
from Qatar to deploy its forces on Qatari soil.  Taking a cautious stand, Qatar denied 
Saudi forces access to its territory, instead setting up the Khafous border post to 
monitor Saudi deployments.  In September 1992, tensions culminated over different 
interpretations of the 1965 agreement on border demarcations when Saudi forces 
allegedly attacked a Qatari border post, resulting in two deaths.309  
In response, Qatar suspended the un-ratified 1965 border agreement with its 
larger neighbour and withdrew from GCC military exercises, intended to protect the 
borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait against any future Iraqi attack. There were 
further tensions in October 1993 and into 1994, while a diplomatic disagreement saw 
Qatar boycott the November 1994 GCC summit conference.310  
By the time Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani succeeded his father in 1995, 
the perception of Qatar as a pliant satellite of Saudi Arabia had been significantly 
reduced.  Following his accession to power, relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
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boiled over again when Doha questioned the choice of a Saudi candidate to take over 
the position of secretary general of the GCC.  
Although the GCC had no formal rules regarding the nationality of the 
secretary general, Qatar claimed that the rotation should be conducted alphabetically, 
which conveniently would have favoured a Qatari choice, as the previous job holders 
had been Kuwaiti and Omani, respectively. Faced with strong opposition from Saudi 
Arabia and its allies, the new Emir and his foreign minister walked out of the GCC 
meeting. Following this diplomatic incident, Saudi Arabia publicly welcomed the 
deposed Emir, as did the governments of Bahrain and the UAE, thus providing the 
former ruler the opportunity to publicly express his determination to regain power. 
Robert Good has argued that foreign policy in small states primarily serves to 
establish the identity of the state, to keep an “in-group” in power and to reduce 
foreign influence at home.311 Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani evolving 
‘iconoclastic’312 approach to international affairs, did attempt to achieve all of these 
objectives.  
But the Emir’s actions also highlighted the importance of the role and 
personality of the leader of a small state in setting out and defining the nation’s 
involvement in the international arena. In a prescient article written immediately after 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani took office in 1995, The Economist magazine 
noted that the new Qatari leader was likely to be a master of the ‘time-honoured 
small-country ploy of playing bigger neighbours off against each other’.  This was 
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most certainly the case. It was also true that, at least up until the Arab Spring, 
‘rigorous neutrality’ was also one of the ‘hallmarks’ of Qatar’s foreign policy.313 
However, as this dissertation argues, Qatar’s invigorated external engagement 
post-1995 also challenged some long-established theories about the role of small 
states in the international system.314 Notably, over the next decade and a half Qatar 
would challenge another of Vital’s foundational arguments that the smaller the state 
‘the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the international 
community’.315  The country’s foreign policy actions would also challenge Handel’s 
theory that while a weak (small) state may enjoy certain advantages as a ‘free rider’ in 
matters of security it cannot develop an independent policy in international affairs.316  
There is no doubt that the size and sophistication of a state’s population 
influences its foreign policy both in terms of ambition and execution even in such 
mundane matters as having the capacity to staff foreign ministries and missions 
abroad with qualified officials.   
In the 1940s, to take one historical example, Saudi Arabia was opposed to the 
establishment of Arab League information offices in London, Washington and 
Geneva because it was embarrassed by the lack of qualified Saudi candidates capable 
of filling the posts and was jealous of the fact that Iraq and Egypt—the two dominant 
members of the nascent Arab League—had no trouble finding suitable appointees.317 
On the other hand, the Qatari experience does provide credibility to the 
argument of Olafsson, based on his analysis of the Icelandic model, that while in 
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objective terms small states are suboptimal from the point of view of security and 
may also be suboptimal as political and economic units in the global system, there are 
‘no serious disadvantages resulting from the small size of states in the global 
system’.318  
Moreover, a sovereign state, however small, has a certain status in the 
international community that is valuable in, and of, itself. A small sovereign state can 
participate in international organisations and regimes, most notably the United 
Nations (UN), on a formally equal footing with much larger states.  
For its part Qatar, which had been an early supporter of the Arab Monetary 
Fund, as well as a host of other Arab League affiliates, became a member of the UN 
in September 1971, soon after it proclaimed independence. From this time onwards, it 
was a member of several of the UN’s specialized agencies, including the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
Universal Postal Union, (UPU) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 319 During the 1970s, it also contributed to 
international development through recycling of a percentage of its petro-dollars into 
the developing world.320  
During the Cold War Qatar was also active in the non-aligned movement, 
sending representatives to its conferences, and providing the movement with financial 
and moral support. However, non-alignment is not a policy in itself but rather a way 
of establishing a diplomatic identity distinct from competitors and Qatar did not adopt 
a policy of neutralism (in the classic sense of non-involvement) in either the Cold 																																																								
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War or regional context following its independence. This despite the fact that it is 
widely argued in the literature that neutrality is the most suitable mechanism for small 
independent states to emphasise sovereignty and freedom of action.321   
Throughout the Cold War Qatar had been fiercely anti-Communist and 
refused for many years to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was only 
in the summer of 1988 that Qatar announced the opening of relations at the 
ambassadorial level with the Soviet Union (and China).322  
In part this move was due to the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in power, 
which apart from marking the end of the Cold War also saw Russia move to develop a 
policy of ‘New Thinking’ in foreign affairs based on diplomacy and economic ties, 
which followed Gorbachev’s call in March 1990 for the disbanding of the Warsaw 
pact as a military organisation and its transformation into a political organisation.323  
Regional integration is another way that small states can theoretically improve 
both their security and external political influence.  The literature makes the case that 
the security and survival of small states like those located in the Gulf is best served by 
the establishment of a community composed of all those states in a region, which seek 
security against both internal and external threats.324  El Mallakh, for example, has 
argued that from early on Qatar had an outward-looking perspective that viewed 
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regional integration via the GCC as a way of directly increasing its status, power and 
security.325  
However, the actual power imbalance in a GCC organisation dominated by 
Saudi Arabia from the time of its establishment, something Qatar would look to 
rectify in the second decade of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani rule, created on-
going tensions and gave credence to the argument made in the literature that a 
coalition of small states with disputed leadership whose members have different 
interests and objectives will have a high degree of stress within it over the formulation 
and implementation of common objectives.326  
On top of Saudi Arabian dominance of the GCC, there were other 
longstanding tensions between Qatar and its GCC partners, and between various other 
combinations of GCC partners, that also posed obstacles to the GCC’s harmonious 
functioning. The bilateral tensions between Qatar and Bahrain in the late 1980s, 
which culminated in the Stinger Missile dispute with Washington has been addressed 
above. So have the clashes with Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s over disputed borders. 
The new Emir also inherited some territorial differences with the UAE.  In December 
1992, when he still served as Deputy Emir, Qatar had threatened to boycott the GCC 
summit conference held in Abu Dhabi over these tensions. 
Interestingly, Qatar’s disagreements with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain 
also highlighted the fact that in all its disputes with its GCC partners Iran, which had 
been one of the first countries to recognize Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin 
Jassim bin Muhammed Al Thani in 1972, had consistently sided with Qatar.  Close 
bilateral Iranian-Qatari relations were based partially on proximity (important trade 																																																								
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links exist between the two countries, including a ferry service between Doha and 
Bushehr) and partly on mutual interests.  
The Iranian community in Qatar, although large, has traditionally been well 
integrated and never posed a threat to the regime. Moreover, Iran’s claim in May 
1989 to one-third of the gas in Qatar’s North Field was resolved by an amicable 
agreement to exploit the field jointly.327  
In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Qatar like some, though 
not all, of its GCC partners began to view Iran as a possible strategic ally. As such, 
speaking at a news conference in December 1990, at the time of the eleventh GCC 
annual Summit, the Qatari Prime Minister confirmed previous reports that the GCC 
was having ‘dialogue and contacts’ with Iran.328  
The following year, Qatar’s Emir welcomed Iranian participation in gulf 
security arrangements. Saudi Arabia was far more suspicious of an enhanced Iranian 
security role in the region and was also suspicious of Qatar’s efforts to improve 
Iranian-GCC relations. This was especially so given the fact that Doha’s efforts to 
increase ties with Iran (including discussions about plans to pipe water from the 
Karun River in Iran to Qatar) coincided with its clashes with Saudi Arabia over 
border rights in late 1991 and 1992.  The same was true of the UAE, which took a 
dim view of Qatar’s reserved involvement in GCC condemnations of Iran’s ongoing 
challenge to the UAE’s sovereignty of Abu Musa Island.329 
As such, on the new Emir’s succession to power in 1995, it was in Qatar’s 
interests not only to sustain its existing relationship with Iran but also to pro-actively 
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develop ties in a manner that contributed to stability across the wider region.  Though 
not addressed in this thesis directly, this became an increasingly important factor 
influencing the bilateral US-Qatari relationship up to 2010 as Washington intensified 
its efforts to neutralize any Iranian moves towards a nuclear military capability.  
In November 1995, Iran and the UAE were invited to Doha to agree on an 
agenda for dealing with their dispute over Abu Musa and The Tunbs in future 
bilateral negotiations. The talks failed but coming as they did just months after the 
new Emir came to power, they highlighted Qatar’s growing attempt to involve itself 
in regional diplomacy.330 
 In the summer of 1999, amid real disagreement among the GCC states, Qatar 
(as well as Saudi Arabia) hosted Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. This was the 
first visit by an Iranian leader to the Arab world since 1979.  The UAE’s foreign 
minister Rashid Abdullah al-Nuaymi, complained that any reconciliation between its 
GCC partners and Iran would come at his country’s expense.  The UAE was even 
more concerned when it transpired that neither Qatar nor Saudi Arabia had raised the 
issue of the sovereignty of the disputed islands during Khatami’s visit.331 
However, in terms of relations with its GCC partners, it was tensions in 
bilateral ties with Bahrain, as in the 1980s, that provided the most immediate 
challenge to the new Emir on coming to power in 1995. As noted previously, just 
under a decade earlier, in April-June 1986, Qatari forces had raided Fasht al-Debel a 
coral reef in the gulf north of Al Muharraq in Bahrain that had been artificially built 
up into a small island. They took into custody twenty-nine workers who were sent by 
Bahrain to build a coast guard station. The workers were released in May and 																																																								
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installations on the island were destroyed. 
Another important disagreement was over the Hawar island (approximately 3 
kilometres from Qatar’s western border), a matter that was rekindled in March 1980 
after the Bahrain government granted an oil concession to a consortium of American 
companies, which covered an area including the small piece of island territory.332  
In 1990, the GCC had a rare success in mediating a territorial dispute between 
members when it prevented Bahrain and Qatar from taking up arms over the disputed 
ownership of a low-tide elevation in the waters separating the two states. In December 
1990, during the summit that took place in Doha some three weeks prior to Operation 
Desert Storm, much of the discussions revolved around the dispute between Qatar and 
Bahrain. 
Tensions rose in July 1991 when, according to reports, Qatari naval vessels 
violated Bahraini waters, and Bahraini jet fighters flew into Qatari airspace. The issue 
was referred in August to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to 
determine whether it had jurisdiction over the dispute. The ICJ’s verdict of July 1994 
that it did after all possess jurisdiction to try the territorial dispute on the basis of 
Qatar’s earlier and unilateral application was ostensibly a defeat for Bahrain.333 
The status of the disputed Hawar islands and the Fasht al-Debel rocks 
continued through the first five years of the new Emir’s rule and was the one dispute 
to figure regularly on the agenda of the GCC.334 But once more, early evidence of the 
new Qatari leader’s emphasis on the importance of diplomacy and breaking with the 																																																								
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status quo, can be seen in the fact that in 1997, 26 years after independence, Qatar and 
Bahrain finally established diplomatic relations. 
Such on-going territorial disputes impacted negatively on the capacity of the 
GCC to function in a united manner into the 1990s.335 As noted above, the Gulf 
conflict of 1990-91 shattered the illusion that the GCC was capable of providing the 
security needed for the region in the face of larger external threats.  By the time that 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power in 1995 with American military 
assets stationed across the region, Qatar’s main strategic focus was on bilateral ties 
with the US.336 
 Small states can choose from a wide array of arrangements of alignment and 
non-alignment in order to enhance their security. These include a bilateral alliance 
with a major power; an alliance of two or several small states; membership of a 
multilateral alliance around one or more major powers; non-alignment aiming at 
neutrality in any war; non-alignment without any generalized commitment to 
neutrality. 337 
Alignment with a major power must either be based on the assumption that the 
small state can keep more independence by allying with it than by standing aloof, or 
that the loss of independence vis a vis a major power is a worthwhile price to pay for 
counteracting possible pressures from another potential threat. 
The simplest way to strengthen the commitment of a great power is to sign a 
formal treaty or to obtain clear and unambiguous promises of support in the case of 
military attack. This explains the series of defence cooperation agreements between 																																																								
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the US and the GCC states that were entered into in the first part of the 1990s in the 
years following Operation Desert Storm. 
In 1994 Qatar signed a defence pact to allow the US to station up to 2000 
troops in the country as well as the prepositioning of heavy equipment for a 
mechanized brigade, including over 100 tanks338. In 1995, the year Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani took office, Qatari military expenditure stood at 6 percent of GDP at 
US$330 million.  This was less, in both dollar and percentage of GDP terms, than 
military spending a decade earlier (at US$401 million and 6 percent of GDP in 
1985).339 Over the next five years, between 1996 and 2000 Qatar’s average annual 
defence expenditure was US$1.28 billion up from an average of US$580 million per 
annum between 1991 and 1995. 
At the same time, defence ties between the US and Qatar, beyond the issue of 
arms purchases, evolved rapidly once Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took power. 
In 1996 Qatar started building the state-of-the-art Al Udeid Air base at a cost of more 
than US$1 billion, at a time when the country itself had only a small air force.340 This 
move was widely interpreted to be a tacit invitation to deeper cooperation with US 
military forces.  US access to the base there was formalized in late 2000.   
By 1999 construction was under way at nearby Camp As Sayliyah on what US 
officials described as the Pentagon’s largest prepositioning supply base outside the 
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US. The project would cost US$718 million and on completion it would be able to 
support 10,000 troops and 5000 vehicle.341 
 By 2000, with the exception of the Philippines, Qatar was the most important 
base for the US outside its national territory.  It actively looked to consolidate this 
status by continuing to build up its military facilities at Al Udeid and As Sayliyah in 
the context of an evolving US national security policy of developing ‘forward 
pressure’ and a ‘crisis response’ in the region.   
 By March 2001, it was reported in the western media that the Pentagon had 
begun moving the heart of its Gulf forces from remote Prince Sultan Air Base in the 
Saudi desert to Qatar because of Saudi opposition to a possible US military attack 
against Iraq.342 
As Handel has pointed out, while small states enjoy certain advantages as free 
riders in matters of security they also generally end up carrying some of the cost of 
the relationship.343 Undoubtedly, the Qatari expenditure of US$1 billion to develop 
the Al Udeid airbase between 1996 and 2000 was one of the more significant 
examples of this financial commitment to the new, US-led, security situation in the 
region. It was also central to the Qatari strategy of, in the words of one Arab 
commentator of the time, making bilateral relations with Washington, ‘the backbone 
of Qatar’s national security’.344 
 However, such a commitment intended to bind the US to Qatar’s security 
during a period of significant instability did not mean that the US and Qatar shared 
the same approach to the challenge posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.  Indeed, 
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differences on this issue would have a significant impact on bilateral US-Qatari 
relations in the decade before the US invasion in 2003, not to mention following it.  In 
the three years before taking power in 1995 Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in his 
role as defence minister, was widely reported to have been pursuing ‘closer 
relations’345 and had made ‘friendly gestures’ to Iraq.346  
In January 1993, the US conducted several air strikes against Iraqi missile 
facilities and other military targets. The allied strikes followed a series of Iraqi 
challenges, including violations of no-fly zones, interference with weapons 
inspections, and the unauthorized removal of materiel from the demilitarized zone 
with Kuwait.  The following June the US also launched a missile strike against Iraq’s 
intelligence headquarters building in response to evidence that Iraq had organized an 
attempt to assassinate former President George H. Bush.347  
In May 1996 it was reported that the US would station 30 Air Force fighter 
jets in Qatar for two months beginning in June. This ‘expeditionary force’ was 
mandated to remain there until August in support of the US-led mission to enforce a 
no-fly zone over southern Iraq to protect the country’s Shiite Muslim population from 
Iraqi government forces. This ‘show of support for the US’348 in the Gulf, as the 
Pentagon described it, came in the same year as press reports circulated stating that 
the US air force had been practicing in Qatar for missions intended to hit Iraqi 
targets.349   
However, Qatar had also looked to mediate between Kuwait and Iraq during 
the latter part of the 1990s and this attempt at a mediated solution caused 																																																								
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disagreement and tension between Doha and Washington.  In 1997, in an interview in 
the Washington Post, Qatar’s Emir not only refused to endorse the US strategy of 
‘dual containment’ of Iran and Iraq but reprimanded President Bill Clinton and 
Defence Secretary William Cohen prior to a meeting with both, with the words, ‘You 
have no more excuses’.350  
In early 1998 Secretary of Defence Cohen said that the Gulf states were lining 
up behind the US to force Saddam to cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors but 
he failed to gain any support for renewed attacks on Iraq. During a visit to Qatar later 
that year he failed to convince the government to endorse the US threat to use force. 
Instead in a joint press conference with Cohen, the Qatari foreign minister was 
clear: ‘We don’t want to see Iraq being stricken again’. 351 Not usually the language 
of the leader of a supplicant small state in dealings with a global superpower.   
If Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had led to profound upheaval 
in the relationship between the US and the GCC countries, including Qatar, over the 
subsequent decade it had also resulted in a gradual change of approach by the GCC to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes to the question of Palestine.  Qatar’s evolving 
approach to this highly emotive and sensitive issue that has overshadowed the entire 
Arab world for more than half a century was highlighted by its presence at the Madrid 
peace conference in October 1991.  
On occasions in the past Qatar had shown itself willing to break with the 
status quo on this most controversial of issues. For example, Qatar was only one of 7 
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Arab states that had welcomed the August 1981 eight point peace proposal for solving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict put forward by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia.352  
At the historic Madrid meeting of 1991, Qatar raised the possibility of a 
rethink on the appropriateness of the Arab trade boycott of Israel in return for an end 
to settlement expansion.  This contribution to Arab-Israeli diplomacy marked the start 
of a consistent, if gradual and considered, process of developing relations with Israel.  
This move towards normalisation was also defined by a Qatari willingness to 
take a more hardline position on certain aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict than a 
number of its Arab partners. On 16 December 1991, the GCC, which had previously 
voted together on the Palestine issue at the UN, chose not to vote collectively on the 
resolution revoking the clause in Resolution 3379 of 1975 stating that Zionism was 
racism.  Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman were absent from the vote and Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE voted against. 353 
This vote had taken place in the context of the new regional situation 
following the Gulf crisis. In particular, the GCC took offence at Saddam’s attempt to 
link his action in Kuwait to the Israeli occupation of Arab territory during the crisis.  
Indeed, Qatar like almost the entire Arab world rejected outright the Iraqi claim that 
the ‘restoration of Kuwait to the motherland’ was the first step towards ‘the liberation 
of Jerusalem’.354  One of the few Arab exceptions to this was the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). Many Palestinians, including PLO leader Yasser Arafat, could 
not resist the opportunity of the Gulf crisis to draw Iraq into the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict and hailed Saddam as their champion and leader of the Arab world.355  In 
response, Qatar, a longtime political and economic supporter of the PLO, bitterly 
condemned the alliance between the PLO and Saddam and along with its partners in 
the GCC cut aid to the PLO at the time of 1991 Gulf Crisis.  
 If relations with the PLO deteriorated greatly after 1991, the launch of the Oslo 
peace process in 1993 also resulted in a dramatic improvement in Qatari-Israeli 
relations.356 Qatar, along with other GCC governments, publicly endorsed the Oslo 
agreement between Israel and the PLO. In a communiqué issued in the first week of 
September the GCC agreed to support the accord as the ‘first step toward reaching a 
just, lasting and comprehensive settlement’.357 
In October 1994, Qatar, along with its GCC partners, announced that it was 
lifting parts of the 46 year-old Arab boycott of Israel and pledged to urge the rest of 
the Arab world to drop all trade restrictions involving the Jewish state.  In practical 
terms this meant that there would be an end to the blacklisting of foreign companies 
trading with Israel. But the move did not end the ban on Arab countries directly 
trading with Israel.  
There was also an unofficial move to allow visitors to enter Qatar using 
passports with Israeli travel stamps and over-flights by airlines landing in Israel as 
well as the transshipment of postal shipments through and to Israel and calls by 
foreign flagged ships that stop at Israeli ports. The GCC also said that it would 
support an initiative put forward for consideration by the Arab League to consider a 
total end to the boycott in order to ‘take into consideration progress achieved’. 
However, in a stark example of how further advanced on this issue some member 																																																								
355 Fouad Ajami, ‘The Summer of Arab Discontent’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No 5 (Winter, 1990-91), 
pp.1-20, p.6. 
356 ‘Kiss now, pay later’, The Economist, 30 October 1993, p. 73. 
357 William E. Schmidt, ‘Backed by Key Arab Nations, Arafat Seeks to Conclude Pact’, The New York 
Times, 7 September 1993. 
	 127	
states of the GCC, including Qatar, were than the rest of the Arab world, the Arab 
League refused to even put the boycott issue on the agenda of their discussions.358 
 In October 1995, the new Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamad bin Jassim 
bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, met and discussed the peace process with his 
Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres while they were at the UN for the opening of the 
General Assembly in New York.  The Emir attended the signing ceremony for the 28 
September 1995, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (widely known as Oslo II). 
 This agreement extended Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories and 
established a framework for Israeli military redeployment. This was intended to open 
the way for the much anticipated, but already postponed, Palestinian presidential and 
legislative elections. While the Qatari minister for information attended Yitzhak 
Rabin’s funeral in 1995. 
 In 1996, on taking over the premiership in the wake of Rabin’s death, Shimon 
Peres visited Qatar, an invitation that was extended despite low levels of public 
support for the invite recorded in opinion polls at the time.359 No less significantly, as 
early as 1994, despite the reservations of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Qatar 
acknowledged entering into official negotiations with Israel to provide it with natural 
gas. There had even been discussions between Qatar and Israel regarding potential 
schemes to build a pipeline that would deliver Qatari natural gas supplied by Qatar 
General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC, now QP) overland to Israel and from there to 
customers in Europe.  
 At the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional economic summit in 
Jordan in October 1995 Qatar had even agreed to supply Israel with gas through the 
US energy giant, Enron. The proposed sale never took place as Israel subsequently 																																																								
358 Elaine Sciolino, ‘Saudis and 5 Other Gulf Nations will Ease their Boycott of Israel’, The New York 
Times, 1 October 1994. 
359 Agence France-Press (AFP), 12 March 1996. 
	 128	
cancelled the letter of intent that was signed in 1995.  Nevertheless, the fact that it 
was even agreed to in the first place highlighted the new Emir’s willingness to break 
with convention on this most politically sensitive issue.  In May 1996, Qatar allowed 
Israel to open a trade representation office in Doha, which made Qatar the first GCC 
state to grant de facto recognition to Israel by launching trade relations.360 
All this points to the fact that between the end of the 1991 Gulf War up until 
the May 1996 Israeli national elections, Qatar steadily improved its relations with 
Israel and was at the forefront of GCC moves to work more closely with Israel. As the 
New York Times summed up, Qatar had gone ‘further than other gulf states in ties 
with Israel’.361 
Benjamin Netanyahu and Likud came to power in Israel in May 1996. 
Netanyahu, a former Israeli UN ambassador, had been a vocal and scathing critic of 
the Oslo peace process while in opposition. While he accepted Oslo grudgingly as a 
fait accompli, on taking power he also promised to comply with Oslo commitments 
only as long as there was ‘reciprocity’ from the Palestinians.362  
Prior to the Likud election victory, and despite some setbacks such as the 
postponement of the Palestinian elections originally scheduled for July 1995, Oslo 
had resulted in two landmark agreements—Oslo I and Oslo II—that transformed the 
local political landscape. As such, there were now real fears that the anti-Oslo 
tendencies of Netanyahu’s Likud-led government might derail progress. As fears 
began to prove founded and the Oslo peace process gradually ground to a halt, 
relations between Israel and the Arab world, which had been increasingly cordial 
since the start of the Oslo process, began to deteriorate. 																																																								
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As such, a number of Arab countries, led by Syria, opposed Qatar’s invitation 
to Israel to attend the fourth MENA economic summit, scheduled for Doha in mid-
November 1997. Organised by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum (WEF), 
this annual meeting was established as an offshoot of the Middle East peace process 
that began with the signing of the Oslo Declarations in mid-1993.  It was intended to 
bring together Arab and Israeli business and political leaders to discuss regional 
economic cooperation.  
In acknowledgement of the setbacks to the peace process and under pressure 
from Arab partners Qatar offered to downgrade the status of the conference from 
heads of government to ministerial level but many Arab countries were still not 
satisfied and demanded the event’s cancellation.  
The new Emir and his government had been outspoken critics of Likud 
government policies, but they defended on-going Israeli ministerial visits to Qatar and 
refused to cancel the planned meeting.  Instead, Qatar responded to its Arab critics by 
insisting that it had the sovereign right to make its own foreign policy decisions. 363 
This resulted in a number of Arab states, notably Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Bahrain, boycotting the conference. Kuwait and Oman sent delegations led by 
under-secretaries rather than ministers as had been originally planned.  
The US backed the controversial Doha MENA meeting of November 1997. 
The State Department explained that the event ‘symbolises the American vision of a 
peaceful, cooperative Middle East concentrating on trade and mutual economic 
benefits’. As such, in the words of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the meeting 
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was ‘important in itself’ and should not be made conditional on the status of peace 
talks with Israel.364  
Qatar’s stand on the MENA conference earned the accolade of influential US-
based commentators such as the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman who called 
Qatar the ‘gutsy, progressive little gulf oil state’.365 More importantly, Qatar 
consolidated its relationship with the US by insisting on hosting the event in the face 
of vociferous criticism from most Arab states. In a show of support US Secretary of 
State Albright attended the gathering, despite its downgrading and the boycott of 
numerous Arab delegations and the decision by Israel to send its then Industry and 
Trade Minister Nathan Sharanksy rather than its Foreign Minister David Levy.366 
In the wake of the MENA summit, senior Qatari officials continued to be 
outspoken in attributing blame for the breakdown in the peace process on Likud’s 
shoulders.  In early 1998, the government reduced the activities of the Israeli trade 
office in Doha and stopped the planned opening of a larger commercial office.  
Subsequently, in September 1998, Israeli physicians were barred from entering a 
medical conference in Doha.367  At the same time, and in response to the deadlock in 
the peace negotiations, the Qatari ruling family increased its backing for the 
Palestinian cause by providing support to establish a Permanent Qatari Committee to 
Support Jerusalem.368 
In the wake of the US-brokered Wye River agreement of late 1998 the Clinton 
Administration looked to the GCC states to recommit to supporting the peace process. 
Washington argued that the pro-US Arab states including Qatar, as well as Egypt, 																																																								
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Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, should move to support the PA economically and 
extend and normalise their ties with Israel.  There was frustration on the part of 
Washington that this group of close Arab allies had not been openly willing to engage 
in pushing the process forward.369  
However, it was overly simplistic for the US to categorize the approach of all 
these countries towards relations with Israel as identical. Just as Qatar stood firm in 
the face of wide-ranging Arab pressure to cancel the 1997 MENA meeting in Doha, 
the government also refused to bow to pressure in November 2000 at the time of the 
Islamic Organisation Conference (IOC) Summit.  
Officially, Qatar claimed that it closed down the Israeli trade office in 2000, 
just before the Summit, which Iran and Saudi Arabia threatened to boycott if the 
Israeli office remained open. In practice, however, as the media widely reported at the 
time, the two Israeli diplomats working at the office did not leave Doha; they were 
operating from inside their hotel suite.  
This attitude towards, and engagement with, Israel in the first five years of 
Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s rule was a perfect early example of Qatar’s 
increasingly independent and nuanced foreign policy and its willingness to act 
autonomously and to upgrade its international profile by showing its determination to 
take risks abroad to protect its strategic plans at home.  It also highlighted the 
willingness of Qatar to support the US on perhaps the most sensitive issue in the Arab 
world, thus underlining the willingness of the country to take risks as a key US ally in 
the region.  
However, just as Qatar’s new diplomacy was consolidating its deep 
relationship with the US, building bridges with neighbours like Bahrain, opening up 
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towards Israel and improving ties with Iran and Iraq – all moves that angered 
neighbours, allies and friends – the September 11 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on 
Washington and New York took place.  As chapter 5 will show, while this created 
certainty and threatened instability and even mayhem, for a small state like Qatar in a 
dangerous region it also opened up new opportunities and possibilities for its role in 
the region and its relationship with local and global powers. But first Qatar had to 






From Oil to Gas: Transformation through Diversification in the post-1995 Era 
‘Statesmen in newly independent states should be responsive to external 
stimuli and should react to external threats in order to protect the 
emerging state’s survival.  However, in later periods, state behaviour may 
be better explained from a domestic level perspective’. Miriam Fendius 
Elman 370 
 
As Miriam Fendius Elman’s above quote underscores, there is an ongoing tension 
between the external and domestic drivers of state behaviour.  Pre-independence 
Qatar was an underdeveloped state.  Like much of the region, it had long had a 
primitive subsistence economy based largely on pastoralism and fishing. Before 1973, 
for example, it did not even have plausible national currency estimates for GNP.371  
Post-independence Qatar was a classic rentier state. The country’s first oil was 
produced and exported in 1949.  Twenty years later, in 1969, it was earning £48 
million of its total government revenues of £50 million per year from Shell Qatar, 
which started production from the offshore field in 1964, and the Qatar Petroleum 
Company, the latter being a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, which was 
also owned by Shell.372  
In 1970 Qatar joined the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC). At the same time Qatar’s oil revenues rose on the back of a rising oil price 
from US$100 million in 1970 to US$1.6 billion in 1974 to US$4.2 billion in 1982.  
This was an annual revenue growth of 36.5 percent over the period between 1970 and 																																																								
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1982. This was a higher percentage of annual growth than all Arab members of OPEC 
other than Saudi Arabia and the UAE.373  
Fasano and Iqbal have argued that small states are much more likely than 
larger ones to be ‘heavily dependent on very few commodities for export’.374 In its 
early years of independence, Qatar certainly gave credence to this argument.  
However, there is a divide in the literature over the extent that Qatar 
successfully used its newfound wealth to address socio-economic challenges in the 
first decades of independence.  The well-known economist Yusif A. Sayigh has 
argued that the country, along with Bahrain and Dubai, registered ‘relatively 
noticeable progress’ in tackling some socio-economic challenges.375  But Ragaei El 
Mallakh, in his 1981 book on the development of Qatar’s oil economy, has argued 
that over the same period the development of human resources in Qatar was lacking 
and that there was little attempt to address the social strains and the new cleavages 
created by the inequitable distribution of wealth at a time of rapid economic 
growth.376 
What is not in doubt is that Qatar’s ruling family had not only survived, but 
had thrived, during the rapid change that had been brought about by oil wealth. 
Successive Emirs had shown a real skill in dispersing hydrocarbon revenues across 
society, co-opting domestic elites and making the whole population dependent on 
																																																								
373 Over this period Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues went from US$1.2 billion in 1970 to US$20 billion in 
1974 and to US$76 billion in 1982.  This was a 41.3 percent rise in revenue over the period. In the 
same years the UAE’s oil revenues went from US$200 million in 1970, to US$4.1 billion in 1974 to 
US$16 billion in 1982, a 44.1 percent growth in revenue. See Michael Tanzer and Stephen Zorn, 
‘OPEC’s Decade: Has it made a difference?, Middle East Report, No. 120, Jan 1984, p.10. See also 
Nasser Al-Othman, With their Bare hands: The Story of the Oil Industry in Qatar, London, Longman, 
1984 and Ching-yuan Lin, ‘Global Pattern of Energy Consumption before and after the 1974 Oil 
Crisis’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 32, No 4 (July 1984), pp. 781-802, p.793. 
374 U. Fasano and Z. Iqbal, GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to Diversification, Washington D.C., 
International Monetary Fund, 2003. 
375 Yusif A. Sayigh, ‘Problems and Prospects of Development in the Arabian Peninsula’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No.1 (1971), pp. 40-58, p.53. 
376 Ragaei El Mallahk, Qatar: Development of an Oil Economy, p.116. 
	 135	
state largesse. Free from the challenge of a politically powerful merchant class, 
control of the oil-funded distributive state allowed the Al-Thani family to consolidate 
its hold on power.  
This allowed for ‘a relatively smooth transition’377 into the hydrocarbon era 
but it also rapidly increased the role and size of the state. Qatar only had 43 
government employees in 1953.  But under British guidance government structures 
and public services began to expand. Over the course of the decade the first telephone 
exchange, desalination plant, power plant, jetty, customs warehouse, airstrip and 
police headquarters were opened.  
During the 1960s, and primarily under the lead of the future Emir, 
infrastructure and the public sector bureaucracy, as well as the labour force across the 
entire economy, grew significantly. The massive infusion of wealth from the 1960s 
onwards resulted in an unprecedented rise in the number of foreign workers from both 
the inter-Arab migratory system and the non-Arab underdeveloped world.378  
 In 1959 a labour department was established to deal with workers in the rapidly 
growing oil sector. In 1962 a labour law was enacted that gave hiring preference to 
Qataris, then to other Arabs, and finally to other foreigners.  Trade unions were 
banned, but Qatari workers had workplace-based organizations, known as workers’ 
committees that dealt with grievances. Strict controls existed on foreign workers, 
whose visas stipulated that they must work for a specific Qatari sponsor at a specific 
job.  
 In the immediate post-1973 era, oil production and revenues increased sizably, 
moving Qatar out of the rank of poor countries and providing it with one of the 																																																								
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highest per capita incomes in the world. By 1975, after the quadrupling of oil prices 
had fed through into the economy, oil accounted for 71.9 percent of GDP. Qatar’s 
major development plans began in this period and they required the large-scale 
importation of labour.379  
Non-Qataris comprised over 50 per cent of Qatar’s population as far back as 
1976.380 The first Qatarisation initiative in the public sector came in the same year 
when a committee called the “Workforce and Qatarisation committee” was formed. It 
was responsible for preparing reports, statistics, and recommendations for developing 
the workforce and implementing a suitable gradual Qatarisation plan.  
 By 1980 immigrants constituted 68 percent of Qatari residents compared to 58 
percent in Kuwait and 50 percent in the UAE.381  From that time onwards, foreign 
workers consistently made up a large proportion of the labour force.  This was 
particularly true of the private sector, which has always been very dependent on 
expatriates, while the government bureaucracy and the public sector employ the 
majority of nationals. The first Qatarisation programe in the vitally important oil and 
gas sector was, for example, launched in 1984. 
 In response, the government started to encourage Qataris to take jobs in the 
work force.  But this process of “Qatarization” had been unsuccessful for the most 
part in the face of huge demand for workers across a number of sectors from 
construction to healthcare.  By the time that Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came 
to power in 1995 the vast majority of labourers, service industry workers and middle-
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level employees in Qatar were foreigners.382 Only nine percent of the Qatari domestic 
labour force is employed in the private sector. This reflects the fact that for most 
Qataris, employment in the public sector has historically been more attractive than 
working in the private sector. 
 Qatar now looked to reduce this phenomenon in order to stem the huge value 
of funds transferred home by expatriate workers and also to increase opportunities 
and incentives for the indigenous population. In 1997 a new set of incentives was 
approved by the Council to foster Qatarisation. These incentives included: 
• Providing Qataris who work in the private and mixed sectors with the 
building loans and the free building land that are usually given to 
Qatari public employees.  
• Implementing the same pension scheme for those who work in the 
private and mixed sectors and those in the public sector.  
• Paying a monthly salary in the case of disability or death for Qataris 
who work in the private and mixed sectors, which is equivalent to that 
which is applied in the public sector.  
This became a priority of the new Emir’s socio-economic strategy, not only for 
economic reasons, but because a disproportionate number of expatriates in the 
workplace threatened the fabric of local culture and identity and because overreliance 
on foreign labour (both skilled and unskilled) projected a negative image of Qatar 
externally. 
 In order to control the influx of expatriate workers, Qatar tightened the 
administration of its foreign manpower programmes and put in place a set of strict 
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entry and immigration rules and regulations. By 2000 a third strategic plan was 
underway. It had a mandate to ‘develop and train inexperienced Qataris and help them 
gain valuable on-the-job experience’, primarily in the industry and energy sectors in a 
wide variety of technical and clerical areas.383 However, this fell far short of its goals 
and foreigners continued to account for the great bulk of Qatar’s workforce, a matter 
of ongoing government concern as the new millennium came and went.384  
In these terms educated females provided the potential to offer a replacement 
workforce for expatriate labour in some areas.385 Women as a percentage of the Qatari 
labour force increased from 4 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 1995 when the new 
Emir came to power. This was a percentage rise comparable with those occurring 
over the same period in the UAE (from 4 percent to 13 percent) and Saudi Arabia 
(from 5 percent to 13 percent). However, this was less than the increase in both 
Kuwait (from 8 percent to 28 percent) and Bahrain (from 5 percent to 19 percent).386  
During the Emir’s first decade in power he made it a priority to address this 
matter.  More and more Qatari women began to serve as public school teachers, 
university professors, senior professionals in government service, health and 
education, the police and private business.387  Despite this, by 2003 the figure for 
female participation in the workforce was only 17.9 percent, a lower percentage than 
in Kuwait (29 percent), Saudi Arabia  (20.2 percent) or Bahrain (22.9 percent).388  
 One major reason for both the inability of the Emir’s new government to make 																																																								
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greater headway in both its Qatarisation project and in its opening up of the workforce 
to women was the pervasive role of the state sector in the economy.  This necessarily 
meant that the private sector played a limited, secondary, role in the growth and 
expansion of the economy.  Even the performance of the private sector in non-oil 
related activities was linked to government expenditure programmes and intervention 
in terms of subsidized loans, equity injections, bailouts, and preferences in 
government procurements. 
 Reform of the public sector is perhaps the most politically sensitive economic 
challenge of all, as any attempt by the state to introduce cutbacks or reforms will 
directly limit the aspirations of citizens and reduce the effectiveness of the economic 
safety net that has become entrenched as a fundamental right across Gulf societies. 
 What made this already difficult task even harder in the Qatari case was the fact 
that the goal of the new Emir was not to merely reform the public sector but to 
fundamentally transform it in every area.  This required overseeing significant 
improvements in capacity-building and institutional development, both vital for 
administrative efficiency and transparency. It also required an overhaul of capacity 
building at managerial and all other levels of the public sector and the implementation 
of policies that promoted equal opportunities and gender equality. No less difficult, it 
required such initiatives to be rolled out across professional associations, social 
organizations, and membership organizations as well as governmental and non-
governmental bodies.  
 These were ambitious goals but they were aided somewhat by the fact that 
compared to its oil-rich neighbours, post-independence Qatar was notable for its ‘lack 
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of delusions of grandeur’.389 Certainly, prior to 1995 the government did at least 
attempt to pursue a cautious approach that linked gradual economic development to 
viable public expenditure policies.390  
 Moreover, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani inherited a kingdom that had 
much potential. In September 1995, just three months after he took power, the World 
Bank issued a report that measured and ranked country wealth on the basis of their 
natural, physical, human and social capital (including the value of income equality 
and democracy). Under this new calculation of national balance sheets Qatar was 
ranked the eight-richest state in the world, and the richest Arab nation.391 
 The theoretical literature argues that economic diversification of the economy is 
vital to the political independence of small states.  Certainly, as noted above, small 
states are much more likely than larger ones to be heavily dependent on very few 
commodities for export. This in turn often results in a dependence on external parties 
(including states, multinational corporations or commodity exchanges), as foreign 
ownership over natural resources is quite common in developing countries.392 
 This was certainly the case in Qatar (and the rest of the oil-producing Arab 
Gulf) until the early 1970s, when its hydrocarbon industry was largely in the hands of 
foreign companies. As part of a strategy that attempted to substitute hydrocarbon 
resources for cliency, the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) was 
established in 1974 with the objective of gaining full control of the country’s oil and 
gas resources for the state. This goal was quickly realized.  
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Important as this was, it did not remove the negative implications and 
associated challenges of the country’s on-going dependence on oil revenues. Between 
1982 and 1986 Qatar suffered badly when the oil price fell sharply in the face of 
stagnant world consumption and a drop in demand for OPEC output. The country’s 
GDP contracted significantly and, by 1986, after a decade of soaring revenues and 
unprecedented spending, national income was down by almost 20 percent on levels at 
the beginning of the decade and the Qatari budget continued to show a deficit into the 
early 1990s.393  
It took over a decade for Qatar to return its GDP up to its pre-oil shock (1981) 
levels.394 Again, in the early 1990s, Qatar almost went into bankruptcy when oil 
prices plummeted and the country was not a big enough player in the crude oil market 
to protect itself from adverse developments in the increasingly globalised world 
economy. By 1997, just two years after the new Emir came to power, it was estimated 
that Qatar’s oil production rates would be unsustainable over the next two to three 
decades. 
 As part of the attempt to overcome the downside of this ‘commodity 
concentration’, Qatar’s new leadership decided to take radical action.  In doing so 
over the next decade and a half it gave credence to the argument in the literature that a 
small state will usually be able to preserve more of its independence by diversifying 
its foreign trade as well as the foreign investments if it accepts and has weighed the 
short-term costs of such diversification against the long-term gains.  
 Of course there are downsides and risks associated with this attempt to gain 
economic independence through radical diversification out of oil just as 
industrialization and import substitution may bring with them the downside of 																																																								
393 Ghassan Salameh, ‘Hangover in the Gulf’, Middle East Report, No. 139, Mar-April 1986, p.40. 
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increased dependence on the import of technology as well the upside of enhanced 
self-reliance. 
 Though traditionally Qatar was guilty ‘of drifting into premature diversification’ 
and Qatar remained ‘an exceptionally narrowly based economy’,395 in the pre-1995 
era there had been a few select attempts at diversifying Qatar’s economy away from 
oil by building an industrial and manufacturing base.  
 During the 1970s and 1980s the Qatari government actively promoted the 
development of both heavy and light industry concentrating on in-country 
resources—steel and iron, chemical, fertilizer and petro-chemical industries and 
cement.  It also established a national fishing company, as well as a number of small-
scale agricultural projects. While in the early 1970s an £18 million fertilizer plant was 
being built at Umm Said and planned to spend £30 million on projects to build 
asbestos and petrochemical plants entered the study phase 1970s.396 
  One can also discern some early signs of Qatar’s awareness of the socio-
economic benefits of green technology and business.  In 1980, for example, the then 
Qatari ambassador to the United Nations in New York was a vocal supporter of the 
10-year UN backed plan to bring ‘clean water and adequate sanitation to all by 1990’.  
 In the course of the UN debate on this issue, Qatar’s then ambassador somewhat 
presciently made the case that his country was uniquely positioned to participate in 
this nascent economic sector as a developing nation committed to investing in the 
right technology.397  
 Despite this ‘energetic’ effort at diversification across various sectors, the key 
areas of industry remained underdeveloped.  By the beginning of the 1990s industry 
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in Qatar only accounted for 10 percent of the country’s GDP.398 Qatar’s efforts at 
diversification into the industrial sector up to this time were hampered by the fact that 
like most Gulf countries in the 1980s, there was a severe lack of technological 
development in all sectors of the economy except the oil industry. 399  
 On top of this, post-independence Qatar had to deal with the same problems that 
all small states face—a small domestic market, high costs of production, low 
economies of scale and Research and Development (R&D) expenditure, a lack of 
exportable products, and low levels of industrial good requiring a high intensity of 
capital research.400 
 A 1990 cabinet reshuffle led to the establishment of a Supreme Council for 
Planning (SCP), formed to coordinate the diversification of Qatar’s economy. But by 
the time the new Emir came to power in 1995, private capital outflows constituted a 
steady drain on the balance of payments, and precluded any serious long-term 
domestic private investment. This, in turn, undermined efforts to diversify the 
economy away from oil towards industry.401   
 As such, while the idea of using revenues from oil to fund viable and sustained 
development was not a new idea, on acceding to power in 1995 Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani inherited an economy that could claim to have achieved little 
significant economic diversification. The manufacturing sector accounted for only 
11.4 percent of GDP in 1995 and fluctuated between 9 percent and 11.4 percent over 
the next two years. In 1995, finance, insurance and real estate made up 11.2 percent of 
GDP, rising to 11.5 percent in 1996 and falling back to 11.2 percent in 1997 and 11.2 
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percent in 1998.402 
 This made the new Emir’s determination to diversify away from stagnating oil 
exports both necessary and challenging.  His government’s first move was to create 
the environment and institutions required to make diversification possible in order to 
overcome the traditional situation where loyalty to leadership and conformity within 
institutional structures was given greater emphasis than competitiveness or innovation.  
As such, Qatar joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 
1996.403 A priori small states are generally likely to gain from a general move towards 
trade liberalisation. Trade characteristics associated with small states include a high 
ratio of trade to GDP, a high content of primary production or natural resources in 
their exports and a high geographical concentration in exports. Moreover, the internal 
trade inside small states tends to be confined to inter-industry trade and specialisation 
and the conditions for intra-industry trade based on increasing returns activities are 
lacking.404 
Entry into the WTO, which had replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1995, boosted reform in all these areas by requiring Qatar to 
open up its economy to outside investors. This made it more difficult for Qatar to 
preserve local monopolies and privileges. It also gave a signal to those on the 
international stage hoping for economic modernization and reform in Qatar, that the 
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new Emir was serious in his attempt to overhaul the structure of the economy in order 
to reduce excessive reliance on oil revenues.405   
 Partly in recognition of the progress made in Qatar from 1995, at the end of 
January 2001, the WTO formally agreed to hold its upcoming top-level meeting the 
following autumn in Doha. This choice was made by consensus of the 140-nation 
trade organisation, which was keen to choose a stable, developing state that could 
afford to host the event. For its part Qatar wanted to hold the six-day long meeting to 
bolster its international image, in line with the leadership’s vision of the country’s 
emerging global role.406 
 Some 142 countries sent delegations to the WTO ministerial meeting between 9 
and 13 November 2001. The success of this summit and the subsequent rounds of 
trade negotiations that followed the meeting, dubbed the Doha Round, gave Qatar 
ongoing global exposure. All the more so as the summit had run smoothly at a time of 
high alert across the international community, coming as it did only shortly after the 
September 2001 (9/11) attacks on New York and Washington.   
 As noted in the introduction place branding is an important strategy for small 
states. Prior to the WTO event of 2001, Qatar had been engaged in particular in event 
hallmarking, whereby places organise events, in order to obtain a wider recognition 
that they exist but also to establish specific brand associations.407 The WTO meeting 
was the culmination of that strategy up to that point.  
 Subsequently, Qatar looked to build on this by hosting numerous high profile 																																																								
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international conferences on everything from democratisation to economic reform to 
investment in the region.   In March 2003, for example, Qatar’s profile in the Islamic 
world was enhanced by its hosting of the summit meeting of the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC). Formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
since its founding in 1969 as the ‘collective voice’ of the Muslim World the OIC has 
grown into the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United 
Nations with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents.   In June 2005, 
Doha was the venue for the second South Summit of the Group of 77, the largest 
intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations.408    
 In 2002 the Qatar Industrial Development Bank (QIDB), the only specialist 
bank operating in Qatar in support of the industry sector, was accorded formal 
approval under Emiri Decree No. 14, 1997, to commence operations in the same year. 
Half owned by the government, the QIDB soon began providing entrepreneurs 
committed to developing small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) with loans to 
cover 80 percent of their equipment costs or 60 percent of their total financing 
requirements.  
 The new Emir’s government also attempted to overcome the downside of 
commodity concentration by attempting to change fundamentally the basis of Qatar’s 
economy. Central to this strategy was a decision to diversify the economy away from 
crude oil towards its large reserves of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and to develop its 
natural gas liquid (NGL) products for both domestic consumption and export.409 																																																								
408 Established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries signatories of the “Joint 
Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations 
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and promote South-South cooperation for development. 
409 NGL products—ethane, butane and propane—are the basic raw materials required throughout the 
petrochemicals industry. NGL constituted a valuable export good, which, in contrast to liquefied 
natural gas (LNG), was readily substituted between markets. 
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 Though this gas project began prior to 1995, it was the future Emir who had 
been the driving force behind this move and on taking office it became a central 
priority of his time in power.  The objective was, in part, to limit the effects on the 
Qatari economy of oil price fluctuations, which had caused havoc in the mid-1980s 
and early 1990s, the consequences of which could be felt into the last years of that 
decade.410  
 It was also part of a much more ambitious departure from the traditional 
thinking that ruled that the two possible alternative avenues for diversification were 
agriculture or industry.411 
 In the first years of Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s rule, Qatar moved 
swiftly to develop its huge offshore natural gas reserves, demonstrating in the process 
a vision and a capacity for developing this natural resource that left behind Russia and 
Iran, the only two nations in the world with larger gas deposits.412  
 At the heart of this vision was a three phase plan to (1) develop gas production 
for domestic consumption (in power, desalination, fertilizer and petrochemicals), (2) 
build an export pipeline to deliver gas to the Gulf and beyond and (3) build an 
liquefaction facility for the export of LNG. 
 There were precedents for Qatar looking to diversify within, rather than outside, 
the energy sector.  Qatar was the first Arab Gulf state to build up its own 
petrochemical industry, with the establishment of the Qatar Petrochemical Company 
(QAPCO) in 1974. By the early 1980s it was producing ethylene, low-density 
polyethylene, and sulfur.  
 However, there had been nothing done previously to prepare Qatar, or the world, 																																																								
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for the scale of this new project that was intended to turn Qatar into the ‘capital of the 
world for this new age of fuels’, and to establish it as the world’s main supplier of gas, 
as Qatar’s long-time energy minister Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah promised in 
2004.413  
 The challenges that the Qatari government faced in building the world’s largest 
liquefied natural gas industry in little more than a decade were ‘monumental’ as the 
New York Times put it.  There were the very obvious disadvantages such as the 
country’s dependence on oil to fund the strategy at a time of collapse in the oil price 
to less than US$10 a barrel in 1997-98. Moreover, Qatar’s oil reserves and production 
levels were always modest by Gulf standards, with the country near the bottom of the 
OPEC producer rankings.  
 In these terms, while the decision to substitute gas for oil was obvious from a 
revenue and production point of view, it was not a clear-cut, inevitable or risk free 
move.  Oil had formed the cornerstone of Qatar’s economy for decades and this 
continued well into the 1990s. As noted above, in 1995, when Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani came to power, oil accounted for 32.5 percent of GDP compared to 
a combined total of 22.6 percent for finance, insurance, real estate and manufacturing.  
In the next three years as the Emir’s vision for gas gathered momentum oil continued 
to account for 32.5 percent (1996), 36.4 percent (1997) and 36.4 percent (1998) of 
GDP.  
 Over the same period, Qatar reached output of 500,000 barrels of oil per day for 
the first time in its history (September 1996) and oil remained the number one expert 
earner throughout the first five years of Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s reign.414 
In other words, even in an era of collapsing oil price it was a difficult decision to de-																																																								
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prioritise an oil sector that dominated Qatar’s economy over many years.415 
 Second, the Qatari gas sector was relatively new and underdeveloped. Much of 
the gas was buried deep in the seabed of Qatar’s northern waters.  It would take six 
years of intense development, between 1991 and 1997 to create the basis of the gas 
industry needed to achieve these goals. The North West Dome (North Field) gas 
structure was discovered off the north east coast of Qatar by Shell in 1971, in the 
course of the company’s prospecting for oil.416 Subsequent drilling revealed a 6,000-
squarekilometre field, the world’s largest known offshore non-associated gas field.  
 The discovery of the North Field left Qatar with the world’s third-largest gas 
reserves. But progress proceeded slowly and there was much speculation from 
analysts over the real value of this gas find. Early plans prioritized domestic gas 
development over gas export projects. However, as the enormity of the North Field 
became more apparent, proposals were developed to export gas both as LNG and via 
pipelines to Gulf neighbors and beyond. 
Numerous factors conspired to prevent actual production of gas in the giant 
North Field for nearly a quarter of a century until the 1990s. In the 1970s, which 
coincided with the height of the oil price boom, there were a number of practical 
difficulties in the construction of the two natural gas liquids (NGL) plants that opened 
in Umm Said in 1981. There were subsequent difficulties in both plants coming on-
line as scheduled and operating at full capacity.  
 The first phase of the North Field development faced several delays prior to its 
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targeted start up in 1990 due to technical problems and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 417 
Fourteen of the 16 production wells in phase 1 suffered from cement casing leaks. 
Then, a week prior to the revised start-up on August 3, 1990 it was discovered that 
chemicals had leaked into an onshore pipeline and the North Field had to be 
temporarily closed. This came a day after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the departure 
of foreign contractors from the region in response to this crisis further postponed the 
start of production.  
 Finally, on September 3, 1991, on the twentieth anniversary of Qatari 
independence and exactly two decades after the initial discovery of the North Field, 
gas production got underway. At the time it was estimated that this project would 
have enough reserves to make 3 billion tonnes of LNG.  This meant that it could 
sustain the LNG industry on its own for more than 50 years if it produced 23 million 
tonnes of gas per year.418 
 However, achieving this was a hugely expensive undertaking. Phase One of the 
North Field project alone would cost US$1.3 billion to complete. Phase 2, the plan to 
develop the capability to export gas via a pipeline to nearby GCC countries from 1996 
onwards would cost another US$2 billion.  Overall, it was estimated that the entire 
North Field project would cost upwards of US$7 billion, comprising a minimum 
US$3 billion for downstream development, a minimum US$1.5 billion for upstream 
and US$2.5 billion for shipping.419    
The cost of establishing Ras Laffan (Rasgas), ultimately one of the largest LNG 
exporting complexes in the world, and to dredge an enormous port from the shallow 
coastal waters, was no less expensive. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s Qatar made a 																																																								
417 Mary Ann Tetreault, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth 
Century’, International Organization, p.584. 
418 See ‘Ras Lafan Industrial City’ http://www.rasgas.com/l_3.cfm?L3_id=33&L2_id=6 
419 Ibid. 
	 151	
multi-billion dollar investment in port facilities and infrastructure at Ras Laffan. This 
world-class port became operational in September 1996. In January 1997 Qatargas 
began exporting LNG from Ras Laffan, with the first shipment going to a Japanese 
company, Chubu Electric Power Company, as a part of a 25-year deal to supply 4 
million tonnes per year.420  
 In subsequent years Ras Laffan Port established itself as the world’s top LNG 
exporting facility.  Its adjacent industrial area, Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC), also 
quickly developed into a thriving energy-industry hub, home to international 
companies such as RasGas, Qatargas, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Dolphin 
Energy.421   
 Ras Laffan also became home to a fleet of locally owned specialist LNG 
carriers purchased at great expense that enabled Qatar to guarantee supply and meet 
the deadlines it had agreed with its customers.  This was an example of the innovative 
and comprehensive thinking inherent in the Qatari move from oil to gas and its 
determination to control the entire supply chain. It also highlighted the lengths that 
Qatar would go to develop a gas industry best suited to meet its customer’s needs.  
 Another obstacle until the 1990s, was the fact that gas was not a much-valued 
export commodity in the Gulf because the only way to ship it was via pipeline, and all 
Qatar’s neighbouring states—potential buyers or competitors—also had oil or gas 
deposits.422  
 Moreover, there was a real risk that the pipelines needed to guarantee a constant 
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would never be built.423 Compounding this challenge was the fact that by the time 
Qatar looked to enter the gas market, Europe, the most lucrative market for natural 
gas in the world, was already supplied by sufficient pipelines from Algeria, Russia 
and the North Sea.  
 In Asia, expected to be the fastest growing market for gas, only Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan had the technology to handle ships carrying natural gas.  So Qatar 
faced stiff competition to break into these markets against long-time suppliers such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia.   
 Of these Asian markets, Japan was the most important potential customer. But 
during the mid-1980s, Japanese companies and government-backed utilities 
concerned about security of supply and the ability to protect the costly LNG 
infrastructure and ships were reluctant to sign off on long-term gas contracts in the 
Gulf.  Once these concerns were alleviated Japanese electric and gas companies 
offered long-term contracts for purchases backed up by favourable financing terms 
provided by the Japanese government via loans and export credits. 
 The willingness of Japanese buyers to pay a hefty premium for supply security 
was important to the development of the Qatari gas sector in the short term. But it had 
a detrimental impact over a longer period.  By the mid-1990s when Qatar’s gas export 
infrastructure was coming online the Japanese economy was stagnating. This resulted 
in a fall in demand for gas. By this time other Asian LNG markets were awash from 
local gas projects.   
 In order to win the necessary contracts in this potentially lucrative region the 
Qatari gas sector adopted an innovative approach to dealing with its competitors, 
which again highlighted the government’s long term commitment to its gas strategy, 																																																								
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as well as its willingness to take risks and to initiate innovative approaches to 
implementing its strategy.  
 Notably, the Ras Laffan LNG Company (Rasgas), beat off stiff competition to 
gain major Indian gas contracts including Petronas of Malaysia, Pertamina of 
Indonesia, Woodside of Australia, Chevron of the US, Total of France and Royal 
Dutch Shell, by agreeing to invest in India’s LNG infrastructure in return for Indian 
gas contracts.424  
 By 1997 Qatar had spent nearly US$18 billion on this project, far in excess of 
its US$3.6 billion oil revenues for 1996. Some estimates of the time priced the entire 
long-term project to transform Qatar into the world’s leading gas exporter at between 
US$20- US$40 billion.425   
The government’s preferred way of raising the funds necessary for developing 
the gas sector was to attract significant private sector investment. The primary way of 
doing this was to bring in foreign partners to maximise the development of Qatar’s 
natural gas sector and to spread some of the huge cost and risk.   
This had long-time precedents. The Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) 
was established in 1974 in a joint venture with Chimie de France CdF. During the 
1980s in the face of an oil glut that drastically restricted the affordability of oil 
exploration, QGPC looked to attract foreign operators to apply for exploration 
licenses. BP’s subsidiary BP America, Elf, and Amoco all participated in exploration 
activity during this decade.426  
Notably, in 1982, Shell, BP and CFP (now Total) were each offered 7.5 
percent equity stakes in a joint venture with QGPC to develop the North Field.  Shell 																																																								
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would subsequently withdraw from this project in order to focus its gas exploration on 
Australia.  This had a short-term negative impact on Qatar’s gas development plans, 
given the company’s initial role in discovering the North Field in the early 1970s.  
However, BP and CFP remained involved and in 1984 a joint-venture 
agreement was signed between QGPC, BP, and CFP officially establishing Qatar 
Liquefied Gas Company (Qatargas) with the function of managing, operating, 
marking and exporting liquid natural gas (LNG) from the North Field. In 1991, the 
Qatar Europe LNG Company was formed as a partnership between QGPC, Hunt Oil 
of the US and the Italian conglomerate ENI’s Snamprogetti, which held a 30 percent 
stake. The consortium planned to construct two liquefaction trains at the largely 
Italian-built port of Ras Laffan, and to ship LNG through the Suez Canal to a new 
terminal in Ravenna on Italy’s northern Adriatic coast.427  
Under Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani such joint ventures proliferated.  
Key to this was the introduction of innovative production-sharing agreements (PSA’s) 
with international energy companies in order to boost production. 428 From the mid-
1990s Qatar had Italian, Japanese, French and American partners participating in its 
huge North Field gas Project.  US giant Mobil (also assigned the lead role in all 
liquefaction operations at the Rasgas project) and Total of France, a founding partner 
of Qatargas, increased their share of the upstream project from 10 percent to 20 
percent and Mitsui and Marubeni of Japan each took a 7.5 percent stake.429  
By 2003 Exxon-Mobil, now the largest foreign investor in Qatar, was 
describing deals with the country as the ‘cornerstone’ of the company’s LNG business 
and the senior Exxon official in the country was noting Qatar’s ‘unique position’ not 
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simply because it had easily accessible resources and was politically stable but 
because it had a good vision for the future.430 
In October of that year both Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch-Shell announced 
major investments in separate natural gas projects in Qatar. The Exxon deal was for a 
US$10 billion investment to develop two new liquified natural gas facilities in Qatar’s 
North Field, of which Exxon owned a 30 percent stake in the project called Qatargas 
II. The intention was for the giant company to play a role at every stage from 
producing the natural gas to building the transport system used to ship the gas after it 
is super-cooled into liquid form.  
Most importantly, Exxon was expected to buy all the natural gas to be 
produced once the project got operational in 2008 for sale in the US. For its part, 
Shell invested US$5 billion in Qatar’s state owned petroleum company to build one of 
the world’s largest gas-to-liquid plans, intended to provide cleaner burning vehicle 
fuel from natural gas.  This would be the largest investment of any major oil company 
in gas-to-liquid fuel production. Together these two deals were described as 
‘underscoring a vast and accelerating shift within the oil industry to capitalize on the 
growing demand for cleaner-burning fuels the world over’.431  
There were others to follow.  In the same year, ConocoPhillips signed an 
initial agreement with Qatar Petroleum for a US$5 billion venture to supply of 7.5 
million tonnes per annum to the US from 2009. The project involved setting up 
facilities in Qatar and the US with Conocco Phillips buying and reselling gas in the 
US.  Known as QatarGas 3, this venture was 30 percent owned by ConocoPhillips and 
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70 percent owned by Qatar Petroleum.432 Qatar also entered into other major 
partnerships with Sasol of South Africa (to produce a new form of diesel from natural 
gas) and Total of France.  
 Apart from an arguably unprecedented willingness to share the risk and reward 
of its natural resources Qatar also borrowed heavily from various sources in order to 
finance its gas projects. From 1996 the US Export-Import Bank provided over US$1 
billion in loan guarantees to support the development of Qatar’s gas production 
facilities in cooperation with a range of US, European, and Asian companies, banks, 
and export credit agencies.433  
Qatar also looked to the international financial markets. This saw the 
country’s heavy debt burden rise to over 100 percent of GDP resulting in onerous 
domestic and external debt repayments. At the same time this highlighted both the 
willingness of the country’s leaders to bet on the gas strategy and the risk that this 
entailed.   
 This was a challenge to development and reform because, as the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe from 2008 underlined, states that collect more foreign debt than 
they can service with available revenues face real constraints on their freedom and 
ability to implement economic policies and find it very difficult to achieve economic 
growth.  
QGPC used an innovative financing technique introduced in the 1980s, 
obtaining loans backed by future oil sales, which meant that a significant percentage 
of the government’s revenue from gas exports over the next decade were mortgaged 
to finance loans. Qatar also issued a successful US$1.2 billion bond offering backed 																																																								
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by US investment and insurance companies—the largest bond ever issued in Middle 
East.434  
 The financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America in 1997-98 coincided 
with, and was directly related to, a decision by OPEC to approve a production quota 
increase, which led to a price collapse during the year, which saw oil fall as low as 
US$10 per a barrel.435 This, in turn, posed a significant fiscal challenge across the 
GCC.  
 The ensuing global downturn all but destroyed investor and lender confidence in 
emerging markets. This left Qatar, already committed to its hugely expensive move 
from oil to gas, struggling to raise large amounts of funds at competitive rates on the 
international capital markets.  Further weak crude prices in 1998-99 resulted in lower 
Qatari export earnings (down 27 percent in the first quarter of 1998 compared to the 
same period in the previous year).  
 On top of this, falling oil revenues reduced the funds that the government had to 
re-invest in the economy.  This resulted in a steep decline in growth in 1998 to 2 
percent, down from 10 percent the previous year, and forced the government to adopt 
a defensive fiscal stance, while also seeking international loans to support the 
country’s balance-of-payments position. 
The combination of the drop in the price of oil and the slowdown in economic 
growth brought about by global financial crisis, resulted in escalating project finance 
costs and a short-term liquidity problem that restricted Qatar’s ability to borrow on 
the international markets.  Indeed, Qatar’s reputation was damaged when the 
government withdrew from the sovereign bond market in the summer of 1998 																																																								
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following indications that it would not get the desired price for its debut sovereign 
offering. In the face of low oil prices and tightening liquidity, the government was 
soon forced back to the market where it had little choice but to agree to an expensive 
US$300 million loan repayable over five years.436 
During the same time period Qatar’s National Oil Distribution Company 
(NodCo) clashed with the British financial institution Barclays Capital.  In early 1998 
the two parties had signed a deal whereby Barclays would arrange and underwrite an 
US$850 million loan for NodCo. However, as the international financial crisis 
intensified Barclays was unable to locate enough interest in the deal and attempted to 
invoke a clause in the contract that would have permitted it to fundamentally 
restructure the terms of the loan, a move opposed by NodCo.  The legal wrangling 
that followed did little to endear Qatar to the markets and was responsible for the 
delay in the signing of a US$475m loan for Qatar Vinyl, arranged by France’s Paribas, 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) and the Arab Petroleum Investment 
Corporation.437 
This threatened the very ambitious programme of modernization, a key part of 
the vision to alter fundamentally Qatar’s socio-economic reality but one dependent on 
harnessing existing oil revenues to tap the country’s vast natural gas potential.   
The downturn in 1998-99 caused delays to some existing and planned large 
scale infrastructural and industrial project in the gas and non-gas sectors as the 
government cut spending plans to match its lower income and reduced borrowing 
power. Notably, the government delayed the go-ahead for a US$1 billion aluminum 
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smelter plant at Ras Laffan, a joint venture between QGPC and Norsk Hydro due to 
be commissioned in 2002.  
The lessons of all this were not lost on the Emir and key policymakers. As 
noted previously, apart from funding the shift from oil to gas, the revenues from 
hydrocarbon income were earmarked to pay for the expansion of education, sport, 
healthcare, culture and an ambitious industrialization programme. But as Qatar’s 
finance minister Yousef Hussain Kamal explained, the government was determined to 
keep domestic expenditure to a minimum until the worst of the country’s external 
debt repayments were behind it. 438   
In this environment the government looked to accelerate the privatization 
process by raising up to US$1.5 billion in 1998-99.439  This included the sale of a 45 
percent stake in the highly profitable state-owned Qatar Public Telecommunications 
Corporation (Q-Tel), which held the monopoly of telecoms provision in the country. 
Subsequent sales included the state-owned Qatar Steel Company (Qasco).  
 The collapse of the Asian export market during the 1998 economic crisis forced 
Qatar to place greater emphasis on supporting local industries with global market 
potential rather than those dependent on Asia or any other specific region. This was 
an increasingly necessary, as well as unavoidable, step in the first five years of Sheik 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s rule between 1995 and 2000.  All the more so as in 
these years, the Qatari manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP actually fell 2.2 
percent from 11.2 percent in 1995 to 9 percent in 2000.   
 Post-2000 Qatari banks also embarked on a massive expansion of credit to the 
private sector. This privatization drive necessitated a radical overhaul of the 
restrictive rules in place for dealing with foreigners purchasing Qatari assets. This 																																																								
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revised approach not only helped to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) but was 
also a key requirement of any comprehensive modernization programme. 
 As such, Qatar, under its new Emir looked to alter investment laws to attract 
greater foreign investment and to make the growth of entrepreneurial activity, and job 
targets more achievable.  
The government also introduced legislation opening the Doha Securities 
Market to foreigners and also set out plans to allow foreign investors to take a 
majority stake in Qatari manufacturing firms.440 Under these rules foreigners were 
permitted to trade on the Doha Securities Market (DSM), which had its name changed 
to the Qatar Exchange from 2000.  Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) citizens were 
allowed to buy and sell shares of new Qatari companies directly, while all other 
foreigners were be permitted to trade through investment firms. 
There was also a provision that allowed for 100 percent foreign ownership in 
the sectors of technical and consultation services, information and technology and 
distribution. The amendment also reduced the controls on foreign ownership in nine 
other sectors, lowering barriers to foreign ownership in order to attract foreign capital 
otherwise restricted by ownership limitations.  
This led the Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Company (Qimco) to seek 
partners for a planned US$1.3 billion aluminum smelter, a US$200 million venture to 
make car tires and a US$120 million project to make melamine. For its part the Qatari 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry also sought US$500 million equity participation 
from foreign firms.  
 One obstacle that explained Qatar and the wider Gulf’s traditionally poor (at 
least in relative terms) performance compared to other emerging markets was a 																																																								
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persistently challenging regulatory environment.441 In October 2001 Qatar announced 
the formation of the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment, headed 
by the Emir and including the governor of Qatar Central Bank (QCB), and senior 
ministers holding the foreign affairs, energy, trade, finance, industry and economy 
portfolios.  
The new council was established to oversee the country’s policies on 
economics, trade, finance and energy issues and to formulate policy on the 
diversification of government revenue sources. It was also tasked with approving 
expenditure plans in order to streamline and keep close control over budgets and to 
enforce the twin policies of fiscal prudence and diversification away from oil.442  
 From 2001, the year that the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and 
Investment was founded, Qatar once more began to derive significant benefit from an 
upturn in the price of oil, which improved the government’s financial position 
enormously.  
 Revenues for 2000-01 were boosted not only by substantially higher revenues 
from crude oil but from gains in the developing LNG, condensates and 
petrochemicals sectors. This allowed for an increase of 15 percent increase in actual 
spending in 2000-01 over the previous year and a 56 percent increase in spending on 
capital projects.  Strong earnings performances on the back of revenues from surging 
LNG gas exports to Europe, Asia and the US continued in 2001, 2002 and 2003.443  
 By 2004 Qatar was the fastest growing market in the Middle East.  Government 
investment amounted to US$4.1 billion while FDI reached a record US$2 billion, a 
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1543 percent increase over 2003.444 Just how impressive this figure was can be seen 
when it is noted that between 2002-07 the Arab world only attracted an average 
global FDI of 2.1 percent of GDP compared to 5.3 percent of GDP on average for 
Central and Eastern Europe.445   
 This resulted in improved ratings from international credit agencies, which in 
turn prompted Qatar to diversify its sources of international financing. Projects put off 
in 1998 and 1999 were immediately restated once financing constraints eased and 
export market conditions improved. This allowed post-1999 Qatar to reinvigorate its 
industrialisation strategy.  
 At least five projects were signed off on in that year. They included plans for 
new roads, buildings and sewerage works that had already been included in the 
budget but which had been delayed by the Ministry of Finance as part of its drive to 
restrict expenditure in the late 1990s. 
 With the rapid upturn in the economic situation post-2000, Qatar, in the words 
of the New York Times, increasingly came to viewed as a ‘bonanza for international 
infrastructure companies’,446 as well as those who provided them with project finance.  
 Traditionally no more than 15 international banks had been involved in 
conducting business across the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
But from the early 2000s Qatar was at the forefront of changing this as its huge 
infrastructural development projects required financing that attracted a much larger 
group of global financial institutions to the region, many of whom had not historically 
conducted business in the region. At its peak in 2007, Qatari projects were on course 
to attract as many as 30 plus internationals banks, mainly from Europe, to participate 																																																								
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in funding infrastructural projects.447  
 The period of economic difficulty in the late 1990s had been important in 
clarifying Qatar’s relationship with the international capital markets. The government 
post-2000 now also looked to finance new projects by external loans and bonds, 
rather than volatile oil and gas income, which would now be used instead to reinforce 
the state’s reserves and meet external debt repayments.   
 On top of this, as noted in chapter 1 in relation to the establishment and 
practices of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), a portion of the rising revenues 
were also now being set aside for overseas investments, a move that would have 
major implications for Qatar’s global role in the ensuing decade. 
 The 1998 crisis was also important in terms of defining and cementing Qatar’s 
relationship with its multinational partners.  In particular, Exxon Mobil provided 
Qatar with US$300 million project loan when other partners where unwilling to do so. 
This generated significant goodwill in Qatar, a sentiment that has defined the bilateral 
relationship since then. 
 Qatar’s external debt continued to grow, reaching US$11.8 billion by the end of 
1999, equivalent to 118 percent of GDP. By 2001 this had risen to US$13 billion.  
However, the gamble on gas seemed to be paying off, as debt as a percentage of GDP 
did begin to decline over the same period as hydrocarbon revenues rose once more on 
the back of higher oil prices and rising exports of LNG, NGL’s and gas condensates. 
Under these circumstances, the total value of exports reached about US$7.2 billion by 
2000, compared with US$5.4 billion in 1998.448  
Of particular note was the growing export value of Qatar’s various gas 
products.  The government’s LNG revenues rose from around US$100 million in 																																																								
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fiscal year 1998-99 to US$640 million in 1999-2000 to nearly US$700 million in 
2000-2001. NGL and condensates earnings were even more impressive. From 
US$300m in 1997, they rose to US$1.5 billion in 1999 and to more than US$2 billion 
in 2000 and 2001.449  
 In order to capitalise on this stream of income, so vital for the development of 
the entire vision of political and socio-economic reform, in 2003 when LNG made up 
less than 5 percent of the gas marketed globally, it was announced that Qatar planned 
to invest US$25 billion over the next 6 years to quadruple its LNG export capacity in 
order to become the world’s largest LNG exporter over the next decade.  
Once more an ambitious economic announcement underlined the scale of the 
Qatari vision, commitment and willingness to take risks. The hope was that recent 
research that had claimed that natural gas would overtake coal and rival oil as the 
leading fossil fuel by 2025 was correct and that Qatar would be in a leading position 
to capitalise on this development when it occurred. In anticipation of this Qatar joined 
twelve other gas rich nations in establishing a group known as the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum, with a liaison office in Doha. 450  
There were still major challenges. Most notably, despite attempts to expand 
the role of the private sector and the financial system, public expenditure remained by 
far the most important motor of the domestic economy as the government still 
struggled with the problem of reducing the state-created and funded jobs that 
overwhelmingly offered employment to Qatari nationals.451   
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As noted above, for the most part hydrocarbon earnings were traditionally 
viewed in Qatar, and the rest of the Gulf, in terms of securing the population’s loyalty 
to the ruling family and in terms of their role in the state’s distributive policies, in the 
areas of education, health and housing.  
There was much less of a tendency to view these revenues in terms of their 
contribution to economic self-improvement, the nation’s domestic well-being and 
international standing including place branding and investment opportunities that 
generate long-term sources of state income.  
 Post-1995, such investments were viewed as important in and of themselves, 
as well as necessary to provide the socio-economic stability vital if the gradual move 
towards political liberalization and democratization (as evidenced in the Municipal 
elections in 1999 for example) were to succeed. 
 The global economic downturn of the late 1990s threatened to derail this reform 
agenda but Qatar managed to stay the course and the reforms introduced by Sheik 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in the socio-economic sectors in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century further entrenched his political position and gained him 
considerable popular support at home contributing greatly to cementing the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled in Qatar.   
 By the middle years of the 2000s, the high-risk and high-cost strategy of 
diversifying the economy away from dependence on the oil industry had paid off.  
Qatar was now a ‘gas superpower’452 and had successfully established itself ‘on the 
frontier of the global economy’.453 This, in turn, boosted the small state’s international 
prestige nations across the international community who hailed its parallel embrace of 
political participation and economic reform as a “catalyst for change” in the region. 																																																								
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But while the crises in the oil and money markets of the late 1990s were a 
stark reminder that increased economic interdependence in an increasingly globalised 
world directly threatened sovereignty and independence there were also other kinds of 





Between the West and the Arabian Gulf: 
The Limits and Opportunities for Small State diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Era 
‘[A small state] recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use 
of its Own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of 
other states institutions, processes or developments to do so’.  
Robert Rothstein454 
 
This chapter will examine Qatar’s response to the changing geo-strategic realities in 
the Gulf region in the years following the September 11 (9/11) attacks.  In doing so, it 
will argue that in looking to pro-actively address its external environment from 2001 
onwards, Qatar has challenged much of the literature on how small states should act 
in the international system.   
That said, this chapter also acknowledges that at times during this period Qatar 
has also had little choice but to adopt to traditional role of a small state in its external 
engagement, thus highlighting in the process the constraints facing even the most 
ambitious small states when acting outside of their own sovereign borders. This is 
particularly true of Peterson’s assertion that small states must be able to reach a 
modus vivendi with their neighbours and that they generally require a powerful 
protector against larger neighbours.455   
The evolving Qatari relationship with the US and Saudi Arabia (the two major 
pro-western powers in the Gulf region) and its engagement in conflict resolution and 
mediation in Lebanon and Israel-Palestine in the years immediately preceding and 
following the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington clearly highlights 																																																								
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all this and these four important case studies will form the basis of this chapter’s 
analysis.   
 As examined in chapter 3 Qatar’s bilateral relationship with the US was a key 
aspect of Qatar’s foreign policy in the second half of the 1990s.  This continued into 
the new millennium.  In April 2001 Qatar’s foreign minister expressed confidence 
that the US and Qatar would maintain fruitful cooperation in the service of, what he 
termed, ‘common objectives’ in order to meet future challenges.456  
The following July, General Tommy Franks, commander of American forces 
in the Persian Gulf, signed a statement of intent with Qatar that gave expression to 
many of the same sentiments in the military sphere.457  Indeed, by the time of the 9/11 
attacks, Qatar was host to the largest US military preposition base outside of North 
America.   
In his work on the US-Iranian relationship during the pre-revolutionary era 
Mark Gasiorowski defined a patron-client relationship as a strategic relationship 
between a strong state and a weak state that is characterized by ‘a reciprocal exchange 
of goods and services …[that] bind[s] the two governments together in a cooperative, 
mutually beneficial relationship’. 458   
It would be incorrect to claim that pre-9/11 the Qatari-US bilateral strategic 
relationship followed the traditional pattern of a patron-client relationship.  As noted 
in chapter 3 in relation to differences over Iraq strategies in the second part of the 
1990s, though the dominant party, the US could never claim to have control over 
important segments of Qatar’s foreign policy whether it be the kingdom’s policy 
towards Iran, Saudi Arabia or Iraq.  																																																								
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Certainly, Qatari officials were unequivocal in their condemnation of the 9/11 
attacks. They signed up to a statement issued by participants at a GCC emergency 
meeting that offered  ‘total support and cooperation’459 for the US in the wake of the 
attacks.  For his part, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani also described the attacks as 
‘unprecedented, and almost beyond our imagining’.460  
On a more practical level Qatar’s Emir was also the first Gulf leader to visit 
Washington after 9/11.  From the time of his visit onwards, Qatar offered cautious 
support for the US-led and UN-backed military operation against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.   
No less importantly, between 2001 and 2003 Qatar held the chairmanship of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international organization 
comprising 57 Islamic countries.  In this capacity Doha played an invaluable role in 
persuading participants at an early October 2001 emergency session of OIC foreign 
ministers to refrain from condemning US military action in Afghanistan.    
Both positions underscore Qatar’s willingness, either out of necessity or 
choice, to play a deferential role as smaller partner to the US superpower in the 
immediate wake of 9/11.  Having said that post- 9/11 the bilateral relationship became 
even more complex and complicated. Wright, for example, has argued that the 
American security guarantee has provided Qatar with ‘a greater degree of autonomy 
in foreign policy.’ 
461
 
The Qatari leadership, for its part, was careful not to provide blind or open-
ended backing for the US at this early stage of what would become known as the 																																																								
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Global War on Terror (GWOT).462  
Speaking before the UN General Assembly in New York in November 2001, 
the Emir, in his capacity as chairman of the OIC and in clear recognition of the 
sympathy for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel across the Muslim world, 
was insistent that 9/11 should not be used as a pretext to condemn legitimate national 
liberation struggles.463  Qatar also publicly expressed ‘deep concern’ over the loss of 
civilian life following the commencement of the Afghan campaign.  
In a press conference of mid-October 2001, Qatar’s foreign minister 
categorically denied that any Qatari bases were being used by the US to strike 
Afghanistan.  He argued that while the US had access to Qatari military facilities they 
did not ‘have fighter planes only support planes’.  But he qualified his statement by 
acknowledging that if the US were to subsequently request access to or the use of 
Qatari bases for military operations, ‘we will study it in accordance with the 
agreements and in the light of the circumstances’464  
In his above statement, Qatar’s foreign minister was technically correct in the 
sense that the US had only begun to use the Al Udeid base on 29 September 2001 
when the air force needed to get aircraft to the region to prepare for the war against 
the Taliban in Afghanistan.  But soon afterwards the US did use this base extensively 
for air raids, surveillance and refuelling duties over the skies of Afghanistan.  
As had been the case in the last years of the 1990s, in 2002 Qatar once more 
agreed to permit major building work at Al Udeid air base and also spent US$400 
million of its own money on upgrading facilities there, most notably increasing 
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warplane capacity and facilities so that they could house troop levels of about 
2,000.465   
These improvements were being made to an already highly developed military 
site. One former head of CENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni, on a visit to the Al 
Udeid base in the same year was extremely impressed over how the facility was 
already designed to withstand biological and chemical attacks and home to one of the 
largest runways in the Middle East (at 4,500 metres), adding that it was ‘phenomenal, 
with a lot of capability’. 466 
By the Spring of 2002, the Washington Post was reporting that Qatar had 
made it clear to Pentagon officials that they would not seek to place limits on US 
operations from bases in the country. Publicly however, Qatari officials were more 
circumspect, telling the western media that any decision on whether to allow US 
forces to use Al Udeid would depend on the view of its GCC partners, because 
although Qatar was ‘bound by our bilateral treaties with the US’, as one official put it, 
‘a concerted and well considered approach will be in the interest of all parties 
concerned’.467  
That said, during a television interview in October 2002 Qatar’s foreign 
minister admitted that his government did not have full knowledge of what was going 
on at the Al Udeid base, explaining that, ‘we know of some of what’s happening there. 
But I’d be lying to you if I said we are in 100 percent control of the base’. 468 
In these terms it was hardly surprising that by late 2002 there was widespread 
speculation that Qatar would play a ‘significant international role’ in any future US 
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military invasion of Iraq.469  Such views had been given credence by the visits to 
Qatar by US Vice President Dick Cheney and US Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld in the first half of 2002. During his June visit (which also took in Bahrain 
and Kuwait), Rumsfeld denied he was ‘soliciting allies’ for the invasion of Iraq.470 
Instead he insisted that the reason for his visit was to thank his hosts for their support 
in Afghanistan. 
Similar denials were regularly restated in public by Qatari officials who 
remained adamant that while they had no objection to the US military operating on 
their sovereign territory, the country would never be permitted to be used as a launch 
pad for any US attack on Iraq.  As one senior Qatari official told Reuters, ‘We do not 
oppose a lasting American military presence on our soil for deterrence and defence 
purposes, but we do not want our soil to be used against brotherly Iraq or any other 
Arab or Muslim country’. This view was reiterated most importantly by Sheik Hamad 
bin Khalifa Al Thani who stressed that he would not allow Qatar to be used for an 
attack against another Muslim or Arab state.471   
In a statement published subsequently, he was less clear-cut than his Emir on 
Qatar’s position in any future US war against Saddam. He once more insisted that his 
country opposed any war against Iraq, and he admitted that he feared that war would 
‘destabilize the region’ and that it was necessary to ‘slow down the process’ towards 
war.  He did not, however, rule out the possibility that Qatar would allow the US to 
use its military bases to launch an attack if such a war broke out.  
Most notably, when asked if his government would grant the US permission to 
use planes and soldiers based in Qatar to invade Iraq he said ‘if they asked us, we 																																																								
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would look at this seriously’, before continuing, ‘nobody asked us. But you have to 
realise that we have a very special relationship with the US, and this relation[ship] 
will always be in our consideration in any decision’.472  
Other officials acknowledged, on the condition of anonymity, that if the US 
pushed to use Qatari territory to launch an attack on Iraq, it would be very difficult to 
either refuse the request or prevent it from happening.  As one such official put it, the 
US was an important ‘political, economic and military ally with which Qatar has 
various political agreements and it would be difficult to jeopardise those 
agreements’.473 
In September 2002 commander of American forces in the Persian Gulf, 
General Tommy Franks met the Qatari Emir to discuss the rapidly moving strategic 
situation in the region. Over the course of the next two months some 600 staff based 
at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, moved to Qatar to participate in a 
week-long exercise dubbed ‘Internal Lock’. This was an electronic war game that 
used a mobile state of the art electronic command post to link various US led forces 
throughout the region with each other and the CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. 
The decision to relocate about one quarter of CENTCOM’s entire Florida-
based staff to Qatar for the exercises marked the first forward deployment of Central 
Command since 1991. This clearly highlighted that the Al Udeid air base was 
increasingly serving as a logistics, command, and basing hub not only for US 
operations in Afghanistan but for preparations for any subsequent military action in 
Iraq.474 
On 11 December 2002, at the same time as the military phase of the war 
against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan came to an end, Qatar and the US 																																																								
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signed an agreement to upgrade Qatari military bases, in particular Al Udeid (already 
home to an estimated 4,000 US troops and 40 aircraft) so that, at a cost of US$1 
billion, it would be able to accommodate, if need be, up to 10,000 troops and 120 
planes.  
As noted above, Qatar at this time also pledged an extra US$400 to build 
residential quarters for CENTCOM staff. Interestingly, in the context of the security 
relationship between a small state and a major power, it was reported that Qatar had 
made the deployment of a ‘credible’ force of 10,000 US troops in the country a 
condition of allowing the US use its facilities, on the grounds that this US presence 
would function as a tacit deterrent to any regional threats that Doha faced. 475   
Though Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld was clear that the agreement was ‘not 
connected to Iraq’,476 there was little doubt that it was, at least in the short-term, 
intended to address the growing standoff between the Bush administration in 
Washington and Saddam Hussein.   
Just over a week after this agreement was signed, on 20 December 2002, 
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the As 
Sayliyah and Al Udeid military bases.  Within days the US had also moved to deploy 
its most advanced ground radar system to Qatar to protect its installations at Camp As 
Sayliyah. The Joint Tactical Ground Station (as the radar equipment is known) had 
previously only been deployed in Germany and South Korea.477  
In February 2003, an OIC Summit aimed at stalling any imminent US invasion 
of Iraq was held in Doha. At the same time as Qatar’s foreign minister read out the 
summit’s final communiqué, which called on the member states to refrain from any 																																																								
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action that might ‘affect the integrity and unity of the Iraqi territory’, an estimated 
6,000 CENTCOM and other US staff officers were stepping up their preparations at 
bases nearby that by now housed 120 US fighter planes.    
In April 2003, following the 200,000-strong Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, 
an estimated 10,000 people participated in a peaceful demonstration near the 
American embassy in Doha against US and Israeli policies in the region. Included in 
the crowd were members of the municipality of Doha and the Advisory Council as 
well as the famous Egyptian cleric Sheikh Youssef Al Qaradawi a regular host on Al-
Jazeera, the Doha based new channel that is the subject of the next chapter.  
Despite popular opposition to the US invasion, as evidenced by the above 
protest, following the initial military phase of the Iraq war, which saw the toppling of 
the Saddam Hussein regime, Qatar was among the first states to welcome the 
establishment of the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad. The country 
also provided considerable assistance to the post-war pro-US regime in Iraq, donating 
US$15 million to education in October 2003, and forming a joint committee to 
channel Qatari investment into the Iraqi energy sector.478 
At least in the immediate term, from the US perspective it was Qatar’s 
strategic location and the role of its bases on Qatari territory rather than Doha’s 
political or humanitarian support that was the most important aspect of the bilateral 
relationship.   
During the conflict, between 10 to 15 percent of CENTCOM’s personnel 
moved from Florida to Qatar. In January 2004, General John Abizaid, the recently 
appointed head of CENTCOM, explained that while the ‘majority [of CENTCOM’s] 
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work’ would still be undertaken in Florida, ‘the time zone calls us forward and 
200,000 troops fighting in that area call us forward and that’s where we will be’.479   
As noted above, on the eve of the Iraq War, the US had deployed the Joint 
Tactical Ground Station radar in Qatar. It had long been a goal of CENTCOM to gain 
permission for such equipment to be stationed in the Gulf. All previous efforts to 
convince Saudi Arabia to agree to host this advanced technology had failed. As such, 
this deployment was an important military milestone for the US in the region.  
At the same time, this deployment highlighted and underlined in a very 
practical way the changing strategic relationship in the region between the US, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia.  In part, it was due to the fact that, as Patrick N. Theros, the US 
ambassador in Doha between 1995 and 1998 explained, ‘the Qataris have decided that 
their future lies in having the closest possible ties with the United States’.480   
It was also the case that Qatar’s ‘assiduous courtship’481 of strategic and 
military ties with the US following the change of leadership in 1995 was given a 
boost by the increasingly strained relations between Riyadh and Washington in the 
period following the 9/11 attacks.  
By the time of the 9/11 attacks the alliance with the US has been vital to Saudi 
Arabia’s security for almost half a century.  However, 9/11 brought to the surface 
underlying tensions in the bilateral US-Saudi relationship. From an American 
perspective the discovery that many of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi citizens was 
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partly responsible for the erosion of relations as political and popular opinion in the 
US became increasingly wary of ties with the Saudi kingdom.482 
For its part, in the wake of 9/11 Saudi Arabia was increasingly distrustful of 
US plans for the region. In turn, it became increasingly reluctant to be seen as 
Washington’s moderate ally in the Arab world.483 There were historical precedents for 
this Saudi belief that the strategic relationship with the US, vital as it was, did its 
regional standing significant damage.   
During the early 1970s, for example, Saudi ruler, King Faisal, long regarded 
as one of the most pro-western of all Arab leaders, acknowledged openly in an 
interview with NBC Television that ‘We are now under attack from the Arabs 
themselves…because of our friendship with the US’. 484  This culminated in Faisal’s 
support for the Arab oil embargo of late 1973 partly as a response to US support for 
Israel in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 
As early into his presidency as January 2001, the White House stated that 
President George W. Bush wanted to keep the US military presence in Saudi Arabia.  
But from late 2001, in the wake of 9/11, the US move to build up its military capacity 
in Qatar was partly motivated by a belief in the possible need to shift its regional 
command headquarters out of Saudi Arabia in the short term.  
There had long been an important precedent for limiting US military access in 
Saudi Arabia, when in the early 1960s, at a time of rising Arab nationalist influence in 
the Arab world, the Saudi government bowed to pressure and closed the American air 
base at Dharan. Moreover, the unavoidable reality was that a decade on from the 
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liberation of Kuwait, there was little appetite or support for US troops amongst the 
local Saudi population and the issue was a constant source of concern for the 
country’s leadership.   
However, and it is important to note, just as in the immediate post-oil crisis 
era in the mid-1970s when American and Saudi leaders worked hard to return to a 
mutually beneficial bilateral strategic relationship, one was also able to discern this 
pattern in the post 9/11 era.  Most notably, during his visit to President George W. 
Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah succeeded in 
reducing bilateral tensions between Washington and Riyadh. 
This, however, did not alter the fact that increasingly in the face of realities on 
the ground the ‘tiny, forward looking emirate [of Qatar]’,485 as one journalist 
described it at the time, offered a more positive environment than Saudi Arabia for 
advancing US strategic interests in the region.  
In April 2003, the US finally announced that it was relocating its major air 
operations centre for the Middle East responsible for overseeing hundreds of air 
missions over Iraq from Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh in Saudi Arabia to the Al 
Udeid Air base in Qatar. Major-General Victor E. Renuart, the Central Command’s 
director of operations, explained the move to Al Udeid as a good strategic fit and a 
‘sort of natural progression for us as we look for a footprint that will be maintainable 
in the future’.486  
As evidenced in the above explanations, this move was widely presented on 
the American side simply as a matter of convenience on the grounds that once the 
military phase of the operation against Saddam Hussein’s regime had finished and the 																																																								
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US was now flying a few hundred rather than a few thousand missions, a major 
Combat Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Saudi Arabia was no longer needed.487  
To a certain extent it is even arguable that the Saudis were relieved that Qatar 
provided an answer to the troubling question that had preoccupied them for a decade 
–how to end the US presence on their territory without ending the security guarantee 
that came with a significant deployment of US forces in the region.  
Given Saudi Arabia’s long-time dominance of the GCC some commentators 
went further arguing that the strategic realignment of the American military presence 
in the region in favour of Qatar must have been done with the Saudi blessing because 
it was ‘hard to imagine’ how any of the ‘smaller members of the GCC could afford to 
host American bases without Saudi acquiescence’.488 
Having said this, there is also no doubt that Qatar’s increasingly central role in 
US military and strategic planning should not be ignored.  In early 2004, the well-
informed and often prescient Economist Intelligence Unit was of the view that Qatar 
was ‘steadily displacing Saudi Arabia as a key location for US military facilities in 
the Gulf’.489  
Further evidence that Saudi Arabia was not only not complicit in the process 
but saw it as a challenge to its lead strategic partnership with the US in the region was 
the negative impact that the military realignment had on bilateral Saudi-Qatari 
relations. 
In the early 2000s these relations took on a ‘roller-coaster-like’ nature as one 
informed regional commentator put it.490 Notably, in October 2002, Saudi Arabia 
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recalled its ambassador from Doha in response to what one official described as 
‘unilateral actions that infringe on the Gulf consensus’.491  
Qatar played down this dispute as nothing more than a ‘misunderstanding’.492 
Subsequently, in a question and answer session at the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York in September 2005, Qatar’s foreign minister evaded audience questions on 
the ‘complications’ caused for Qatar’s relationship with Saudi Arabia due to its 
hosting of US military forces. Instead, he diplomatically underlined Qatar’s 
‘obligation’ to cooperate with the US in the region and pointed out that neighbouring 
states had done the same much earlier than Qatar ever had.493  
On top of this, as examined previously in chapter 3, from the early 1990s there 
had been noticeable tensions in the Qatar-Saudi bilateral relationship that also 
contributed to the evolving tensions in the post-911 and post-Iraq invasion periods. 
Certainly, many of the country’s foreign policy approaches, whether intentionally or 
not, had the effect of distancing Qatar from Saudi Arabia. These included its attempt 
to build bridges with Iran, Iraq and Israel; and its support for the North in the Yemen 
Civil War, which prevented the Saudi-led GCC from officially recognizing the 
Southern government. This ultimately resulted in placing Qatar, and by default the 
GCC, on the side of the victor.  
 The move towards political liberalization in Qatar post-1995 was even viewed 
in some quarters as an explicit attempt to distinguish the country from its Saudi 
neighbour.  And, of course, as the next chapter will show, there was also the issue of 
the Al-Jazeera satellite channel’s tendency to report on Saudi Arabia, primarily in 
terms of it lack of political progress, and to provide a platform for Saudi dissidents, 																																																								
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that infuriated the country’s leaders.  
  The extent that Qatar’s innovative approach to domestic development and 
external involvement from the mid-1990s onwards was motivated by the desire to 
come out of the shadow of Saudi Arabia is hard to measure. It certainly was only one 
of several motivating factors. However, what is certain is that the war in Iraq altered 
the three-way US-Qatari-Saudi relationship and with it the regional strategic dynamic 
as Qatar consolidated its position as a key partner of the US in the region, and one 
whose own foreign policy, with some notable exceptions, was closely aligned with 
that of Washington.494   
This new strategic reality also contributed to Qatar’s growing reputation in the 
US, certainly when compared to Saudi Arabia, as a ‘relatively benign autocracy’ and 
‘Islam’s tolerant face’.495 As well as being perceived as lacking much of the popular 
hostility towards strategic cooperation with the US that defined Saudi Arabia at all 
levels of society, Qatar was increasingly viewed as a politically and socially 
progressive partner.  
Even before 9/11, Qatar had worked hard at developing this perception as part 
of its efforts to develop its small state branding. For example, in April 2001, the 
inaugural Qatari-American Conference on Free Trade and Democracy took place in 
Doha.  The meeting addressed issues including democracy, economic growth, 
religious tolerance, free trade and human rights.  
In the post-9/11 world Qatar, especially compared to Saudi Arabia, seemed to 
offer itself as an oasis of stability, progress and goodwill in a turbulent region. 
Certainly, compared to Saudi Arabia, there was no history of religions groups with 
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articulated grievances that had to be addressed in Qatar. Nor was Islamist extremism 
viewed as a major or pressing internal security concern.   
  Following Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s accession to power there was 
only one notable incident relating to radical Islamist operatives. In 1996, US officials 
learned that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was wanted in connection with the plot 
to blow up 12 US planes over the Pacific Ocean, was living in Doha and working at 
the Public Works Ministry.  When agents arrived in Qatar they were told that 
Mohammad was nowhere to be found. Subsequently, US officials would claim that 
Mohammed, a suspected lieutenant of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, a convicted terrorist, 
had been tipped off by Qatari officials.496   
However, while radical Islamist terror was far less of an issue in Qatar’s 
bilateral relationship with Washington than it was for Riyadh post 9/11, as shall be 
seen in the next chapter, Washington like Riyadh would take Doha to task regularly 
over what was perceived to be the sympathetic coverage of Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin 
Laden on the Al-Jazeera news channel.  
And while Qatar and the US subsequently signed an agreement covering the 
exchange of information on terrorists and other similar security-related matters, there 
remained scepticism on the US side, with Wikileaks revelations showing that for at 
least some in the US counter-terror bureaucracy Qatar was the least accommodating 
of any of the GCC partners in terms of waging the GWOT.  
Nevertheless, in terms of stability in the post 9/11 era Qatar experienced very 
few terror attacks certainly compared to Saudi Arabia. There were two exceptions.  
The widely publicized February 2004 assassination in a bomb blast of former 																																																								
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Chechyan President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had been living in exile in Qatar 
since 2001; and a suicide bombing in March 2005 in a Doha theatre popular with 
western expatriates, which killed one British citizen and wounded a dozen.497  
In October 2005, the US also warned of possible terror attacks on Doha hotels. 
The warning was intended primarily for US citizens who were advised to stay away 
from major hotels during the third week of Ramadan. In response Qatar increased its 
terror alert. This was the first terror warning the US had ever issued for citizens in 
Qatar. This alert was rescinded in early November.  
The inter-relationship between internal stability, political and social 
development and strategic cooperation in the post 9/11 era was clearly highlighted by 
the fact on the same day that Qatar held a referendum on the constitution – 29 April 
2003 – US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld announced the planned departure of US 
forces from Saudi Arabia before the end of the year. 
All these developments also had significant implications for the growing US-
Qatari bilateral relationship in the economic and energy sectors.498 Trade relations 
between the two countries had not traditionally been significant for either party. 
Between 1982 and 1992 Qatari imports from the US were the lowest of any of the 
GCC states. In 1982 they amounted to US$153million worth of goods. A decade later 
this had only risen to US$189 million. Qatari exports were also the lowest to the US 
of any GCC state. In 1982 the figure stood at US$110million. By 1992 it had fallen to 
US$76 million.499 
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In part this was due to the fact that Qatar, a ‘relatively small’ oil producer,500 
was not a key Gulf oil supplier to the US – a distinction that fell to Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the UAE. 501 However, in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict Qatar had 
looked to deepen its economic as well as its strategic ties with the US. As part of its 
strategy, noted in chapter 4, of encouraging external partners to join projects in the 
energy sector, the country signed major co-operation deals with American energy 
companies like Occidental Petroleum and Mobil.  
 Moreover, as the US domestic market increasingly embraced new gas-fired 
technology to generate power, Qatar’s evolving position as a leading global producer 
and exporter of gas helped to cement ties in the economic sphere. In the immediate 
years following 9/11, the US only held 3 percent of global gas reserves but had seen 
the use of natural gas in electric power production increase by almost 40 percent since 
1990.  By 2003 the US had emerged as the key future growth market for LNG 
accounting for one quarter of the natural gas consumed in the world each day.502  
Over the same period, one economic factor that influenced the bilateral US-
Qatari relationship indirectly at least was the gradual erosion of Saudi Arabia’s status 
as the predominant and untouchable master of the global oil markets – a status that 
had been a central component of long-time US-Saudi strategic ties.503 
As far back October 1974, then Saudi foreign minister Omar Saqqaf had 
passed on assurances to the US from King Faisal that his country was committed to 
																																																								
500 Bruce Maddy Weitzman, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 21, Boulder, CO., Westview 
Press, 1999, p.215. 
501 Shibley Telhami and Fiona Hill, ‘Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter?’, Foreign Affairs, p.168. 
502 Daniel Yergin and Michael Stoppard, ‘The Next Prize’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, (November-
December, 2003), pp.103-114, p.105. 
503 Timothy E Wirth, C Boyden Gray and John D. Podesta, ‘The Future of Energy Policy’, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 82 (July-August, 2003), p.132-155, p.134. In 2003, of the one trillion barrels of oil 
reserves, only 4 percent were found in the US, and over 60 percent in the Persian Gulf. A quarter of US 
imports were from that region. 
	 185	
ensuring that OPEC provided a stable and affordable supply of oil.504  Such promises 
were entirely credible in the mid-1970s.  At the time Saudi Arabia was the only global 
oil producer able to raise or reduce its production by millions of barrels per day 
without negatively impacting on its own financial wellbeing.  Few doubted that this 
capacity gave the kingdom significant influence and credibility in Washington from 
the 1970s onwards 
Following the overthrow of the pro-Western Shah of Iran, Mohammad Rezā 
Shāh Pahlavī, by Islamic revolutionaries in February 1979, the Saudis, who still 
controlled around one third of OPEC’s oil reserves, increased oil production from an 
average of 8.5 million bpd to 9.5 million bpd in an attempt to stem the global 
economic crisis that events in Iran had triggered.  
While it is true that Saudi Arabia’s absolute capacity to control both the price 
of oil and production of the prized commodity was watered down in the 1980s for 
reasons to do with both supply and demand, it remained the dominant, moderate pro-
western oil producer for the rest of the century. 
As examined in chapter 4 in relation to Qatar’s economic diversification 
efforts, in 1998 oil prices fell dramatically, at times hitting a low of US$10 per barrel 
and Riyadh, which had seen its US$100 billion cash reserves of 1981 dwindle over 
the next two decades notably due to the cost of financing Iraq’s war against Iran 
(1980-88) and the subsequent US war against Saddam (1990-91), found itself 
desperately short of funds.505 Worse, it had been Saudi actions that had partly resulted 
in the collapse of the price of oil in the late 1990s as the country attempted to re-assert 
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its leadership of OPEC in the face of Venezuelan efforts to break with Saudi 
control.506   
Though this move was successful in terms of Saudi Arabia asserting its 
centrality to the oil markets it came at a cost, as it resulted in much reduced oil 
revenues at a time of major budgetary pressures.  Per capita income in Saudi Arabia 
in 2001 was US$6,800 down from $28,600 in 1981. By comparison the average per 
capita income in Qatar in the same year was US$26,000.507 
Coinciding with this, and in the period immediately preceding and following 
9/11, Russia, following on from Venezuela’s recent attempt to challenge Saudi oil 
hegemony, engaged in a high-profile stand-off with OPEC over its refusal to comply 
with the organisation’s demands for substantial production and export cuts to boost 
oil prices at a time when its members were placing restrictions on output. Instead, 
Russia consistently looked to increase its annual oil output at a rate of nearly half a 
million barrels per day (bpd), the largest single increment of increased output of any 
country in the world.508 
This led Saudi Arabia to take a series of decisions to increase the price of oil 
that contradicted its traditional oil policy since the late 1970s of preventing price 
spikes and holding down prices. As the price of oil rose during 1999, Saudi oil 
production fell by more than 1 million bpd and Riyadh also led the way in the March 
1999 agreement between major OPEC and non-OPEC producers to reduce 
production.509 
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By mid-2004, Saudi Arabia had lost much of its past ability to significantly 
influence oil price single-handed.  The turning point came at an emergency meeting 
of the OPEC in May of that year when Saudi oil minister, Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi, 
tried at the White House’s request, to halt a move away from OPEC-fixed prices (then 
ranging from US$22-US$28 per barrel).  
He proposed that OPEC producers collectively increase production by two 
million bpd in order to maintain those low prices. He failed, and Saudi Arabia had 
little choice but to pump an additional two million bpd on its own in an effort to 
reduce prices.  That failed too and as a result the price of crude oil rose from US$40 a 
barrel in May to close to US$50 a barrel by the time of the US elections in 2004. It 
continued its climb subsequently hitting US$147 a barrel in July 2008 despite 
Riyadh’s increased production.510   
 For its part, Qatar, by moving its energy focus to natural gas over the same 
period, was able to shield itself from oil price fluctuations and was also able to reduce 
its reliance on a commodity still dominated by Saudi Arabia, thus allowing it 
increased freedom to act independent of Saudi interests and influence. Moreover, by 
making itself less reliant on the fluctuating oil price Qatar, one of OPEC’s smallest 
producers, was able to abandon its past practice of being one of OPEC’s worst 
overproducers in percentage terms, something that had created much animosity 
towards Qatar both inside and outside OPEC. 
At the time, Qatar’s goal to be the world’s largest exporter of LNG was also 
driven by a belief in some expert quarters that LNG could go from accounting for 1 
percent to 20 percent of the US natural gas supply by 2020.511 Though subsequent US 
breakthroughs in domestic means of oil and gas production (in particular shale fuel) 																																																								
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has greatly reduced this huge market for Qatar, in the first five years of the 2000s it 
offered the kingdom huge possibilities to become a major supplier of US LNG needs. 
This in turn led Qatar, along with other gas producers, to prioritise investment 
in gas related ventures in the US. The country’s senior energy officials also now 
began to follow closely domestic energy politics in the US, including Congressional 
voting on the LNG provisions in annual energy bills.   
In April 2004, in acknowledgement of all this Qatar and the US signed a Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). By 2010, the year this thesis comes to 
an end, US exports to Qatar amounted to $3.2 billion, primarily machinery and 
transport equipment. Qatari exports to the US in the same year – mainly fuel and 
fertilizers – totaled $464.3 million. 512 
However, bilateral Qatari-US relations up to 2010 were not primarily about 
economic ties. In his appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2005, Qatar’s  
foreign minister explained his own view of the Qatari-US bilateral relationship.  It 
was one of ‘friendship and alliance’, he told his audience, joined together in the 
pursuit of common interests and ‘in the context of the concept of strategic 
partnership’.513  
In these terms the ‘roller-coaster rise of oil prices’,514 as well as a much 
reduced Saudi capacity to control the oil markets, and the altered geo-strategic 
realities in the region post-9/11 were key.  Most notably, the role of the Al Udeid and 
As Sayliyah bases during the Iraq conflict underscored a major a shift in strategic 
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alliances in the Gulf region and benefitted Qatar’s bilateral ties with the US at the 
expense of Saudi Arabia.  
 As has been seen, apart from military protection, close ties with the US 
undoubtedly offered Qatar a degree of political autonomy and regional influence it 
would otherwise have been difficult for it to achieve.  It also facilitated increased 
levels of economic cooperation especially in the gas sector.  
 However, as noted over the course of this thesis, in the period between 1995 and 
2010 Qatar did not limit its diplomatic and strategic engagement to its bilateral 
relationship with the US.  It also looked to influence its home region in a more pro-
active and direct manner in ways perceived to be in its own interests, as well as in the 
interests of regional stability. 
 This was even the case when, on occasions, its approach to key regional issues 
diverged significantly from Washington.  As shall be seen later in this chapter this 
became evident in regard to its evolving bilateral relationship with Israel, its parallel 
attempts to mediate peace between Israel and the Palestinian factions, as well between 
the major Palestinian factions – Hamas and Fatah – themselves.    
 It was also evident in Qatari efforts at mediation in the cause of conflict 
prevention in Lebanon between 2006 and 2009.  As chair of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference in 2001-2003, Qatar spoke for 57 Islamic countries and almost a 
quarter of the world’s population in their engagement with international and regional 
organizations and, in particular, with the United Nations.  Qatar was elected to and 
joined the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a temporary 2-year member at the start of 
2006. This offered Qatar the opportunity to involve itself in international affairs at the 
highest level of global diplomacy and was part of its strategic attempt to increase its 
international profile and enhance its standing inside and outside the Muslim world.  
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One of the key issues it faced as both chair of the IOC and as a member of the 
UNSC was the ongoing crisis in Lebanon.  Most notably, during the during the July-
August 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, Qatar used its seat on the UNSC to 
condemn the Israeli attack and repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire and 
complete Israeli withdrawal, as well as UN action to stop what the country’s foreign 
minister called a ‘bloodbath’.515   
At the same time as Qatar aligned itself with Lebanon diplomatically at the 
UN, it took practical action. It was one of the first countries to send relief supplies to 
Lebanon following the outbreak of the war and the Emir was the first head of state to 
visit Beirut, as well as the only Arab leader to do so, following the end of hostilities.  
He also pledged US$300 million to rebuild the war-torn country.  
In early September 2006, as tensions between Israel and Hezbollah continued 
in the wake of their large-scale military clash, Qatar’s national airline Qatar Airways 
landed a plane at Beirut airport despite the Israeli blockade of Lebanon.  The same 
day the Qatari government announced that it would contribute 200-300 troops to the 
expanded UN force set up to keep peace between Hezbollah and Israel in the south of 
the country following the war.516  
The decision to do so made Qatar the only Arab country to agree to join the 
force. This willingness to act alone among its Arab partners provided the context for 
its lead role in Lebanese peace negotiations in May 2008.  These talks were held in 
Doha and were attended by all the key Lebanese factions and parties. Over six days of 
talks an agreement was reached to end 18 months of political conflict, which had cost 
the lives of 81 people.  
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Qatar’s role in hosting, mediating and sponsoring these peace talks in 2008 
illuminated the country’s evolving foreign policy approach in a number of ways. First 
it highlighted the country’s willingness to anger its major partner – the US.  The 
reality was that the deal that the Qatari leadership brokered in Doha amounted to a 
significant shift of power in favour of Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon.   
In the deal that ended violence, Washington’s opponents in Lebanon won the 
power to veto any cabinet decision, a key political victory for the Iran-backed 
group.517 In these terms, another aspect of the deal that antagonised the US was that it 
involved Qatar bringing in key regional players including Iran and Syria, 
Qatar’s engagement in Lebanese mediation also highlighted Qatar’s rising 
diplomatic standing and influence on a regional level by this time.  Notably, the fact 
that the Emir had reportedly only joined the talks in Doha after returning from Saudi 
Arabia,518 highlighted Qatar’s increasing regional influence vis a vis Saudi Arabia, 
one of the main backers of the governing coalition in Lebanon.   
Up until these negotiations the governing coalition had refused to accept terms. 
The Qatari-sponsored deal thus succeeded where attempts by other major political 
players from inside and outside the region including the US and Saudi Arabia had 
failed. Qatar’s success paved the way for the formation of a new government and a 
new election law and looked to fill the vacant Army Chief of Staff post that had been 
vacant for 6 months.  This went some way to resolving the country’s 18-month 
political crisis, and toward ending over two years of political stalemate that had 
brought Lebanon to the brink of civil war.519 
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The Lebanon agreement highlighted two other key trademarks of Qatar’s 
evolving international engagement. The first was its willingness to use of its wealth to 
influence the outcome of negotiations. It has been estimated that Qatar distributed 
between US$300-US400 million to the local Lebanese parties in 2008 in order to get 
them to come to terms.520 The second, and arguably even more important contribution, 
has been what veteran Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt described at the time as 
an ‘interesting and subtle diplomacy’,521 defined by a capacity to convince the feuding 
sides that Qatar’s only agenda was peace.  
In part, this Qatari success was due to a real willingness to talk to and with all 
parties to the crisis and to give equal weight, free from ideological baggage or 
strategic interests, to all involved.522 This in turn emphasized how, at least up until the 
Arab Spring, ‘rigorous neutrality’ was one of the ‘hallmarks’ of Qatar’s foreign 
policy.523 
By the summer of 2009, the Qatari leader in an interview on Al-Jazeera was 
announcing that the ‘goals’ of the previous year’s ‘settlement’ had reached its three 
main objectives. ‘The agreement’, he explained, ‘aimed at the election of a president, 
the formation of a national unity government that will organize parliamentary polls in 
the summer’.524. 
In recognition of this achievements billboards were erected on the road from 
Beirut airport saying ‘Thank you Qatar’.525 It also resulted in a visit to Doha by then 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to express his own appreciation on behalf of the 
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international community.  
The reputation of the Emir and his Foreign Minister as skilled exponents of 
diplomacy was greatly enhanced following the Lebanon deal and with it Qatar’s 
standing in the region and beyond rose greatly.  This was especially the case because 
in brokering the Lebanon deal Qatar had been able to bring the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Syria grudgingly along with it.  The implications were clear.  As one Doha-based 
newspaper editor put it, ‘In the old days, nobody had really heard of Qatar…Now, 
once you say “I’m from Qatar”, it’s, “Step right this way”’.526 
 For its part, Israel had welcomed Qatar’s September 2006 contribution to the 
UN force in Lebanon.  As foreign ministry spokesman Mark Regev explained, ‘Qatar 
has relations with Israel [and] as a result Israel has no objection to its participation in 
the force’.  For their part, senior Qatari officials had hoped that the country’s UN role 
in Lebanon would not only be welcomed by Israel, but that it would further contribute 
to the view in the Arab world and Israel of Qatar’s commitment to Arab-Israeli peace. 
As the country’s foreign minister explained, the move was intended to ‘tell the 
world of the Arab presence, even modestly, in this force and to tell Israel that we 
believe in this decision, and so we want to contribute to implementing it’.527  
On the surface this seemed to indicate that in the post-9/11 era, just as in the 
late 1990s, Qatar was unwilling to allow its Arab partners dictate its relationship with 
Israel or its engagement in the long, and for the most part, unyielding quest for Israeli-
Palestinian peace.   
For example, in an interview in late 2000 the Emir of Qatar acknowledged that 
he had ‘informal relations with Israel in the economic and trade spheres’, and that he 
refused to let ‘Israeli transience’ destroy the ‘little progress already achieved’ and 																																																								
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restated that once Israel embraced a ‘comprehensive and just peace’ his country 
would be ‘willing to establish normal relations’.528 
This explains why the Emir rejected Saudi demands to close the Israeli trade 
office in Doha up until late 2000 despite Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s decision to 
boycott a summit of Islamic states in Qatar in response.  The following year, in mid-
May 2001, the Qatari leadership offered to host a summit meeting between 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Doha at a 
time when the Arab League had already decided to sever ties with Israel.529  
The distinctive approach of Qatar on the issue of engagement with Israel 
manifested itself further in the encounter between the Qatari foreign minister and his 
Israeli counterpart, Shimon Peres, in Paris in July 2002. This came at a time of severe 
tension between Israel and the Arab world and during a period when the Arab League 
had frozen political ties with Israel because of the latter’s violent repression of the 
Palestinian intifada.  
Qatar’s foreign minister also met Peres’ successor as Israeli foreign minister, 
Silvan Shalom, once more in Paris in May 2003. During this encounter, according to 
reports, the senior Qatari official indicated his willingness ‘to seriously consider the 
possibility of increasing the level of diplomatic relations.’530 
In a September 2004 speech before the UN General Assembly, the Qatari 
Emir challenged fellow Arab leaders to refrain from using the Israel-Palestine conflict 
as a pretext for avoiding domestic reform.  In doing so, he placed the public spotlight 
on a highly sensitive issue in the Arab world, and one that Israel had been arguing for 
many years – that the existence of Israel was neither the reason nor the excuse for 																																																								
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inter Arab and intra-Arab problems. 
Exactly one year later in the immediate wake of the Israeli unilateral 
withdrawal from Gaza, Qatar’s Emir once more used the platform of the UN General 
Assembly to welcome recent developments.  ‘We should salute this Israeli step’ he 
informed his audience of world leaders, before adding that  
it is important—very important –that there should be a clear vision to what 
becomes after this step, and that the whole Arab countries must take a step 
toward Israel by a conference, an international conference, or a conference 
between the Arab countries and Israel and those sponsoring peace, especially 
the United States, trying to find a clear vision as to what comes after Gaza. 
 
As in the case of Lebanon, Qatar also demonstrated a willingness to pay for its role in 
mediating Israeli-Palestinian and Hamas-Fatah reconciliation in these years.  For 
example, in 2006, according to a statement by Hamas Prime Minister Haniyeh 
following a visit to Doha, Qatar had promised to pay the salaries of 40,000 
Palestinians education workers for a number of months, as well as the salaries of 
11,000 health ministry officials ‘if necessary’ to a combined total of US$27 million a 
month. The emir also promised to set up an Islamic Bank in the Palestinian territories 
with initial capital of US$50 million to fund agriculture, industrial and economic 
projects. In August 2009, Qatar offered $10 million in cash payments via the Hamas 
administration in Gaza to support thousands of unemployed Palestinians, including 
fishermen facing difficulty in relation to Israel’s blockade of Gaza’s coastal waters. 
 The nature of this perceived Qatari engagement in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-
Palestinian conflict alienated some inside the Arab world.  Qatar’s desire to fall in line 
with US foreign policy in order to consolidate the vitally important bilateral 
relationship with the US was presented in some quarters as the sole reason for Qatar’s 
move to improve ties with Israel at a time when Israel’s political relations were at an 
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all time low not only across the Arab world but in Europe as well.   
 Notably, Syria and Iran accused Qatar of looking to ingratiate itself with the US 
when it invited Tzipi Livni to give the keynote speech at the 8th Doha forum on 
democracy, development and free trade in April 2008. 
From 2006 onwards, following the Hamas rise to power in Gaza, Qatar also 
actively looked to revive stalled negotiations on a national unity government between 
Hamas and Fatah. This saw the start of a period during which Doha hosted Hamas 
officials for numerous talks and consultations.531  
This engagement clearly highlighted the contradictions of Qatari foreign 
policy and the complexities of Qatar’s evolving relationship with Israel (where 55,000 
households were tuned into Al-Jazeera’s recently launched English news channel by 
2007).  
In October 2006, Qatar’s foreign minister shuttled between Palestinian 
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya.  
His goal was to restart face-to-face negotiations between Palestinian factions that had 
collapsed following a tentative agreement in September to form a united government 
and, if possible, to secure the release of kidnaped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his 
Hamas captors.  
In undertaking this role, Qatar also looked to challenge Egypt as the main 
Arab mediator between Fatah and Hamas. The PA president Mahmoud Abbas and 
Hamas leader Khaled Mashal met in Doha to hold talks during which time Qatar’s 
foreign minister presented a six-point plan for a Palestinian unity government.  This 
reportedly called for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which 
could be viewed as implicit recognition of Israel and called for a Palestinian prime 																																																								
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minister not directly connected to either Hamas or Fatah to be appointed.532 
The Israeli response to this was consistently negative.  After first accepting an 
invitation to a December 2006 conference in Doha on New or Restored Democracies 
and causing significant Arab backlash against Qatar in the process, Israeli foreign 
minister Tzipi Livni then declined her invitation once it became known that Hamas 
leaders were also invited (though an Israeli delegation led by lower-ranking diplomats 
participated in the conference). 
 At the same time Israel agreed to a request to support Qatar’s candidacy for a 
seat on the UN Security Council on the grounds that Qatar was one of the few Arab 
states to continue its ties to Israel during the intifada of the early 2000s.  As noted 
above, Qatar took a tough line on Israel during its time on the UN Security Council.  
In November 2006, for example, the US vetoed a UNSC resolution condemning Israel 
for its military action in Gaza that had been introduced by Qatar on the grounds that, 
in the words of then US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, it failed to ‘display an 
even-handed characterization of the recent events in Gaza, nor does it advance the 
cause of Israeli-Palestinian peace’.  The original draft had made no mention of Hamas 
rocket strikes into Israel and accused Israel of conducting a ‘massacre’ of civilians. 
This was replaced soon a revised draft containing more diplomatic language.533   
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited Qatar in February 2007 
though he rejected the opportunity provided by the meeting to agree to the Qatari 
Emir’s reported suggestion that Israel negotiate directly with Hamas.534 
Subsequently the US and Israel were repeatedly angered by Qatar’s direct 
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financial aid to Hamas to pay for public service salaries and other costs at a time 
when the US, the EU and much of the international community was boycotting 
Hamas-run Gaza due to its refusal to agree to their demands to recognize Israel, 
renounce violence and accept previously signed agreements. 535 
 For example, speaking in 2008 one anonymous State Department official 
described Qatar’s engagement with Hamas as ‘a very vexatious problem’.536 US 
criticism was expressed most publicly in an April 2009 statement by then US Senator 
John Kerry, that concluded that ‘Qatar ... can’t continue to be an American ally on 
Monday that sends money to Hamas on Tuesday’. 
At the same time Qatar was perceived to be attempting to challenge Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt for their traditional lead role in mediating between Arab and 
Muslim factions engaged in the Israel-Palestine dispute. Early in January 2009 Qatar 
hosted an emergency Arab summit on the crisis in Gaza attended by 13 Arab states at 
which Hamas leader Khaled Mashal was to serve as the official Palestinian 
representative.  
This move was opposed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the PA and all three 
refused to send representatives to attend. Egypt feared that its own role in placing 
restrictions on its Rafah border crossing with Gaza might come to attention during the 
meeting and did not want to legitimize Qatar’s attempt to play a mediatory role that 
was traditionally its own.  
It is also true however, that on occasions such as in 2003, Qatar served as an 
intermediary for Hamas with both Israel and the United States.537 Subsequently, it 
also served as a conduit for negotiations between Israel and the Arab world on the 																																																								
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Israel-Palestine issue, and expended much political capital on behalf of Washington in 
persuading other Arab states to attend the US-sponsored Middle East peace 
conference in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007.538 
 In 2008, then Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni visited Qatar to give a 
keynote speech at the Doha Forum at the invitation of the Emir. Livni had previously 
met with Qatari leaders at the UN but this was only the third Arab state Livni had 
visited after Egypt and Jordan, both of which had peace agreements with Israel. 
  In explaining Livni’s decision to accept the invitation an Israeli foreign 
ministry spokesman said that ‘They [Qatar] are among the moderates and they 
support the peace process, so its important to go when they invite us’.539 
Qatar responded in the harshest terms to the war in Gaza that followed soon 
after, with the foreign minister condemning Israel’s ‘flagrant, savage, aggression’540 
and demanding the convening of an emergency summit. One practical expression of 
Qatar’s displeasure at Israel over its war in Gaza was the closing of the Israeli trade 
office in Doha, freezing ties and expelling Israel’s representatives. While Khaled 
Mashal and other Hamas leaders visited Doha in April and December 2010 and met 
with the Emir and Prime Minister  
  But even during this period of tension Qatari officials kept open the 
possibility of renewed ties once the crisis was alleviated.541  In 2010, Qatar, along 
with Saudi Arabia invested US$250 million in an investment fund with a leading 
Israeli multinational IDB,542 while leaked Wikileaks documents of the same year 
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noted the on-going relationship between Qatar, and other Gulf States, with Israel.543   
 Fromherz and others have argued that the country’s role as a mediator was a 
major factor behind its success and underscored its talent at individual deal maker at 
the regional level.544  Certainly, Qatar’s role in the diplomacy of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict demonstrated the ‘multi-dimensionality’545 of the country’s external 
engagement in the post-9/11 era. While its lead role in the 2008 Doha Accords in 
Lebanon, was viewed by many as Qatar’s ‘greatest success in regional diplomacy’.546 
At the same time, Qatar strategy of ‘playing all sides’ – Israel and the 
Palestinians, Hamas and Fatah, Hezbollah and Lebanon’s Christians, as well as its 
reputation ‘as independent-minded arbitrators who will cozy up to anyone’,547 also 
highlighted profound differences between its world view and that of its most 
important strategic partner, the US.   
As this chapter has shown, on various issues and occasions, Qatar’s approach 
to external engagement led its key regional and global partners – Saudi Arabia and the 
US –to view bilateral ties as ‘complex, bordering on one of animosity’.548  As the next 
chapter will show, this was particularly apparent between 1996 and 2010 in terms of 
the role of Al-Jazeera.  Perhaps more than any other factor this Doha-based news 
station contributed to enhancing Qatar’s regional and global significance between 
1995 and 2010 at the same time as it alienated friend and foe in the region and beyond. 
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The Media and the Message:  
Al Jazeera Factor as a Case Study in Qatar’s Soft Power Standing 
[Small state] decision-makers [are] unable to compete with their 
counterparts in larger states in regard to the quantity and diversity of 
information that is available to them and which they can disseminate. 
Peter R Baehr549 
 
In 2000, following a visit to Al-Jazeera’s headquarters in Doha, former Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak was reported to have remarked, ‘all this trouble from a 
matchbox like this’.550  Little could he have realised at the time that just over one 
decade later his own officials would blame the Qatari news channel for his overthrow 
after three decades as Egyptian president.  From late January 2011,when Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage of the demise of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia was beamed into Egypt, the 
channel became involved in an intense and hostile ‘cat and mouse game’551 with the 
Mubarak regime.  
The channel quickly became an ‘active participant in events rather than a mere 
bystander recording events’.552 The Egyptian government’s response to this 
development was harsh. For example, the governor of the province of Minya, 
speaking on television, called for the trial of Al-Jazeera correspondents as ‘traitors’ on 
the grounds that they had ‘caused more destruction than Israel for Egypt’.553 The 
Egyptian ministry of information closed down all Al-Jazeera bureaus and withdrew 
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accreditation from the news channel’s staff, six of whom were arrested before being 
released. 554  
 On 27 January 2011 the network’s live channel was dropped by Nilesat.  This 
was a clear breach of the satellite provider’s contractual agreement with the Qatari 
network and meant that only viewers outside Egypt could follow events on satellite.  
In response to this move, at least ten other Arabic language television stations 
including Al-Hewar, Al-Jadeed, Al-Karama, Al-Suhail, and Aden offered to carry Al-
Jazeera’s content for free.555  
The governments in other countries affected by popular revolt responded in a 
similar manner to the Mubarak regime.  In Libya, the secretary-general of the 
country’s People’s Committee, Ahmed Al-Zuwi, stated on television that the Qatari 
government and Al-Jazeera were in a conspiracy to incite violence and spread lies 
over the number of civilians killed by the regime.556 In late 2006 the Tunisian 
government had closed its embassy in Doha and withdrawn its ambassador, on the 
grounds that Al-Jazeera had launched a ‘hostile campaign’ against the country and 
had provided a platform’ for Mohamed Moncef Marzouk, a leading Tunisian human 
rights activist, who called for called for ‘civil resistance’.557 Five years later, the 
Tunisian authorities barred Al-Jazeera reporters from the country. This attempt at 
silencing the channel in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt proved totally ineffective to the 
extent that commentators at the time noted that there was no way that the world would 
have watched the ‘extraordinary events’ played out in Egypt if Egyptians had not seen 
																																																								
554 Hugh Miles, ‘The Al Jazeera Effect’, Foreign Policy, 8 February 2011. 
555 Ibid.  See also Brian Stelter, ‘Channels join Fight to Broadcast Al Jazeera in Egypt’, The New York 
Times, 1 February 2011. 
556 Roula Khalaf and Abeer Allam, ‘Al Jazeera’s backing is key for coalition’, The Financial Times, 20 
March 2011. 
557 ‘Tunisia breaks ties with Qatar over al-Jazeera’, The Guardian, 26 October 2006. 
	 204	
an up-to-the-minute account of the real time disintegration of first the Ben Ali regime 
in Tunisia.558.  
Faisal Kasim, host of Al-Ittijah al-Muakis (The Opposite Direction), one of 
Al-Jazeera’s most popular and controversial shows, has explained that the Arab media 
‘should be harnessed to liberate the Arab people from their internal gladiators’.559  
Certainly that was the perception of Al-Jazeera during the Arab Spring.560  
Apart from non-stop reporting and documentaries on the Arab Spring (notably, 
‘Death of Fear, End of a Dictator, Seeds of a Revolution’), Al-Jazeera sent the 
protests across the world through social media outlets.561 This demonstrated the news 
network’s sophisticated use of innovative social media.562  In a region where many 
citizens had limited satellite access this provided an important service and put the 
channel at the forefront of an increasingly important sub-culture across the Arab 
world that used technology driven means of communications to overcome censorship, 
a lack of political representation and the attempt by governments to limit access to 
information.563  
 Al-Jazeera’s ‘aggressive coverage’ of the Arab Awakening, the term used by 
the channel to refer to revolution in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, pointed very clearly to 
the fact that Arab regimes ‘no longer control[ed] the message’.564 The Qatari-based 
channel could now claim to be a newsmaker not just a news reporter with the 																																																								
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consequences of this (both positive and negative) measured in global as well as 
regional terms. 
The BBC, the world’s largest provider of news content, heralded Al-Jazeera as 
‘a world class international news network’,565 and Columbia University’s Graduate 
School of Journalism named Al-Jazeera’s English channel as the 2011 recipient of its 
Columbia Journalism Award given in recognition of ‘a singular journalism in the 
public interest’ for its ‘peerless’ and ‘ongoing’ coverage of the Arab Spring.  
However, while the Arab Spring was Al-Jazeera’s ‘moment’566 the important 
point to realize in the context of this dissertation that concludes at the same time as 
the Arab Spring was getting underway, is that the channel had been developing this 
cutting edge approach as the ‘go to option for news in the Middle East’ long before 
the Arab Spring.567  
By 2010, for example, Al-Jazeera was already a ‘phenomenon’—a word used 
widely in the literature to describe the channel.  By that time it – prior to the Arab 
Spring – it could already claim to have been the subject of academic conferences568 
and numerous books569. Indeed, within a decade of its launch the channel was one of 
the world’s most familiar brands.570 
This chapter’s focus is thus not on the role of Al-Jazeera during the Arab 
Spring.  Rather it examines the evolution of the channel from the time of its birth in 																																																								
565  Hugh Miles, ‘Al-Jazeera boss steps down: strains with Qatar royals?’, BBC NEWS, 1 October 2011. 
566 Robert F. Worth and David D Kirkpatrick, ‘Seizing a moment, Al Jazeera Galvanizes Arab 
Frustration’, The New York Times, 27 January 2011. 
567 Aryn Baker, ‘Bahrain’s Voiceless: How Al Jazeera’s Coverage of the Arab Spring is Uneven’, 
Time, 24 May 2011. 
568 See for example, a conference in October 2010 co hosted by University of Sout California’s Center 
on Public Diplomacy and the Al Jazeera Center for Studies to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the 
channel.  
569 Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is Challeing the West, 
New York, Grove Press, 2005; Muhammad Zayani (ed.), The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical 
Perspectives on New Arab Media, Boulder, Paradigm Publishers, 2005; Marc Lynch, Voices of the New 
Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera and Middle East Politics today, New York, Columbia University Press, 
2006. 
570 Wadah Khanfar, ‘Why did you want to bomb me, Mr Bush and Mr Blair?’, The Guardian, 1 
December 2005.  
	 206	
1996, the year after the new Emir came to power up until 2010.  In doing so it 
examines three independent, but overlapping aspects of the Al-Jazeera ‘phenomenon’.  
The first is the extent to which Al-Jazeera, during the decade and a half 
between 1996 and 2010, with its famed slogan, ‘the opinion—the other opinion’ 
flashing across the screen, had ‘pushed the boundaries’ of information by providing 
live coverage of major events in the Arab world.571  
The second is how, in doing so, it had consolidated, complicated and extended 
the status of Qatar as a major regional and global player. The third is the extent that 
Qatar’s Al-Jazeera experience changed fundamentally the boundaries of how a small 
state in the international system can use the media to increase its standing, influence 
and power on the regional and global stage.572   
Al-Jazeera was originally created as part of the new Emir’s strategy of 
increasing Qatar’s international standing and to project its influence well beyond its 
own borders.  This was evidenced by the fact that it was launched in 1996, the year 
following the new Emir’s rise to power and that it was established with initial state 
financial support of US$137 million.573
 
  Its reach and impact was immediate, which in turn placed Qatar in the 
international spotlight like never before. By 1998, only two years after its 
establishment, it could claim 35 million regular viewers across the Arab world. By 
2000, the renowned New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman was noting how 
Al-Jazeera had ‘swept up Arab audiences from Morocco to Iraq’.574   
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From a branding perspective this was hugely effective as Al-Jazeera came to 
embody the post-1995 perception of Qatar as an open, innovative and cutting edge 
Arab state. In 1996, the year of Al-Jazeera’s founding, media restrictions in Qatar 
were relaxed, while the ministry of information was abolished and censorship 
regulations were substantially reduced.575  
Traditionally Arab leaders believed that they could consolidate their power by 
controlling the media. Upon coming to power, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani 
did exactly the opposite.  Realising something in the mid-1990s that arguably only 
dawned on his peers in the region during the Arab Spring, he envisioned Al-Jazeera as 
the emblem of an independent media that was not the consequence of reform, but 
rather a key to creating and consolidating that reform.  This, in turn, made a huge 
impact on the region’s ‘news service landscape’.576 By the early 2000s Al-Jazeera’s, 
‘no-holds-barred’577 approach to many controversial issues had consolidated its 
standing as a ‘pioneering’578 network in this regard.  ‘In a part of the world where 
news has always been the news the government wants, true or not’, argued The New 
York Times, ‘Al-Jazeera is truly a phenomenon’.579   
For its part, the Qatari government worked to maintain such positive 
perceptions by defending Al-Jazeera from all comers and by looking to present the 
country, via the news network, as a bastion of free speech and enlightenment. As 
Qatar’s foreign minister explained in 2005, ‘there is a free press and free speech in 																																																								
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Qatar…that is why we have headaches with most of our friends and brothers in the 
Arab world’.580  Al-Jazeera was, in the words of the Emir who founded it ‘a TV 
station reflecting the new image of Qatar’,581 and that new image was one that he 
wished to project to the outside world. 
On a practical level this required the news network to provide two kinds of 
content that distinguished it from its regional peers. The first was daily news reports 
on subjects and issues that other regional news organizations studiously avoided. The 
second was topical discussion shows in-studio on subjects that had previously been 
taboo in the Arabic news media.   
These two parallel approaches were central to the channel’s success in 
consolidating its reputation as the most free and open source of news reporting and 
debate in the Arab world. As Mohammed El-Nawawy noted, the channel ‘crossed all 
the red lines and boundaries…an unprecedented phenomenon’.582 The Egyptian 
novelist Ahdaf Soueif was even more eloquent in his description of Al-Jazeera as the 
‘one window through which we can breathe’.583 
From the time of the channel’s launch all of Qatar’s neighbours, as well as 
Jordan and Egypt, at one time or another banned Al-Jazeera, over what they saw as 
the channel’s unforgiving coverage of all regional issues except domestic Qatari 
ones.584  The same was true for North Africa. Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with 
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Qatar in 2006 over news content on Al-Jazeera. So did Libya and Morocco in the 
years before the Arab Spring. By 2002 more than 450 official complaints had been 
made against Al-Jazeera by Arab governments but the reality was that all attempts to 
check the sale and use of satellite dish receivers failed in the 1990s, and short of 
banning satellite dishes there was no way to stop the Al Jazeera message. 585 Even as 
Arab leaders lobbied Washington to pressure Doha to reign in the news channel,586 
Al-Jazeera evolved into ‘a no-holds-barred radical Arab voice that sent shock waves 
through a ‘conservative, region’.587  
 This was especially true for Saudi Arabia.  As noted in chapter 5, the Qatar-
Saudi relationship was fraught on a number of fronts in the period covered by this 
dissertation.   From the time of Al-Jazeera’s launch it had been a key cause of tension 
between the two GCC partners.  On a business level Al-Jazeera very quickly became 
a counterweight to the Saudi Arabian media giant the Middle East Broadcasting 
Corporation that had monopolised the media market in the Gulf until the emergence 
of the Doha-based channel. In response, Saudi Arabia pressured Arab advertising 
agencies to boycott Al-Jazeera.  Though Saudi Arabia also refused to allow Al-
Jazeera to open an office in the kingdom, the channel had a social impact that Riyadh 
was helpless to prevent. In 2002 opinion surveys in Saudi Arabia showed that public 
perceptions were being increasingly formed by media sources from outside the 
kingdom rather than by the official government-controlled press.588  
 For example, Saudi citizens were able to tune into the Qatari network and see 
reports on female business leaders and policy makers, which directly challenged the 																																																								
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argument of Saudi traditionalists that women were unsuited to leadership roles.589 
They could also see lively debates and discussions that regularly featured Saudi 
dissidents and focused criticism on the Saudi royal family as well as other sensitive 
political issues such as Saudi Arabia’s Palestine policy.590  
 Indeed, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Doha following comments 
made by one vocal dissident on the channel. Relations continued to be strained in the 
following years. As one anonymous Qatari official told the New York Times in that 
year, the Saudis just ‘don’t understand why the emir wants to rock the boat’ with Al-
Jazeera. 591  
 In December 2005, the Emir of Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown 
Prince Abdullah were expected to meet on the sidelines of a GCC annual summit in 
Manama, Bahrain. The meeting, arranged by the Kuwaiti prime minister Sheik Sabah 
al Ahmed al-Jabr al Sabah, was intended to rebuild bridges, but the meeting failed to 
take place when the Saudi crown prince decided not to travel to Bahrain.   
 There were undoubtedly tensions other than Al-Jazeera that influenced Saudi-
Qatari mutual attitudes and bilateral relations in these years. For example, in 2006 
Qatar’s energy minister blamed Saudi intransigence for the failure of Qatar and 
Kuwait to move forward on a multi-billion dollar gas project. The deal had been 
initially proposed by Qatar in 2001 but was blocked by Saudi. In 2003, Saudi gave 
permission but denied it again in 2006.   
 However, there is little doubt that during the 2000s, tensions between Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia increased greatly at the same time as Al-Jazeera rose to global 
prominence and at the same time as the channel’s coverage of major events from the 																																																								
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9/11 attacks on the US to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 placed major stresses on the 
Doha-Washington bilateral partnership.  
  In early October 2001, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks on the US, the channel 
began broadcasting a series of videotapes featuring several speeches and interviews 
with Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his inner circle. Similar to CNN’s rise to 
global prominence following its blanket coverage of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and the subsequent military campaign, Al-Jazeera received another major boost 
when it provided exclusive and comprehensive coverage of the early stages of the 
Afghan war in late 2001.  
As seen in the previous chapter, Qatar’s rising status as ‘a unique hybrid 
diplomatic actor’,592 in the region in the post-9/11 era was a direct challenge to Saudi 
Arabia, because it helped contribute to a consolidation of Qatar’s bilateral strategic 
relationship with the US. This was the country’s number one foreign policy priority. 
But over the same period Al-Jazeera established itself as the second main pillar of 
Qatar’s diplomacy.   
At times, as shall be seen, Al-Jazeera was the cause of significant tension 
between Doha and Washington, as US policymakers have consistently viewed Al-
Jazeera as a tool of Qatar’s foreign policy.593  A US state department document 
published by Wikileaks in 2009 highlighted this thinking among US officials.  Qatar, 
it argued, used the channel ‘as a bargaining tool to repair relationships with other 
countries particularly those soured by Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts including the United 
States’.594 
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 Tensions with the US were particularly apparent over Al-Jazeera’s coverage of 
the GWOT and, in particular, the airing of the bin Laden tapes before, during and 
after the war in Afghanistan (Al-Jazeera’s office in Kabul was bombed in November 
2001).  Though tensions were deflated somewhat by Al-Jazeera’s agreement to 
provide the US with copies of Bin Laden videos 48 hours before airing them, and to 
allow US officials airtime to comment on or rebut the tapes.  
 Tensions between Washington and Doha over the role of Al-Jazeera escalated 
following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Al-Jazeera took a leadership role in 
international journalistic initiatives following the outbreak of war and, notably, in 
2004, it even organised a forum for news organisations from around the world to 
discuss global communication technology issues in the context of the war in Iraq.595 
In May 2003, during the battle for Baghdad, the office of Al-Jazeera was the 
target of an American missile, which claimed the life of Tarek Ayyoub, one of Al-
Jazeera’s reporters. As in the case of Kabul two years earlier, the argument of US 
officials that Al-Jazeera’s office was not targeted or deliberately bombed did not 
satisfy many. Salah Hassan, a cameraman for the channel, was subsequently arrested 
by US forces in November 2003, while covering the aftermath of an attack on a US 
convoy near the city of Baquba.   
Senior US officials repeatedly requested from their Qatari counterparts that 
the critique of US policies and actions on Al-Jazeera be toned down. On one well-
publicized occasion Qatar’s Emir reportedly responded to such a request from US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell by poniting out that the first amendment of the 
American Constitution guaranteed the freedom of the press.596  																																																								
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596 Steve Tatham, ‘Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera and Muslim Public 
Opinion’. 
	 213	
In April 2004, the Bush administration protested to Al-Jazeera and provided a 
list of what it described as ‘inflammatory’ reports. On this occasion, Powell once 
more raised these concerns in a meeting with Qatar’s foreign minister saying that ‘the 
friendship between our two nations is such that we can also talk about difficult issues 
that intrude in that relationship, such as the issue of the coverage of Al-Jazeera’.597 In 
response, Hafez al-Mirazi, Al-Jazeera’s Washington Bureau Chief claimed that his 
network maintained editorial independence from the Qatari government and called 
Powell’s intervention with Qatar’s foreign minister as ‘regrettable’.598 
Nevertheless, State Department sources at the time argued that US efforts in 
Iraq and across the Middle East were being undercut by what The New York Times 
described as ‘politically motivated or erroneous reports’.599 This US dissatisfaction 
with the news network became a matter of public record from 2004 onward because 
of the US administration’s concerns over the negative impact of Al-Jazeera coverage 
on the continued US occupation of Iraq. In particular, the fear in Washington was that 
the channel’s negative coverage would further inflame anti-American sentiment, in 
turn making it harder to gain Iraqi support for US post-invasion stabilisation efforts. 
In particular, there was barely concealed anger over what US officials viewed 
to be emotive reports by Al-Jazeera of civilian casualties in Iraq, without any attempt 
to provide the broader context. Similarly, there was a belief that the channel gave 
undue and excessive attention to the statements and arguments of Osama bin Laden 
and, in the words of the Financial Times, was complicit in ‘giving a platform to Al-
Qaeda leaders’.600   
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Most controversially, there were also accusations that Al-Jazeera was 
encouraging terrorists by airing broadcasts of beheadings of foreign hostages in Iraq, 
a charge the channel’s executives dismissed as ‘unfounded’ on the grounds that 
‘never at any time’ had it ‘transmitted’ such pictures and voiced ‘deep regret and 
surprise’ over the US accusation. 
In 2004, at the height of these tensions, one anonymous senior US official told 
the New York Times, ‘All people are seeing [on Al Jazeera] is the minaret hit by 
American fire and falling.  They’re not seeing the pictures of the fighters shooting at 
us from those mosques and minarets’. 601 As State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher explained, ‘we have very deep concerns about Al Jazeera’s broadcasts 
because, again and again, we find inaccurate, false, wrong reports that are, we think, 
designed to be inflammatory that appear on this network’. He continued to argue that 
such broadcasts ‘make the situation more tense, more inflamed and even more 
dangerous for Americans, for Iraqis and for Arabs’. 602 
In July 2004, Secretary of State Powell claimed that videotapes of terrorists 
screened ‘for the purpose of inflaming the world and appealing to the basest instincts 
in the region’ and Powell said he had ‘many, many discussions [about the] horrible’ 
coverage with Qatari government.603   
So concerned was the US Department of Defence over the negative impact of 
Al-Jazeera coverage on the war effort that its Arabic media and programmes unit 
began maintaining an Al-Jazeera ‘truth matrix’, which included over 50 entries by 
April 2004.  There was also an instruction to combat troops to use their personal 
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digital cameras to take pictures of insurgents operating from mosques and from 
behind civilians in order to counter the images shown on Al-Jazeera.604  
The channel’s footage of civilian casualties in Fallujah in 2004 resulted in US 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld describing the Channel as a ‘mouthpiece of 
Al Qaeda…inaccurate and inexcusable’. On another occasion he accused it of dealing 
in ‘vicious lies’.605  While a 2005 memorandum of a conversation between Tony Blair 
and George Bush was leaked in which the US president reportedly suggested 
bombing the headquarters of Al-Jazeera in Doha. 
In the summer of 2004, Al-Jazeera’s Baghdad office had been shut down by 
the interim Iraqi government on the grounds that the channel had incited violence and 
racial hatred.  Though Al-Jazeera denied this charge, the US administration refused to 
condemn the move, which came months after intense US criticism of the channel that 
reverberated and impacted on political and diplomatic relations for the remainder of 
the period under examination in this thesis.  Most notably, the decision of the US 
president not to visit Qatar during an early 2008 visit to the region was widely 
interpreted as a consequence of the Bush administration’s anger over Al-Jazeera.606 
There is no doubt, as Hugh Miles suggests, that Al-Jazeera deviated 
considerably from the Qatari government’s pro-American policy vis a vis the war in 
Iraq. It is also evident that the channel regularly challenged the US version of events 
on other sensitive issues. Every time the US government complained to Doha about 
Al Jazeera content the government was adamant that it did not interfere in the 
editorial independence of the channel.   
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 Having said that, according to a Wikileaks cable of October 2005 Al-Jazeera’s 
then managing director Wadah Khanfar did succumb to pressure from US officials to 
play down civilian casualties in some of the network’s coverage of the Iraq war, and 
agreed to remove an inflammatory slide show from the channel’s website.607  
If this is true, it raises as many questions about US attitudes to free speech and 
reporting as it does about Al-Jazeera’s editorial independence.  As one former US 
ambassador in the Middle East noted, ‘the challenge here is, how does the US on the 
one hand promote freedom of the press as part of a whole process of reform in the 
Arab world, and on the other, accommodate the interests of the US and its troops. 
There’s a big tug there’. 608 
Al-Jazeera was one of the few news channels with a substantial Arabic and 
English presence in Gaza during the Israel-Hamas war in December 2008 and January 
2009.  Exactly one year later, in January 2010 Al-Jazeera (in cooperation with the 
Guardian newspaper in London) published more than 1600 documents detailing 
negotiations between Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israeli 
and US officials.609  
The first batch of documents released focused largely on final-status 
negotiations between the PLO and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government 
between 2006-09.610 Much of the material seemed to present Abbas’ PA leadership as 
surrendering Palestinian claims on such key issues as the status of Jerusalem and the 
right of return of Palestinian refugees.  Indeed, the Al-Jazeera website featured an 
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above the fold photograph of chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat next to the 
quote, ‘we are offering you the biggest yerushalayim in Jewish history’.611 
 From one perspective Al-Jazeera’s release of this mass of documents provided 
the Palestinian leadership with a great service. Amjad Atallah of the Middle East Task 
Force at the New America Foundation argued that the release of the documents finally 
killed the myth created by President Bill Clinton that the Palestinians were not  
serious partners at Camp David and were to blame for the lack of a two state solution 
to the conflict. While The Economist magazine argued that ‘if anything’ the batch of 
leaked papers ‘shows the Palestinians defending their corner rather well’.612   
But Palestinian leaders were unmoved by such positive assessments and took 
great exception to the implication put forward repeatedly by Al-Jazeera in its 
coverage that it had given away almost everything to the Israelis, without pressuring 
them for concessions or compromise in return. The PA challenged the veracity of the 
documents,613 with Erekat claiming that the channel had taken documents ‘out of 
context’ and that its ‘information is full of distortions and fraud.’614  
The Palestinians also viewed Al-Jazeera’s move not only as an attack on its 
negotiating strategy but also as a ‘direct attack’615 on its leadership.  No doubt 
influenced greatly by the Qatari government’s attempt to insert itself into both Israeli-
Palestinian diplomacy and Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, Mahmoud Abbas accused Al-
Jazeera of trying to destroy him politically.616  
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Veteran Palestinian official Yasser Abd Rabbo described the publication of 
the documents as a ‘political campaign of the first degree’ and a ‘political decision at 
the highest level from our brother in Qatar’. He even claimed that the Emir of Qatar 
was responsible, as he had instructed Al-Jazeera to attack the PA as a way of 
protecting his own regional influence.617  
On a more practical level the channel’s office in Ramallah was surrounded by 
protesters carrying signs ‘Al-Jazeera=Israel’ and billboards were erected criticizing 
Qatar for its relations with Israel.618 Al Jazeera had broken the taboo among Arab 
media outlets by becoming the first Arab channel to allow Israelis to speak 
uncensored and then by regularly inviting Israeli officials to present their case live. 
This included then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, who was invited to speak 
live on Al-Jazeera on the eve of the Arab Summit held in Beirut in March 2002. 
However, the interview was canceled at the last minute. 
Interestingly, in terms of the changing attitude to both Al-Jazeera and Qatari 
involvement in regional diplomacy, in the same month as the Ramallah attacks on the 
news channel supporters of ousted Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon set fire to 
an Al-Jazeera vehicle and accused the channel of sympathizing with Hezbollah.619 
In truth there was little in the Palestine Papers published by Al-Jazeera that 
was not already widely known.620  But the case clearly highlighted the power of Al-
Jazeera to anger regional leaders and the perception that the channel, in the final 
account, was the mouthpiece of the Qatari Emir.  
Speaking in 2010, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani acknowledged this 																																																								
617 Hugo Naylor, ‘Al Jazeera under fire in Palestine over leaked papers’, The National. See also ‘Al 
Jazeera and the Palestinians: The Palestine Papers’, The Guardian, 24 January 2011. 
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anger while rejecting any editorial role, ‘I know Jazeera causes me a big problem ... In 
the past, many Arab leaders ... didn’t want to talk to me’. ‘But it’s good’, he 
continued, ‘that then they understand that I’m not going to change my mind’.621   
At the same time, the few years immediately prior to 2010 also saw to some 
degree what The New York Times has described cogently as the  ‘gradual 
domestication of Al-Jazeera’.622 This was most apparent in the channel’s evolving 
relationship with both Saudi Arabia and the US.  In September 2007, after a number 
of years of open tension, the Qatari Emir visited to Riyadh.  Later in the same year 
Saudi Arabia’s leader attended a GCC summit in Doha. This led to an announcement 
in the same month that Saudi Arabia would ‘immediately’ send an ambassador back 
to Qatar for the first time since 2002.  
One motive for rapprochement was the rising tension over the Iranian nuclear 
programme.623 This looming challenge made inter-GCC cooperation in the security 
sphere increasingly necessary.   It is possible to see a gradual toning down in Al-
Jazeera’s rhetoric on Saudi Arabia from as far back as 2003, when the channel’s 
founding managing director Mohammed Jassem al-Ali left office.  
It became much more noticeable following the improvement in bilateral 
diplomatic, political and economic relations from the end of 2007 onwards. Some 
media experts also noticed a new tendency for the channel to treat Saudi Arabia with 
‘kid gloves’624 and fewer Saudi dissidents appeared on Al-Jazeera programmes.   
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In particular, some wondered whether the channel would have remained silent 
over a November 2007 Saudi court ruling sentencing a young woman to 200 lashes 
after she pressed charges against a group of men for rape, if high level ties with Saudi 
Arabia had not improved in the previous months and if the Saudi King was not 
scheduled to attend a summit meeting in Doha within weeks.625 
 Hugh Miles, one of the leading western experts on Al-Jazeera has noted that in 
the post-2008 era, ‘issues of extreme sensitivity to the Saudi regime, such as royal 
family corruption and the succession question [have been] passed over lightly’. 626  
 The practical consequences of this were quickly seen. In March 2008 Saudi 
Crown Prince Sultan visited Qatar for 3 days, the first such visit since 2002. In July 
2008, a high level meeting between officials of both countries in Jeddah led to the 
agreed demarcation of shared borders and the establishment of a joint council at 
crown prince level to strengthen ties in the political, security and financial and 
economic spheres.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar signed a comprehensive bilateral 
agreement including political, security, economic and media cooperation in December 
2008. In 2010 Qatar released 10 Saudi prisoners serving life sentences in the country. 
While in early 2011, Saudi Arabia gave permission to Al-Jazeera for the first time to 
open an office in the country and station a permanent correspondent there.627 
 The parallel normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia, Al-Jazeera and 
the Qatari state in the same period underscores clearly the intricate relationship 
between the news channel and government foreign policy in the years up to 2010.628 
This in turn undoubtedly raises issues related to the independence of Al-Jazeera from 
the foreign policy priorities of Qatar’s leadership and has led some to argue that the 																																																								
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channel was nothing more than a ‘sophisticated mouthpiece’629 of the state. 
From its launch Al-Jazeera’s most precious asset was its credibility.  One key 
indicator of this was its coverage of Saudi Arabia, which also contributed greatly to 
Qatar’s efforts to emerge as a leading regional actor in part by reigning in Saudi 
influence in the region in a pro-active fashion. 
But regardless of whether or not Al-Jazeera chose independently or was 
directed to take a less aggressive approach to reporting and coverage on Saudi Arabia 
in the period after 2007 as the Economist magazine put it in 2010, ‘the influence and 
reach of Al Jazeera continues to astound’.630  Or in the words of one regional Arab 
commentator by the time of the Arab Spring the channel had become the ‘biggest 
media phenomenon in the Arab world since the advent of television… [had] 
revolutionised Arab-language television news... [and had become] the most watched, 
the most controversial  new channel in the region’.631  
By 2010 the channel was estimated to reach 200 million and beamed into 
around half of all Arab homes.632  Since the establishment of Al-Jazeera English in 
May 2006 it also consistently rivaled international players like the BBC and CNN in 
terms of worldwide audiences, with an estimated 35-50 million viewers and between 
them the two Al-Jazeera channels had at least 60 bureaus (up from 35 in 2001), with 
12 in Africa alone. 
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So profoundly had Al-Jazeera turned the traditional media system in the Arab 
world upside down that commentators even talked in terms of a ‘pre-Al Jazeera era 
and a post-Al Jazeera era’ in the Middle East.633 
This inevitably meant that even before the Arab Spring, the channel’s success 
led some to argue that it had outgrown Qatar and that Al-Jazeera was a state with 
‘Qatar as its capital’ or that ‘Al Jazeera is a major league channel in a minor league 
country’.634  
This is a fundamental misunderstanding of both Qatar in the period between 
1995 and 2010 and Al-Jazeera’s role in and influence in the country during those 
years. Certainly, the channel’s success contributed to Qatar’s attempt to increase its 
regional influence.  The channel gave Qatar a sense of its place not only locally but 
across the Arab world and beyond. One can even argue, as has been done, that Al- 
Jazeera is the ‘main identification’ of Qatar for people across the globe.  
However, while it is true that Al-Jazeera in the period between 1996 and 2010 
provided Qatar with a global profile that far exceeded its size, the greater truth is that 
Al-Jazeera was not simply a ‘showpiece’635 or the vehicle for Qatar and its ambitious 
Emir to play a high profile role in the region and the world beyond.  Rather, its 
creation and success was only possible because it represented and illuminated the 
vision of Qatar post-1995.  
In increasing its profile across the region and then, after the establishment of 
Al-Jazeera English in 2006, across the globe, it echoed the attempts of Qatar the 
country to do the same.  Within a year of its launch Al-Jazeera English was a 24-hour 
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news channel reaching 100 million homes. From the start with four regional news 
bases – in Washington D.C., London, Kuala Lumpur, and Doha – it presented itself as 
providing ‘accurate, impartial and objective news for a global audience from a grass-
roots level’ and promised that it would develop into ‘the channel of reference for 
Middle East news’.636  
In the process, Al-Jazeera English became an integral part of the development 
of the “Qatar brand” in the foreign policy arena and has done more than anything else 
to bring attention to the country’s progressive approach to socio-economic 
development, political liberalization and fundamental rights such as freedom of 
speech.637  
The channel also consolidated Qatar’s place on the world map as a gateway to 
the Arab world, as well as developing into one of the ‘most important organizations in 
the world today.’638 In these terms, Al-Jazeera ‘exhibited Qatar’s heterodoxical 
course’,639 while at the same time shattering the long-time argument in the small state 
literature that decision makers in smaller states are unable to compete with their 
counterparts in larger states in regard to the quantity and diversity of information that 
is available to them and which they can disseminate.640  
This was true in terms of Al-Jazeera’s impact on bilateral relations between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the US and Palestinians in the period up to 2010. It is also 
evidenced in the fact that over the same period Qatar and Al-Jazeera were accused by 																																																								
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friends and foes alike of acting in the interests of Al-Qaeda, the White House, 
Saddam Hussein, Israel, Hamas, the Taliban, Hezbollah and the CIA. Sometimes, on 










Small State, Big Challenges: Sustainability on the home front 
‘Weakness [is the] most common, natural and pervasive view of self in 
the small state’.  David Vital641 
 
‘An Arab version of Switzerland – rich, neutral, secure’,642 is how one commentator 
described Qatar in 2006.  In the relatively short period of time covered in this thesis 
between 1995 and 2010, Qatar developed into a leading foreign policy player on the 
regional and international stage. At home its achievements were no less impressive as 
the country was one of the fastest- growing economies in the world, as well as one of 
the wealthiest and had come to be recognised as standing ‘on the frontier of the global 
economy’.643  
 Compared to many other economies, Qatar was relatively spared from the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008-09, with the growth rate slowing to an 
impressive 9 percent in 2009, down from 16.4 percent in 2008.  This consistently high 
growth, combined with prudent government support for the financial sector, 
contributed to maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability. In fact, in global 
terms Qatar’s macroeconomic environment emerged stronger from the crisis, moving 
from 13th to 8th place globally according to the World Economic Forum’s Arab World 
Competitiveness Review.644 
As such, despite the global economic downturn, Qatar’s budgets for the fiscal 
years 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11 were expansionary in nature, with total 																																																								
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expenditures up by an estimated 46 percent year on year due to flagship 
infrastructural projects, including the overhaul of the airport, rail and metro and road 
networks.  
This was in part due to pre-investment in anticipation of the World Cup bid.  
But it was also due to the conscious decisions of policymakers who were adamant that 
infrastructural development had to play, in the words of then Qatari Finance Minister 
Yousef Hussain Kamal, a critical role in the country’s progress and development and 
would not be abandoned or frozen despite the global downturn. 
This view was echoed by Qatar’s Olympic Committee secretary-general, 
Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, who told the World Conference on Sport 
and Enviornment (WCSE) in the wake of the successful World Cup bid that 
‘Infrastructure development has left a lasting legacy in Qatar and will continue to be a 
key driver of all fundamental indicators... [part of a] vision to develop a truly 
sustainable and energy independent economy’.645 
The above reference to a ‘sustainable’ economy underscored the fact that by 
2010 Qatari leaders were focused on socio-economic development that resulted in 
sustainability across all sectors of economic endevour.  As Khalid bin Mohammad Al 
Attiyah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, would explain, ‘As a nation we believe 
it is our responsibility to invest today in the technologies and practices required to 
build a healthy and prosperous future for the next generation’.646   
By 2010, Qatar had already made huge progress in terms of establishing the 
foundations across society required to achieve sustainable growth and progress.  Each 
year from 1990 onwards, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has 
published the Human Development Index (HDI). This evaluates a country’s economic 																																																								
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and social progress outside the traditional GDP measures.  In particular, the HDI takes 
into account education, in particular the literacy levels of the local population, as well 
as health indicators, notably access to clean water and electricity, and to basic health 
and sanitation facilities as well as life expectancy at birth. 
Though the HDI does not take into account gender or income inequality or 
human and political rights it is nonetheless accepted as an important and valuable 
measure of socio-economic development above and beyond GDP. The UNDP 
classifies countries into three groups: (1) high human development (with an HDI 
measure between 0.8 and 1.0, largely for industrialized countries); (2) medium human 
development (an HDI between 0.5 and 0.8); and (3) low human development (an HDI 
less than 0.5).   
In the period between 1995 and 2010 no single country achieved the full mark 
of 1.00, though a number of small states in the international system have scored very 
highly each year. Notably Norway, Iceland and Ireland have consistently ranked in 
the top five globally between 2007 and 2010, with Norway topping the rankings in 
2008 with 0.908; 2009, with 0.971 and 2010 with 0.938. 
For its part, Qatar has seen a consistent rise in its ranking over the period 
covered in this dissertation.647 This was particularly the case from 2000 onwards. In 
2000 Qatar was ranked 47th with a score of 0.839. By 2004 it was ranked 44th with a 
score of 0.844 in 2004.  By 2008 the country ranked 32nd with a score of 0.876; in 
2009 it was ranked 33rd with a score of 0.910; and by 2010 it was ranked 38th with a 
score of 0.803.   
Thus, over the course of the years examined in this thesis Qatar had moved 
into the High Human Development grouping, at least according to the UN.   																																																								
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 Over the same period, Qatar achieved similarly impressive results in the Arab 
World Competitiveness Review published by the World Economic Forum. In 2010 it 
was ranked 17th globally, not only reaffirming its position as the most competitive 
country in the Arab world, but highlighting its high-quality institutional framework 
(with low levels of corruption and undue influence, high government efficiency and 
excellent security) for which it was ranked 10th globally, as well as its stable 
macroeconomic environment (8th) and the efficiency of its goods market (12th).648  
 All this makes it easy to understand why in mid-2010, The New York Times 
proclaimed that the ‘citizens of Qatar appear to have it made’.649  Certainly during the 
period between 1995 and 2010 Qatar’s leaders exhibited a commitment to initiating 
and supporting long term strategies for change and development and for 
acknowledging, as this thesis has attempted to show, the vital interplay between social, 
economic and political factors in the process of rapid growth and development. 
As, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, Qatar’s foreign 
minister and prime minister during the period under examination, summed up in 2005, 
in the decade since 1995 his government’s policies and actions had been 
‘characterized with the determination —we are on the path of reform and democracy, 
not overlooking the social fabric that characterizes our society—and this was adopted 
prior to the events of 9/11 and we have come a long way since then’.650  
The willingness to embrace the long-term strategies that required to make such 
statements come true challenges Rothstein’s critique of small states for their ‘vaunted 
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irresponsibility’ based on the ‘imperatives of immediate security’, which may 
preclude consideration of long-range problems.651  
However, a commitment to long-term planning has not eradicated the 
challenges faced by contemporary Qatar as it moves into the next stage of its 
development. As in the rest of the region, there has been, and continues to exist and 
understandable tension between traditional society and political norms that have 
struggled to keep pace with the unprecedented process of rapid development, 
modernization and ambition.652  
An increasingly important measure of a mature society is the relationship of 
the state to its civil society sector.  Traditionally GCC states, including Qatar, have 
been reluctant to promote or even allow open access for civil society actors.  This is a 
barrier to reform.653 Instead of seeing civil society as a threat and a challenge, 
governments should see it as a strength, and this paradigm shift will allow them to 
tackle problem areas, such as skill divides, youth unemployment and dissatisfaction, 
as well as address discrimination based upon ethnicity, religion or gender, all of 
which impact negatively on the skilled labour market.  
A strong and thriving civil society can provide support for government in 
various areas. For example, working to integrate the inhabitants of rural areas, 
promoting gender equality and interacting with disaffected youth are all key functions 
of civil society groups.654 Non-profit organisations can also play an important role in 
nurturing other forms of human capital in a developing society.  
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As noted over the course of this dissertation, Qatar’s growth and development 
has been primarily achieved between 1995 and 2010 by revenues generated from its 
oil and, increasingly, in more recent years from its gas sector.  
Traditionally, economies dependent on energy revenues are inherently less 
competitive and less efficient than their non-oil counterparts. The literature attributes 
this lack of competitiveness to very tight regulatory policies followed by the 
government and an equally poor implementation of reforms.655   
Qatar’s leaders in the period between 1995 and 2010 were very aware of these 
pitfalls, as well as the more general negative consequences of an overreliance on 
natural resource revenues. Notably, shocks in the price of oil have resulted in 
fluctuating business cycles as economies respond to the rise and fall in the price of oil 
and the spillover of volatility from oil to non-oil sectors.  
In 2007, a year during which the Qatari energy sector accounted for around 56 
percent of GDP, 80 percent of export earnings and 70 percent of government 
revenues,656 the Emir acknowledged his country’s past failures to maximize the 
benefit of its revenues form natural resources. As he explained, as the price of oil shot 
up in the 1970s, ‘we found ourselves here in paradise, money everywhere, 
everywhere.  We didn’t try to make ... a good plan to keep part of this money for the 
future’.657 He added that: 
Qatar used to be famous for its pearl hunting activities, but when the Japanese 
invented artificial pearls, so to speak ... this caused a lot of poverty and 
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deprivation in Qatar. But when we discovered oil we didn’t learn from what 
happened during the pearl time – that we risked becoming poor. 658 
Then he concluded with a stark but pragmatic summary of the challenges his country 
faced going forward.  ‘Our energy sector won‘t last forever - so we need to secure a 
good life so they [future generations] can continue the same standard of living...We 
will have lots more money over the next few years. The challenge is where to invest 
it’.659  
In order to ensure that this challenge is met by his successors since he 
departed office in 2013, Qatar’s leaders need to harness energy revenues in building 
up sustainable development. This requires, first and foremost, reducing the country’s 
vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations through diversification into other 
economic sectors and improving competitiveness across the economy.660 As this 
thesis has shown, this objective was a major priority for Qatar’s leadership in the 
period between 1995 and 2010.  
Studies have shown that nations like Qatar, with a high economic 
concentration ratio, suffer from higher growth volatility than nations with a high 
diversification quotient like Norway.661  In fact Norway, a nation that, as shown 
above, excels in the UNDP’s rankings and whose hydrocarbon wealth has not 
prevented it from achieving a successful strategy of economic diversification, is an 
important small state case study for Qatar.  So too are countries like Finland, Iceland, 
Singapore, Israel and Ireland, other small states which for different reasons and in 																																																								
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659 The Financial Times, 23 October 2007.   
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different areas of socio-economic endeavour offer cases of ‘best practice’ that Qatar 
can draw on. 
 This is true in terms of negative, as well as positive lessons.  In the process of 
maximising the benefits of its energy revenues via diversification, Qatar should 
ensure that there are mechanisms in place that limit any tendency towards 
squandering current prosperity.   This is one of the stark lessons of the Irish 
experience of failing to set out and follow a long-term investment strategy that 
capitalised on the prosperity and income generated during the boom years of the 
2000s prior to the global financial crisis. 
There is little doubt that most of Qatar, along with the rest of the GCC, has 
spent heavily in pursuit of economic diversification.  However, as chapter 4 has 
highlighted much of this has been targeted upon building the necessary physical 
infrastructure and establishing, from a very low base, a globally competitive 
educational system.662  
Between 1995 and 2010, Qatar was an excellent example of how investment 
in physical infrastructure can bring quick rewards. A good transport system, energy 
producing facilities, manufacturing centres and developed hospitality and services 
sectors all led to a return on investment, eventually creating a good return on any 
initial outlay.663  
 However, an emphasis on physical infrastructure must always be balanced by 
investment in both structural reform and investment in human capital development. 
Small state theory argues that development depends greatly on the extent to which the 
nation in question is able to secure an indigenous base for research and development.   																																																								
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 This is difficult to achieve. Building up Qatar’s research capacity and 
knowledge-economy requires a continued focus on human capital development in key 
areas – including education, health, financial services, technology – that can help 
achieve economic diversification, improve competitiveness, increase productivity, 
attract further foreign direct investment (FDI) and ultimately results in a more 
prosperous and stable society.  
 For example, a foreign company is not going to invest in a country just because 
it has a good physical infrastructure with plenty of modern, well-designed office 
buildings. It also wants to be sure that its money is safe and unchallenged by 
corruption, that political instability is not going to threaten its investment, and that 
there is a talented pool of skilled labour to draw upon. This requires sustained and 
innovative approaches to education. 
Ireland despite its failure to develop and initiate a strategic investment plan 
prior to 2008 has nonetheless excelled in the above in exactly the same period (1995-
2010) that is the focus of this dissertation. The Irish success in attracting foreign 
direct investment during this decade and a half came about because of a willingness to 
harness an educated, English-speaking workforce to a number of progressive 
economic policies—most notably low tax rates, flexible business practices, and a 
strategic goal ‘to promote a competitive enterprise environment’ that fostered 
enterprise development and met ‘the emerging challenges and opportunities of an 
increasingly knowledge-based economy’, as the Irish government described it in the 
early 2000s.  
Ireland also excelled in establishing flexible business practices by reducing 
red tape across the economy. The Irish government, with the support of trade unions 
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and employers, also made the promotion of a competitive enterprise environment an 
overriding priority of its economic strategy.  
A 2003 Johns Hopkins University study explained the extraordinary fact that 
US investment in Ireland in that year was more than two and half times greater than 
investment in China due to the former’s more liberal investor friendly policies.  While 
a June 2004 report by the European Equity and Venture Capital Association rated 
Ireland (along with the UK and Luxembourg) as the most attractive EU economies for 
investment because of its low tax burden and its flexible business practices.    
In 2007, one the eve of the global financial crisis, Qatar recorded the fasted 
growth in FDI in the MENA region of US$1.1 billion, seven times larger than in 
2006.664 Qatar was also one of only three Middle Eastern countries (the other two 
were Kuwait and Lebanon), which did not see a decline in FDI during the tightening 
of the international credit markets during the global financial crisis.665  
 In order the attract FDI Qatar, in line with its approach in numerous other areas, 
also looked to implement innovative policies.  To give just one example, Finance 
Minister Kamal acknowledged that Qatar considered on a number of occasions of 
following the Irish corporate tax model by reducing corporation tax from 35 percent 
to 12.5 percent for foreign companies operating in the non-hydrocarbon sector.  This 
eventually came into effect on 1 January 2010.666   
 As this thesis has shown, Qatar achieved much success between 1995 and 2010 
in building up its education sector. In terms of the quality of primary education Qatar 
led the way in the Arab world for much of this period followed by Lebanon and 
Tunisia and was not far behind Finland, the best global performer in education 
provision. In terms of the quality of secondary level education Qatar only achieved a 																																																								
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665 Babu Das Augustine, ‘Investments in the region set to grow’, Gulf News, 23 July 2010. 
666 Qatar: 2009 Article IV Consultation-IMF Country Report No. 10/41, February 2010. 
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score that amounts to approximately 80 percent of the Finnish level but was still the 
best performer in the Arab world.  
 However, it should also be noted that Qatari students had some poor 
international test results, with no students scoring at advanced international level at 
mathematics, while it had one of the lowest international scores at 4th grade level and 
in 2007 scored among the lowest of 48 countries that took the TIMSS, an 
international test of math and science skill for 8th graders.667 
 In these terms Qatar still faces significant challenges in putting in place strong 
educational foundations.  Firstly, despite rapid and significant improvements in the 
quality of education, there remains a tendency in Qatar, as is the case across the GCC, 
to adopt rigid educational curricula that do not necessarily reflect changing 
technology or produce graduates with the skills needed to develop cutting edge 
business sectors.668  
 A recent study into entrepreneurs and business owners in UAE showed that 
higher education correlated with the likelihood of starting up a business. Qatar should 
draw on this research and provide students with the skills to set up their own 
businesses as an alternative to becoming employees. Practical skills such as basic 
accountancy, business law, basic economics and advertising could be further 
prioritized in the curricula.  
 This way the growing number of Qatari graduates in science, macroeconomics, 
engineering and medicine, for whom business skills should form an important part of 
their degree, will be able to re-invest their knowledge in entrepreneurial ways in their 
home country, ensuring that there are a number of highly skilled local candidates 																																																								
667 Raja Kamal, ‘Harrods, or just a horrid investment’, Daily Star (Beirut), 25 June 2010. 
668 Nabith Maroun, Hatem Samman, Chadi N. Moujaes and Rabih Abouchakra, ‘How to Succeed at 
Education Reform: The Case for Saudi Arabia and the Broader GCC Region’, Booz Allen Hamilton, 
2008, p.7  
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available for jobs.  
 There is also a need to increase the number of indigenous teachers especially 
employed in third level institutions in order to move away from the continued 
overreliance on expatriate teachers, whilst ensuring that tertiary education can 
continue to attract high-quality foreign teachers until this goal is accomplished.669   
 An even more pressing issue that needs to be dealt with is attracting more men 
into higher education and translating the impressive levels of female participation in 
higher education (women make up 70 percent of the student body at Qatar University) 
into workforce participation.  
 As noted above, Qatar needs to continue to invest heavily in education and 
training, which are vital to the strategic national objective of Qatarization and the 
successful participation in the global economy. Countries with similar GDP per capita 
levels invest on average twice as much in their students, which means that Qataris 
will join the labour market with less preparation than their counterparts from other 
countries. 
 This is a key challenge facing Qatar as it endeavours to develop the labour 
market and it is vital that it looks to formulate policies and reforms that will help 
develop a domestic workforce with the skills and incentives needed to work in the 
economy‘s most important and competitive positions.  
 As noted in relation to Ireland above, and something that is also evident in other 
successful small states like Israel and Singapore, is the fact that a strong education 
base is a key requirement for developing a globally competitive and sustainable 
economy that can attract significant amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).670    
 In particular, the Israeli case also highlights that on top of a strong educational 																																																								
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offering, long-term economic success requires building an investment and research 
environment that leads to cutting-edge technological innovation  and world-beating 
entrepreneurship. 
 In proportion to its population, Israel has the largest number of start-ups in the 
world. In absolute terms, its 3,500 start-ups as of 2006, mostly in high tech, were 
second only to the U.S.  Israel’s success in building these cutting-edge companies 
from scratch can be traced back to the 1970s. It was driven by the economic realities 
of a tiny domestic market and regional isolation, as well as the strategic necessity of 
making long-term, risky investments in military technology in the face of relentless 
conflicts and arms embargoes. 
 By the time of the global high-tech boom in the 1990s, Israel – boosted by an 
influx of educated Russian Jews following the fall of the Soviet Union – had more 
scientists and technology workers per capita than any other country in the world. It 
also had an impressive track record of investment in education and a highly computer-
literate high school population and the world’s most advanced technology incubation 
programme.   
The almost continuous economic growth in the period between 1995 and 2010 
(which according to IMF figures reached 16% in 2010671) meant that there was high 
demand for skilled labour to a level far exceeding the supply available among Qataris.  
The resulting chronic shortages in the labour market created a unique and challenging 
situation for the Qatari government, as it attempted to diversify its economy away 
from the hydrocarbon sector.  
As of 2010-11 Qatari citizens accounted for just 25 percent total (425,563) of 
the total population (of 1,696,563). The remaining 75 percent of the population 																																																								
671 IMF, Qatar: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 11/64, March 9, 
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(1,271000), was made up of expatriates, many of whom had lived in the country for a 
long time.  More than 1 million were migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Philippines, who worked in construction (over 500,000) or in the service 
industries.672  
Indeed, one recent major challenge has been the global attention on the poor 
welfare, living and working conditions of migrant labourers working in Qatar in 
preparation for World Cup 2022.  This has included allegations that hundreds of 
Indian and Nepalese workers, who make up some of the largest groups of migrant 
workers in Qatar, have died since 2010.  
Following a visit to Qatar in late 2013, Amnesty International’s Secretary 
General was adamant that the Qatari government ‘must step in now and end this 
crisis’. Amnesty, along with Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been one of the major 
groups that have been championing this cause along with the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) and Britain’s Guardian newspaper. 
Between 1995 and 2010, Qatar did pursue a vigorous programme of 
“Qatarization” under which all joint venture industries and government departments 
strived to move Qatari nationals into positions of greater authority.  As was the case 
in other small states experiencing economic growth (Ireland in the early 2000s for 
example), growing numbers of foreign-educated Qataris returned home in these years 
to assume positions formerly occupied by expatriates. In order to control the influx of 
expatriate workers, Qatar also tightened its migrant labour polices.673 
																																																								
672 ‘Qatar Country Summary’, Human Rights Watch, January 2012, p.1. Law 14 of 2004, governing 
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The policy of Qatarization is ambitious and challenging but as other small 
states have shown, notably Singapore, it is vital to move nationals into positions of 
responsibility and to streamline Qatar’s bureaucracy and make it more efficient and 
responsive to people’s needs.  It is also necessary as part of the government’s strategic 
policy of diversification and labour nationalization and in terms of the need to create 
employment opportunities for Qatari nationals in general in the private sector as a 
way of reducing citizen dependency on state sector employment.  
 In order to achieve this, the Qatari government needs to further highlight the 
benefits of a career in the private sector.  By 2010, the private sector continued to 
represent a small portion of the economy. It was estimated that between 92 and 96 
percent of Qataris who made up one in eight of the overall total labour force in the 
country, worked in either the public or semi-state (public-private cross-over sectors), 
while only 4 percent worked in the private sector.   
 This latter figure was down from 10 percent in 1986, as the state’s on-going 
provision of generous public sector employment militates against Qataris having the 
incentives to acquire valuable skills and to work in the private sector.674 For example, 
a decade into the Emir’s rule in 2005, the average monthly wage for employees in the 
private sector was QR3558 ($975) compared to QR9139 ($2,504) in the public sector, 
and QR11152 ($3,055) in the mixed public-private sector. Though this has been 
addressed more recently as the government has looked to provide generous incentives 
for its citizens committed to entering the private sector Qataris still prefer public 
sector jobs based on the view that it is more prestigious and because of the highly 
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desirable benefits, early retirement and high pensions.675  
 Fully aware of this, the Qatar National Vision 2030, published by the General 
Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP) in July 2008, made one of its key 
objectives ensuring that ‘public and private sectors move ahead in step, pursuing their 
goals together’, as senior GSDP official explained.  
This requires Qatar to continue on the path of developing the physical and 
infrastructural development of the country as prioritized between 1995 and 2010 with 
the proper support for human capital development primarily through education and 
investment in new technologies.676  
Most importantly, investing in human capital development in all its aspects is 
crucial to building a diversified and sustainable economy that has a balance between 
the private and public sector, because, as the recent global economic crisis underlined, 
in times of downturn bloated and relatively un-productive public services are a drain 
on resources and limit the capacity to tackle structural economic change.   
Vital to this is what an influential 2009 report described as ‘the set of factors 
that develop human capability and permit the easy and efficient growth of business 
activity’.  These cover political, legal or socio-economic factors including the degree 
of political stability and the strength of the institutional framework, the rule of law, 
tax policies, and intellectual and physical property rights protection, research and 
development capabilities, business processes, and employee training and education.677 
 In the Qatari context this has required, and requires, addressing the issue of 
trade liberalization, regulatory reform and the privatization of state-owned Qatari 
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enterprises such as the financial services sector and the utilities, the promotion of 
private sector development, as well as increasing transparency, predictability in 
national economic policies, laws, regulations and administrative practices affecting 
domestic and foreign investment.  
 Qatar will need to continue the privatisation programme for its dominant public 
sector entities. It will be quite a challenge for the government to relinquish control 
and interest over state enterprises to full private ownership given the size and the 
diverse activities of these entities. Full privatization is also challenging to the 
management of these enterprises, creating additional pressure on the issue of 
accountability and transparency and the creation of an effective corporate governance 
framework. 
Qatar has looked to develop the rule of law, a strong and transparent 
institutional framework and the integrity of intellectual property rights. The IMF now 
classifies Qatar as “fairly good” in meeting transparency requirements and the IMF’s 
Article IV reviews of Qatar have been consistently positive about the country’s 
economic management. Nevertheless, in order to build on this going forward requires 
improving and developing administrative reform, including governance and rule of 
law, and transparency and accountability in public administration.678 
The global economic crisis also underscored the danger of relying on a single 
source of income. The overreliance, for example, of Dubai and Ireland on a property 
boom and the subsequent near financial collapse of both economies, highlighted very 
clearly how the failure to diversify can create serious political and economic 
problems.679  
 The Qatar National Vision 2030 also set out economic diversification as one of 																																																								
678 World Economic Forum, The Arab World Competitiveness Review, 2010.  
679 Larry Elliot and Heather Stewart, ‘Fears of a Double Dip Recession Grow as Dubai Crashes’, The 
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its ‘Four Pillars’. It defined economic diversification as ‘The development of a 
competitive and diversified economy capable of meeting the needs of, and securing a 
high standard of living for, all [Qatar’s] people for the present and for the future’. 
As noted in chapter 4, for most of the period between 1995 and 2010 Qatar 
followed a gradual and cautious approach towards its diversification and 
sustainability strategy and one directly linked to oil and gas wealth. For example, the 
moratorium on new Gas projects in Qatar’s massive North Field, implemented to 
allow operators to find ways of sustaining high levels of output over the longer term, 
was initially scheduled to end in 2008, but has been continued until at least 2015. 
To facilitate sustainability, the government established the Sustainability 
Development Industry (SDI) initiative, a pledge by companies to improve their 
environmental record, as well as their corporate governance, social progress and 
human development efforts.  
Qatar’s General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP), which 
oversaw the publication of the Qatar 2030 Vision, also plays an important role in 
consulting, engaging and influencing policymakers on the role of sustainable 
development in national policy. As Saleh bin Mohammed Al-Nabit, Secretary-
General of the GSDP has stated ‘Sustainable development is crucial to Qatar’s 
National Vision 2030’.680   
As part of its goal to achieve suitable economic diversification, the National 
Vision recognised that ‘A diversified economy that gradually reduces its dependence 
on hydrocarbon industries enhances the role of the private sector and maintains its 
competitiveness’.681  This is not notification of an intention by Qatar to abandon its 
hydrocarbon sector.  Its contracts to supply natural gas to Japan, India, South Korea 																																																								
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681 See Qatar National Vision 2030 Report, Doha, General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008. 
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and some European countries in the years before 2010 were primarily long-term 
contracts, often extending to 25 years in duration, and they have many years to run. 
Moreover, as a senior official in Qatar Shell acknowledged in 2010, the energy 
industry was confident that Qatar would be a key player in the global energy sector 
for the foreseeable future due to its LNG and pipeline gas exports. 682  
 Acknowledging this, Qatargas, the world’s largest LNG producer, has 
repeatedly promised that it will nonetheless maintain its commitment to Qatar’s 
Sustainability Development Industry (SDI) initiative.  
 It is also true that in the years immediately preceding 2010, Qatar began to 
adopt a more aggressive approach to diversification out of hydrocarbons and set out 
ambitious goals for coming decades.683   As Abdul Mastafawi, the head of HSBC 
Qatar has put it, ‘The philosophy has changed…This time they want to invest in 
downstream industry: fertilisers, plastics, and refined energies like gas to liquid clean 
diesel’. 684    
 Having established the Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) in the mid-
1970s, Qatar gradually established itself in the global petrochemicals sector with 
capabilities to produce ethylene, polyethylene and capacity build up in different types 
of petrochemical products such as polyethylene, polypropylene, styrene, polystyrene, 
aromatics and vinyl products. By the end of 2010 it had set a target to achieve annual 
petrochemical production of 18mn tonnes by 2015-16. In order to achieve this the 
government is investing billions of dollars in new petrochemical ventures through 																																																								
682In April 2007 the world’s largest exporters of natural gas planned to establish a high level group on 
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QAPCO, QP and their affiliates.685    
 In the gas-to-liquids portfolio, Qatar is also establishing itself quickly as one of 
the world’s largest producer. This growing reputation is being driven by the 
construction of Pearl GTL, the world’s largest gas-to-liquids project at Ras Laffan, 
already home to the world’s largest single site producer of gas-to-liquids – Oryx GTL. 
Qatar is also investing in aluminum and fertilizer factories as part of its diversification 
strategy.  
However, there was still much work to be done on this by the end of the time 
period covered in this thesis.  According to the IMF, in 2010 hydrocarbon sector 
growth was estimated at 29.5 percent for 2011, while non-hydrocarbon growth was 
estimated at 9.5 percent.686  Connected directly to both this ongoing, and inevitably 
long-term dominance of the hydrocarbon sector, and the country’s evolving 
commitment to sustainable development has been Qatar’s development of a “Green” 
Economy.  
Qatari hydrocarbon facilities are making notable progress in achieving 
measurable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and investments in new 
technologies also offer the potential to open up another high-value revenue stream as 
demand for such technology grows globally. Indeed, one unique selling point of its 
World Cup bid in 2010 was the ‘Green’ nature of the Qatari World Cup in terms of 
the carbon footprint that would be left after the event and the emphasis on 
sustainability at every stage of the project.  
Another notable example of this innovation in the Green economy is a project 
launched in 2008 to transform the area surrounding Doha North Sewage Treatment 
Works into an eco-park, the first of its kind to adopt ideas of sustainable development, 																																																								
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while the treated water from the Doha North facility will irrigate the eco-park to 
provide a green space for the enjoyment of the local community.687  
While the QIA has also agreed to be a lead partner in a plan that has led to the 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) – with 
a mandate to develop a new model of economic development by linking economic 
performance to sustainability.  The QIA has also invested extensively in Green 
projects overseas joining, for example, a Singapore-led consortium building the 
Tianjin Eco-city in China. 
Qatar has also been a moving force behind the establishment of the Global 
Dry Land Alliance (GDLA) a partnership between arid and semi-arid countries facing 
the threat of food and water insecurity.  In the period under examination in this thesis 
(1995-2010) Qatar’s population grew by almost 200% to about 1.7 million. As noted 
previously, in 2008, the government established the Qatar National Food Security 
Programme (QNFSP). 
By 2010, though Qatar imported 90 percent of its food and the country faced 
ongoing population growth, QNFSP officials estimated that country would continue 
to be able to meet its target of becoming self-sufficient for about 70 percent of its 
food requirements by 2023. Speaking in an interview with the Qatar News Agency 
one official explained that this would be achieved by using the latest technology to 
cultivate dry land.    
QNFSP has set out a five-stage plan to increase agricultural self-sufficiency 
through creating four new economic sectors.  This includes building an agriculture 
productivity sector that looks to maximize the cultivating sufficiency of a specific 
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piece of land; managing and desalinizing seawater; and building a sustainable energy 
and food manufacturing industry.688   
One aspect of these plans that once more highlights the willingness of Qatar to 
break with conventional strategies is that the Qatari programme looks to achieve 
partial self-sufficiency through using high-technology to develop domestic agriculture 
at a time that other Gulf countries are conserving water by shutting down domestic 
cultivation.  
These ambitious plans and targets highlight the fact that Qatar views food 
security as a matter as a national strategic priority especially after the global food 
crisis of 2008 that saw countries like Russia, India and Argentina impose export 
restrictions on various food goods.   
A key part of Qatar’s strategy of developing its non-energy sectors by using its 
energy wealth has been the development of the financial sector.  By the end of 2010, 
according to the Arab Competiveness Review, Qatar scored lower in this sector than 
in other areas in terms of trustworthiness and confidence among the business 
community (62nd); soundness of banks (46th;) and the legal rights of borrowers and 
lenders (103rd). 689   
 As the World Bank itself has shown in its own research ‘financial openness is 
not a panacea’.  Nor is there any evidence that financially open economies grow faster 
or have higher investment rates than other kinds of economies.  It is also true that by 
opening up financially countries expose themselves to greater volatility due to the 
vagaries of international financial markets.   
 Although, as chapter 4 noted, Qatar was in a position to limit the impact of the 
global financial crisis on its banking system and to provide much-needed financial 																																																								
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assistance to a number of national banks, events from 2008 onwards highlighted that 
the country’s financial sector was far from immune to global events.690  
 In particular, the construction boom that had commenced in the early 2000s was 
put under severe pressure, which in turn threatened the banking sector, in particular, 
the part government-owned top six banks in the country. This led to a government 
decision to recapitalise public sector banks by 10-20 percent, which prevented a crisis 
situation but did impact on the credit rating of the affected banks, with Moody’s for 
example, downgrading the entire Qatari banking industry in 2009.691   
 On the other hand, financial openness does provide a valuable means for small 
states, like Qatar, to diversify some of the large risks they face and this is arguably the 
most important consideration for contemporary Qatar in thinking about the future 
direction of its financial sector.692  
 Abdul Aziz Al-Ghorairi in his illuminating and highly important research on the 
Qatari financial sector has shown that the development of the Qatari economy and 
other Arab Gulf states, in no small measure challenges the argument put forward 
extensively in the literature of financial sector development that the sector is the 
engine of growth and development in a modern society.   
 The engine of growth in these states, including Qatar, Al-Ghorairi has shown 
has been the massive hydrocarbon revenues that have enabled it to become the key 
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economic player in the state.693 
This explains why Qatar’s financial system was a late developer even 
compared with others in the GCC, notably those in Dubai, Bahrain or Kuwait.  The 
Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) was established only in 2005 as a driver towards 
economic diversification and to spur financial sector development.694 In particular it 
was at the centre of the drive to attract global financial firms into Qatar and the wider 
region.695 The QFC allows for 100 percent ownership by foreign companies and 
provides a base that allows top financial firms to invest in and nurture local emerging 
businesses and upcoming entrepreneurs as well as participate in flagship development 
projects.   
 From its launch the government of Qatar promoted QFC as part of its strategy to 
increase the role of the financial sector as a main contributor to its strategy of 
economic diversification. In part this has been about developing a world-class 
infrastructure for international financial firms to establish regional hubs in Qatar.  
 However, the government has also made clear that QFC was created to ‘support 
the development of Qatar and the wider region, develop local and regional markets, 
and strengthen the links between the energy-based economies and global financial 
markets’. As such, QFC is earmarked to be heavily involved in enhancing the 
competitiveness of the sector by attracting foreign capital, promoting transparency, 
improving regulation of the sector and promoting the Qatar brand.  
By the end of 2007, the QFC had attracted and licensed a large number of 																																																								
693 Abdul Aziz Al-Ghorairi, The Development of the Financial Sector of Qatar and its Contribution to 
Economic Diversification, Doctoral thesis, Durham University, 2010. 
694 The Qatar Central Bank openly encourages competition and has carried out a number of reforms in 
recent years to facilitate entry of private and foreign players into the industry. 
695 Aware of these challenges and constraints, the government made the decision in 2005 to create the 
QFC, as part of its effort to modernise and enhance the capacity and competitiveness of the financial 
sector as an essential element of its diversification strategy. The QFC has been instituted as an onshore 
finance free-zone where international financial institutions can set up 100 percent owned businesses 
and transact with Qatari as well as off-shore entities. This model has been created imitating similar 
entities created by Dubai and Bahrain. 
	 249	
firms from around the world representing the world‘s leading banks, insurers, 
investment houses, asset managers, legal firms, accountants, auditors and 
consultancies.  By 2009 Standard & Poor rated the QFC as ‘successful in terms of its 
own strategic goals’.696  
As of the end of 2010, the date when this thesis ends, 128 firms were 
registered and ran offices at the QFC, including Goldman Sachs, Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Credit Suisse and JP Morgan.697 Notably, in terms of the above discussion 
on the links between training, diversification and education, QFC plans to play a 
major role training and developing local talent to work in financial services. 
This strategy that focuses on creating an environment for international players 
to engage in the region through Qatar is an acknowledgment of the limitations of the 
domestic financial market. However, between 1995 and 2010 policymakers also 
attempted to address this key area. 
The Qatari government looked to become more proactive in promoting 
economic diversity by increasing greatly the number of grants and loans to small 
businesses and businessmen, and by helping entrepreneurs to create prosperity and 
wealth by providing easily accessible credit for investment.698  This is important, as 
making credit available to the entrepreneurial class, as well as traditional small 
business owners and women, is essential.699  
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 In Qatar, the banks have also looked to develop the flow of credit in the last 
decade. For example, funds earmarked for domestic investment by Qatari banks 
between 2004 and 2008 increased by 150 percent. They also expanded credit to 
private businesses and helped non-oil and gas businesses to emerge and grow through 
easy credit. Total credit expanded about 393 percent between 2003 and 2008. While 
credit to the public sector increased by 138 percent during this period, credit to the 
private sector saw a greater growth rate of 662 percent. This six-fold increase in credit 
to the private sector within a five-year period saw the percentage share of private 
sector credit in total credit increase from 54 percent to 77 percent.  
 This massive expansion in credit to the private sector during the period between 
2000 and 2010 was one of the most important functions that the banks in Qatar have 
played in recent times because it highlights the increased role of banks in supporting 
private activities as part of the implementation of the diversification policy. 
 However, due to dependence on the energy sector throughout this decade and a 
half (in 2008, due to record oil prices, hydrocarbon GDP accounted for 61.69 percent 
of the total GDP), the financial sector’s role in the economy, and with it banking 
lending activities focused on trade finance, consumer loans, real estate and the stock 
market. 
Qatar’s stock market was originally known as the Doha Securities Market 
(DSM) but subsequently changed its name to the Qatar Exchange.  To start it was 
very small both in comparison with other emerging markets and in absolute terms. It 
grew quickly but this was followed by a sharp downturn in 2006 that wiped out 
previous gains. 
However, subsequently, the Qatari government agreed to the sale of a 20 
percent stake for US$200m to NYSE Euronext, operator of the New York Stock 
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Exchange and the Paris Bourse among others. This enabled it to gain access to trading 
technology needed to launch new products largely unavailable on the markets of 
regional competitors. This led, in time, to Qatar Exchange growing significantly. By 
2010, it was, placed third regionally in terms of capitalisation and fifth in terms of the 
value of traded stock.700 
 The government also instituted the Qatar Development Bank (QDB), a 
specialist developmental bank with the sole objective of providing credit to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. This is an area whose development will be significant 
going forward in terms of income, employment and growth generation, and which 
constitutes part of the diversification effort of the government.   
 Up until the establishment of the QDB, the Qatar Industrial Development Bank 
(QIDB) was the only specialized bank operating in Qatar in support of the industrial 
sector. In line with the new leadership’s attempt to address the challenge of 
privatisation and diversification, the Bank was accorded formal approval under Emiri 
Decree No. 14, 1997, to commence operations in the same year.  
 A decade later, in 2007 the scope of the bank’s activities was widened to 
include a range of sectors: industry, tourism, education, healthcare, agriculture, 
animal resources and fisheries and the Qatari government, the full owner of the bank, 
injected additional capital of QAR 10 billion to pursue this programme.  
 As highlighted above, meaningful diversification and sustainability involves 
developing a financial market that can respond to local and regional needs and 
opportunities. But it is also true that the financial market plays a key role in 
privatization. As this thesis has shown, this was an important aspect of the Qatari plan 
for diversification and sustainability in the period between 1995 and 2010.  																																																								
700 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘Qatar fashions financial oasis to go toe-to-toe with East and West’, 
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Since 2001, the government of Qatar focused on increasing private sector 
participation and gradually over the ensuing decade either fully or partially privatized 
key institutions. Notably it transferred the responsibility of the state-owned electricity 
and water corporations to an independent authority; it partially privatized Industries 
Qatar and Qatar Gas; and privatized telecommunications and the Qatar Fuel Company. 
 In these terms, the government plans to spend over US$130 billion between 
2010 and 2020 in the areas of health, social welfare, education and transport in the 
hope that this would lead to further capital flows from the local private sector as well 
as from abroad.  
 Qatar has also looked to strategically position itself as a safe haven for foreign 
investors and is ranked number one in the Middle East in terms of business 
confidence. As of 2010 the Wisdom Tree Middle East Dividend Index, a weighted 
index that measures the performance of companies in the Middle East region that pay 
regular cash dividends, lists Qatari based businesses as four of the top 10 holdings—
Industries of Qatar (8.7 percent), Qatar National Bank (5.5 percent), Qatar Telecom 
(4.9 percent), and the Commercial Bank of Qatar (3.3 percent). 701  
 Likewise, the Dow Jones GCC Titans 40 Index, is a benchmark that measures 
the performance of publicly traded companies based in countries belonging to the 
Gulf Cooperation Council or that generate the majority of their revenues in these 
countries. According to this benchmark the Qatar National Bank (7.2 percent) and 
Qatar Telecom (3.5 percent) make an appearance in the top 10 holdings of this fund, 
																																																								
701 Though accounting for about half the country’s total bank deposits, the partly state-owned Qatar 
National Bank, looked to openly encourage competition and has carried out a number of reforms in 
recent years to facilitate entry of private and foreign players into the industry.  See Ali F. Darrat and 
Saif S. Al-Sowaidi, ‘Information technology, financial deepening and economic growth: Some 
evidence from a fast growing emerging economy’, Journal of Economics and International Finance, 
Vol. 2, No.2 (February 2010), pp.28-35. 
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and in total Qatar accounts for about 22 percent of assets.702  
Nonetheless, given that investors are more inclined to be attracted to proven 
sectors of the economy foreign investment in Qatar has remained confined primarily 
to the hydrocarbon sector and there has been much less foreign investment in other 
sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, aware that external investors want fast returns compared to internal 
investors (including state agencies) who are making longer-term investments and who 
are more concerned with the local drive towards innovation and entrepreneurship, 
Qatar has also looked to attract foreign companies that add value to the country’s 
development strategy across a number of economic areas.  
This final chapter has examined the ways that Qatar’s leaders attempted to 
achieve sustainable growth in the period between 1995 and 2010 and has also 
examined how this can be further developed in the future.  It is the contention of this 
analysis that a vital part of this will require the country’s leadership continually look 
to reassess exactly what it wants society to look like in the decades to come and to be 
clear and open about the values on which a national development strategy is built.   
In particular, where relevant, the country’s future leaders should adopt the 
‘best practice’ of other small states in the international system as the Qatari economy, 
despite its impressive achievements since the mid-1990s, is still in the development 
phase and it is a truism of history that rapid development can also be accompanied by 
ugly side effects that are best avoided by looking at the mistakes of others.   
Qatar’s leaders should also continue to ensure that the country’s wealth is not 
is maximised through continuing an innovative and sustainable economic 
diversification programme. Finally, they should continue to invest resources in 
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building up their economic power in key areas, which can also help to diversify 
growth and improve competitiveness, notably in education, health, financial services, 
technology.    
As the recent turmoil in the Arab world has highlighted, it is vital to address 
these issues as a priority as economic and social disparity is one of the biggest drivers 
of social unrest and focusing on this is a way of attacking the causes rather than the 








In 1987 a western diplomat with many years service in the Gulf region noted that 
‘Qatar has always kept a very low profile. They have always been quiet’.703 A quarter 
of a century later it would have been impossible to find a diplomat in the region, or 
anywhere else in the world, holding the same opinion.  
As this thesis has shown, between 1995 and 2010 the political leadership of 
Qatar was extremely ambitious about putting Qatar on the world map. In the process 
Qatar developed into, and consolidated its place internationally as, ‘the little state that 
could’704 and the ‘Arab El Dorado’.705  
At the most basic level the Qatari objective in doing this was the same as it 
has been and is for every country when they decide to act either domestically or 
externally – to achieve stability and prosperity at home and to win of friends and 
influence abroad.  On balance, this was certainly achieved in the period under 
examination in this thesis. Writing in his recent book, The End of Power, published in 
2013,vthe leading international affairs analyst Moises Naim described Qatar as ‘one 
of the best examples of smaller countries that have used coalitions of the willing, 
economic diplomacy (i.e. a lot of money), and soft power to advance their 
interests’.706 
Certainly, in the period under analysis in this thesis, Qatar played a ‘unique 
diplomatic role in the Middle East as peace broker and regional moderator’.707 As 
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704 Steven A. Cook, ‘A Country with No Politics’, The Weekly Standard, 22 November 2004. 
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previous chapters have highlighted, this was the fruit of the Qatari leadership’s efforts 
between 1995 and 2010 at building a myriad of alliances and contacts and 
championing pro-active, unconventional and, at times, seemingly contradictory, 
policies abroad that have challenged Robert Keohane’s assumptions on the limits, in 
terms of impact, of the small state ‘on the [international] system’.  
In a small state, where the leader aided by his closest advisors controls the 
decision-making process, foreign policy will always be an expression of the 
aspirations of the ruler. During the 1980s, under the current Emir’s predecessor, 
Qatar’s conservative approach to foreign affairs was widely held to be a reflection of 
the conservative nature of the then Emir.  
Similarly, the country’s external engagement between 1995 and 2010 can be 
viewed as a function of the vision and ambition of the Emir of that period.  Indeed, in 
that decade and a half Qatar’s international engagement was highly personalized, 
centered on the Emir and his prime minister and foreign minister.   
This thesis has acknowledged the centrality of the current Emir (and his 
foreign minister) in developing Qatar’s contemporary involvement in international 
affairs.708 In these terms, the announcement of his abdication on 24 June 2013 in 
favour of his 33-year-old son, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani 
followed by the new Emir’s decision to remove Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber 
bin Muhammad Al Thani from his post as prime minister and foreign minister, means 
that Qatar’s future foreign policy direction is unclear.  Though the new Emir has 
publicly expressed a commitment to follow in his predecessor’s path following the 																																																																																																																																																														
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2011), pp.113-
128, p.113.	
708 There is a wide-ranging literature on the role of personality in foreign policy decision making. See 
for example, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, 
Little, Brown, 1971; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy 
Decision and Fiascos, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1972; Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice Hall, 1982. 
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virtually unprecedented and brilliantly stage-managed leadership transition it is 
inevitable that a new leader will bring new priorities and directions to key foreign 
policy issues. 709 
To a certain extent this change of leadership does not matter because a 
country’s foreign policy will always be influenced significantly by the external 
environment that a leader has to deal with while in power. In these terms, Qatar’s 
future international role will depend on a set of regional and global circumstances that 
are currently only evolving. 
In the 1980s, the bi-polar realities of the Cold War still dominated 
international affairs, especially in the energy rich and strategically invaluable Gulf 
region.  This was compounded by the fact that Qatar had to deal with upheaval in 
neighbouring Iran, following the overthrow of a pro-Western Shah by Islamic 
revolutionaries in 1979.  
This was followed soon after by an eight-year war between Iran and Iraq that 
required delicate diplomacy in order to shield Doha from the anger and potential 
revenge of much larger and more powerful neighbours. As a Qatari government 
official explained in 1987, ‘after the war ends we don’t want to have an enemy’. 710 
This overriding, and understandable, preoccupation was very apparent in the later 
period of the Iran-Iraq war, when Qatar was more reluctant to support the 
involvement of western navies in Gulf waters than a number of its partners in the 
GCC including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. 
By the time that this thesis ends, in 2010, following the success in winning the 
World Cup there was a whole new set of domestic, regional and extra-regional factors 																																																								
709 Marc Lynch, ‘Mysteries of the Emir: What do we really know about the transfer of power in Qatar 
and the plans of the country's young, new leader?’, Foreign Policy, 27 June 2013. 
710 Warren Richley, ‘Iran loses ground in efforts to woo small Arab Gulf States’, Christian Science 
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that influenced Qatar’s approach to foreign policy making in the near abroad as well 
as further afield.  
The first related to the economic realities of recent years compared to the 
1980s. Qatar was a relatively rich, if underdeveloped, small state in the 1980s. Since 
then, as chapter 4 charted, the country has evolved into an energy power of the first 
order, as well as a leading international financial, business and cultural centre.  
Qatar’s rapid development in all these areas coincided with the rapid process 
of globalization across the world. For better of for worse, this has fundamentally 
changed the way that countries engage externally in all domains. This is especially 
true of a country like Qatar that is fully integrated into the global economy and whose 
citizens and large resident expatriate population are both extremely outward looking 
and engaged with events in the outside world.711   
As one commentator pointed out in 2010, leaving aside the English and Arabic 
versions of the Al-Jazeera network (examined in chapter 6), Qatar’s two English 
language newspapers—The Peninsula and Gulf News—each carry as much 
international news content as global news outlets such as The Financial Times and the 
International Herald Tribune.712  
This interconnectedness has also expressed itself by way of a broad consensus 
that in an interconnected world, national and regional security and stability are pre-
requisites for order in the international system and that order in the international 
system is vital for national and regional security. As chapters 3 and 5 have noted, 
momentous events like the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1989-91; the 1991 war to free Kuwait following Iraq’s invasion of the country; the 																																																								
711 The rating agency Standard & Poor’s projects an average annual population growth rate of 6 per 
cent until 2016. As of 2013, foreign nationals made up around 87 per cent of Qatar’s 2 million strong 
population and expatriates represented around 93 of total workforce in the country. 
712 Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘Move over Dubai’, UPI International, 5 March 2010.  
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rise of Al-Qaeda and the organisation’s attacks on the US in 2001; as well as the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, have all profoundly influenced and even 
permanently altered the strategic environment in which Qatar exists and must function.  
But these epoch changing events have all also underlined the fact that regional 
issues (like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) no longer only have regional consequences, 
just as the consequences of far away events, such as the Al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks on the 
United States can be felt far beyond the borders of the country where they occur.  
In a 2010 speech, delivered on the eve of the Arab Spring, the Emir of Qatar 
addressed this unavoidable reality of modern life.  The world, he noted, faced major 
political, environmental and economic instabilities and injustices that threatened to 
overturn all the positive achievements of recent decades.  In order to prevent this from 
taking place the developed world had to work together to plan for the future by 
embracing ‘sound thinking and balanced calculations’. He continued to urge that all 
partners needed to try to answer the vital question – ‘How do we manage these 
challenges?’713  
It is the contention of this thesis that one can only understand Qatar’s 
engagement in international affairs in the contemporary era if one views it as a small 
state attempting to ‘manage these challenges’ as the Emir put it in his 2010 speech. 
This explains why in the years following 9/11 up until 2010 the two main 
pillars of Qatar’s foreign policy were bilateral relations with the United States and 
developing Al-Jazeera into a global player as well as a global brand. This also 
explains Qatar’s willingness to respond quickly and innovatively to regional and 
extra-regional events that on first appearances seem to have little to do with the 
country’s direct interests. Such moves have not only regularly appeared to complicate 
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rather than simplify the challenges that the country faces but have also and regularly 
puzzled, irritated and even angered its neighbours, partners, and allies. 
Chapters 5 addressed this dynamic in the context of Qatari relations with the 
US and Saudi Arabia in the period following the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of 
Iraq. It also examined Qatar’s groundbreaking role in Lebanon, as well as its evolving 
relationship with Israel and the Palestinian factions in terms of this dynamic.  
While chapter 6 examined this in the context of Al-Jazeera’s alienation of the 
US as well as many of Qatar’s Arab partners, in particular Saudi Arabia, for most of 
the last decade, and the Fatah leadership of the PA in the period between 2008 and 
2010. 
Throughout all this it is fair to define the Qatari approach as embodying ‘a 
typically individualistic attitude’.714 This was seen clearly, as chapter 6 has shown, in 
the important role that Al-Jazeera played in influencing the course of the Arab Spring 
in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.  As one contributor to a Japanese newspaper put it, with 
its ‘round the clock workshop of live news, and interviews, switching from one 
revolution to another’ Al-Jazeera was ‘Qatar’s promoter of the Arab Spring’.715 
Despite Al-Jazeera’s role in the Arab Spring post-dating the end of 2010, it 
was important to include it among the issues addressed in chapter 6 of this thesis 
because it served to show how a small state, albeit one with significant financial 
resources, is capable of not only defending its narrow interests but, in contradiction to 
Keohane’s hypothesis, can make ‘a significant impact on the system’. 
Indeed by looking at how Qatar not only used its media power so effectively, 
but drew on is evolving diplomatic experience it is possible to divine a number of 
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principles that underpin Qatar’s foreign policy approach and which contribute to 
Qatar’s capacity to make a ‘significant impact on the system’.  
These include a willingness to break with small state norms by taking 
unnecessary risks; a willingness to defy conventional thinking about the relationship 
between size and power by taking a lead role in major international issues; and a 
willingness to champion policies that anger important regional and external partners. 
Qatar’s foreign policy involvement both up to and especially since 2010 has 
sparked a backlash amongst commentators and even government officials in other 
nations who consider Qatar to have overextended itself diplomatically or worse, and 
to have alienated the very countries that it hoped to serve by involving itself where it 
was not wanted. 
 In particular it has become a common argument that with the Arab Spring Qatar 
stopped playing the role of neutral mediator by siding with those engaged in the fight 
for regime change and in consequence the country has increasingly faced the charge 
of having a foreign policy based on ‘opportunism and promiscuity’.716  
 For many this has been embodied in Qatar’s post Arab Spring determination to 
support branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Gaza, Libya, Syria and 
Tunisia regardless of the impact of such a policy on regional stability and diplomatic 
ties with long-time allies, particularly partners in the GCC. 
Some have argued that all this underscores the fact that Qatar’s ‘moment in 
the sun, however, is likely to be a transient one’ because the country ‘lacks the 
intrinsic qualities’ to be a serious foreign policy player in the decades to come and 
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that it has ‘nothing to offer beyond bottomless coffers’ and will soon be ‘brushed 
aside’ and its ‘influence will be fleeting’. 717 
Having said that, despite the diplomatic setbacks that Qatar has experienced 
since 2010 there remains extensive support for the view that while Qatar’s foreign-
policy activism has over-reached itself on some issues, the country has earned its 
foreign policy spurs in the past decade and a half and can and should continue to play 
a independent role in international affairs going forward.  
As one Russian commentator writing in 2012 noted, ‘The Qatari example 
disproves the old belief that the main indicators of a country's influence are the size of 
its area and population, and the power of its armed forces’.718   In the same period a 
French weekly described the then Emir as ‘a global player, intermediary between east 
and west and the ruler of a “new world power”’.719 
Subsequently, in February 2013, Jane Kinninmont, one of the UK’s most 
informed commentators on the region, was of the view that despite the foreign policy 
challenges and mistakes of recent times ‘this increasingly confident tiny country is 
not yet afraid of over-reaching itself’.720 
Indeed, it is widely forgotten that during the Arab Spring Qatar demonstrated 
a willingness to take risks beyond its borders that is unusual for a small state. It also 
exhibited a tendency, again unusual for a small state, to shoulder significant 
responsibilities and to take the lead on key international issues.  Notably Qatar’s Emir 
was the first Arab leader to join the NATO-led operation in Libya and the first Arab 
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leader to publicly call for military intervention in Syria.  He was also the only GCC 
leader to visit Egypt and meet with Field Marshal Tantawi in his new capacity as de 
facto ruler of Egypt following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime back in May 
2011.  
This is not to ignore the difficulties and limits that Qatar faces as a small state 
playing for big stakes in the international arena. But it is also true that over the last 
decade and a half Qatar has shown that in a rapidly changing global system, small 
states can act in the foreign policy sphere in a less constrained fashion with great 
flexibility and beyond what is generally viewed to be the capacity of small states to 
influence major international issues.   
And while one level the Qatar model is unique to Qatar and has limited 
relevance for other small states, on another level Qatar between 1995 and 2010 served 
as a perfect example of what Henrikson has noted – that a state’s perception of its size 
and with it its influence is very subjective and differs greatly from the perception of 
other external parties.721  
There will be undoubtedly be further major foreign policy challenges ahead 
for the country’s new leadership.  It is likely that Al-Jazeera will be very different 
than the organization that was in existence between 1995 and 2010. During that 
period the news channel was a key aspect of Qatar’s rising global profile and foreign 
policy engagement.   
By 2011, after fifteen ‘controversial’722 years in existence, the news network 
was finally playing the role many had predicted, and many others had feared, for so 
long. It was not simply relaying the news but playing an important role at the centre 
of upheaval and revolution across the Arab world. As then US Secretary of State 																																																								
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Hilary Clinton, for one, acknowledged in mid-2011 Al-Jazeera deserved credit for 
‘changing people’s minds and attitudes…it is really effective…it’s real news’.723  
Arguably, this marked the high point in the channel’s influence and standing. 
In terms of politics, since that time the channel has faced widespread criticism for its 
apparent one-sided support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world. In 
November 2012, for example, the well-known expert Alain Gresh wrote that the news 
channel had ‘lost much of its lustre –and some of its best journalists – as a result, and 
has become a mouthpiece for the Brotherhood’.724 The following January The 
Economist in an article titled “Must Do Better”, condemned the network for its 
‘breathless boosting’ of ‘the Qatar-aligned Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’.  
Since then there has been a proliferation of regional channels building on the 
Al-Jazeera model. Direct 24-hour news networks such Abu Dhabi TV and Al Arabiya 
(a Saudi-funded channel which broadcasts from Dubai) are in direct competition with 
Al-Jazeera and have looked to emulate Al-Jazeera’s formula of field reporting, and 
tough questioning of political figures on live interviews.725  
The Arab spring has also resulted in a more sprawling and vibrant network of 
local and national news, all of which will inevitably supplement Al-Jazeera’s regional 
focus.726 Though in these terms it should be noted that the channel launched Al-
Jazeera Mubasher Misr Egypt Live, a TV channel targeted specifically to the 
Egyptian market only ten days after Mubarak was ousted from power. Nevertheless, 
the channel also has to compete increasingly with the internet, mobile phones, voice 
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over IP (VoIP), chats, social networks, and SMSes as a prime source of information 
for many in the Arab world.727   
Qatar remains one of the world’s fastest growing economies and, as this thesis 
has shown, it is using the spotlight of hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup in 
combination with its vast hydrocarbon revenues both to continue development at 
home and to promote the Qatar brand abroad.  
It cannot be stressed enough that the extent of Qatar’s domestic success over 
the last decade and a half has been based on a willingness to take informed risks. On 
the domestic front (as chapter 4 has shown) this was most apparent in the 1990s 
decision to bet heavily on becoming a leading global gas exporter in the medium term 
despite difficult market conditions and gaps in technology that made this a difficult 
goal to achieve.   
At the time of completion of this thesis Qatar was the fourth largest dry 
natural gas producer after the United States, Russia and Iran and continued its number 
one status as the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), a position it 
has held since 2006. Qatar is also a leading producer of gas-to-liquids (GTL) and 
home to the world’s largest GTL facility.728  
Qatar’s non-hydrocarbon sectors accounted for a solid 58 per cent of GDP in 
2012 and is projected to rise in the run up to the World Cup 2022 on the back of 
investments in infrastructure projects besides initiatives by private sector investors. 
As Windecker and Sendrowicz have noted, though the 2022 World Cup 
should be the crowning achievement of its foreign policy stance it bears the risk of 																																																								
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damaging the country’s image. The precarious situation of migrant workers on the 
construction sites of future venues is casting a shadow on Qatar’s efforts to project a 
positive image of itself to the world.729 
This aside, at home Qatar’s achievements have been notable. As well as 
building up its energy sector it has also looked to develop quickly into a financial, 
cultural and sports hub as evidenced most notably by its successful bid to host the 
2022 World Cup.  Moreover all this was achieved during the worst global economic 
downturn in living memory, a period in which a number of other small states –
including Ireland, Portugal, Iceland and closer to home Dubai –were hit particularly 
hard.  
In this context Qatar is a text book proof of the argument that a small nation 
will usually be able to preserve more of its independence by diversifying its foreign 
trade as well as foreign investment as it weighs the short term costs (both economic, 
social and cultural) of such diversification against the long term gains.  
These benefits include increased productivity and prosperity which, apart from 
bringing in a source of income other than energy-based revenues, will allow states to 
wean their population away from relying upon state handouts. However, as the final 
chapter has showed, for all its success Qatar continues to face significant challenges 
in achieving its domestic objectives for the future, primarily in meeting the goal of 
sustainable socio-economic development in a challenging social and economic 
climate.  
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Qatar also challenges traditional notions about size and capabilities. As this 
thesis has shown, between 1995 and 2010, the country’s policymakers, led by the 
Emir himself, reframed the debate on what is possible and what is necessary for a 
small state in a dangerous region to do in order to facilitate and protect domestic 
progress, to contribute to regional stability and to establish itself as a serious player on 
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